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In his 1952 text Key to Modern Poetry, Lawrence Durrell describes the collective of
human ideas and knowledge to be like a shifting, dynamic universe. He develops
this sense of instability throughout his works, drawing it close to his central themes
by consistently favoring revision over continuity and variation over predictability. I
recognize the construction of such a sense of flux, with constant change superseding
stability, to be crucial in understanding Durrell's major novels, what he has called
his "opus": The Black Book, The Alexandria Quartet, The Revolt ofAphrodite, and The
Avignon Quintet.
My project considers changeability in these major novels in light of the writings
on liminality by Victor Turner. Turner's sense of liminality is one that is fruitful: the
liminal stage of the rite of passage not only problematizes structural categorizations,
but it also offers interface among them. Far from a unidirectional construction, the
liminal stage presents an upheaval and indeterminacy that can work to strengthen or
weaken a sense ofmovement along a linear construction.
I approach Durrell's opus from a number of these linear constructions—each war¬
ranting its own theoretical model—looking first at the relationship of the subject and
object, secondly at that of fiction and reality, thirdly at geographical locales, fourthly
at considerations of time, and finally at the placement of the opus along the con¬
struction of modernist and postmodernist trends. In these works, Durrell hoped to
reinvigorate what he thought to be a dying art; I suggest that liminality in his opus
vivifies by emphasizing the potential for mutual influence in any two elements of tran¬
sition. Ultimately, the liminal in Durrell's writing is offered as a method of extending
categories and categorization, challenging staid expectations by repositioning art to
be always at the edge.
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The third book of Lawrence Durrell's TheAlexandria Quartet opens with the vivid de¬
scription of a fishing expedition at dusk. Mountolive, titular character and British
diplomat in training, sits in darkness, carried by boat across the surface of Alexan¬
dria's Lake Mareotis, a silent presence among others whose voices echo off the water
in a blurring of sensation and form. His Egyptian host positions their boat in an
agglomeration of other boats to form a loose circle and at a signal lights a lamp. At
this, the water below unmeshes itself from inky darkness, becoming viscous with life
as schools of fish coagulate and roll at the surface. At the same time, the sky thickens,
differentiating itself in a mirror image of that watery transformation: edges of black¬
ness sharpen into the talons and beaks of hundreds of unseeing and unseen pelicans,
flamingos, and kingfishers, all moved to hunger by the aquatic activity. As the men
scoop nets of fish into their boats, they struggle to keep back the birds, whose un¬
planned paths often—occasionally fatally—intersect those of the men, the boats, and
each other (Quartet 397—402).
These men in boats represent an intermediate third intruding between two oth¬
erwise stable states: the sea and the sky. A strange kind of surface tension suspends
the men between the aerial and the aquatic, threatening the inhabitants of the two
suddenly overlapping worlds whose structural categories, in the darkness of the night,
merge and collide. In this scene, the infinitely thin surface of the water represents
a margin, a structural differentiation that, normally, is invisible: without the boats,
there is nothing more than sea and sky. And yet, the addition of the third, the men
in boats, those of the not-sea-and-not-sky, displaces by projecting this non-category
upward into the air and downward into the water, penetrating both worlds.
The men in the boats present the liminal, what the anthropologist Victor Turner
calls "an interstructural situation" (Turner, "Betwixt" 93), challenging and defying
categorical identification by temporarily residing between states. Turner's liminal
phase represents a middle ground "betwixt and between" the beginning and end ofany
rite of passage. The men in boats, "transitional beings," by virtue of their inability to
1
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be classified are "polluting": they "are neither one thing nor another; or may be both;
or neither here nor there; or may even be nowhere" (97). The passage of a herring into
the talons of a kingfisher might seem instantaneous: the flash of feather and shine of
fishy scale would bear the only witness to the transition between watery life and airy
death. Likewise, a dead flamingo sinks beneath the waves far too quickly to consider
such a structural change. But Turner writes that this is because the subject of such
a passage is "structurally, if not physically, 'invisible'" (95); from the vantage of the
surface, however, such a transition demands attention. The violence in Mountolives
fishing expedition bespeaks much of the trouble of the structural transition.
The image of surface tension is emblematic to the whole of Durrell's oeuvre; as
such this thesis will focus upon similar issues of liminality and transition in Lawrence
Durrell's later novels. Particularly, it will consider Durrell's favoring ofvariability over
stability, acknowledging and extending the metaphor he uses to describe "the whole
universe of ideas—a universe perpetually shifting, changing its relations and tenses
as verbs do in speech, altering its outlines" (Key xi). In this introduction I will first
present the theoretical impulses ofmy thesis. Secondly, I will distinguish and justify
the scope ofmy considerations, what I mean by Durrell's opus. Finally, I will set out
the expectations of each chapter and explain the structure of the thesis-at-large.
A Pluralistic Universe Perpetually Shifting
While the utilitarian terminology and the coarser texture ofmy theoretical delibera¬
tions are greatly indebted to Victor Turner's work (furthering that by his predecessor,
Arnold van Gennep) on liminality and rites of passage, beneath my usage ofTurner's
more overt considerations lie deeper ones responsible for this very sense ofchange, im¬
plicitly informing every aspect of my argument. The bulk of these considerations is
informed by the work ofWilliam James. In A Pluralistic Universe, James differentiates
empiricism and rationalism by the methods in which they approach an understanding
of the world:
empiricism means the habit ofexplaining wholes by parts, and rationalism
means the habit ofexplaining parts by wholes. Rationalism thus preserves
affinities with monism, since wholeness goes with union, while empiri¬
cism inclines to pluralistic views. (James, Pluralistic 7—8)
James writes that the rationalist predilection for starting with the concept of an abso¬
lute whole also absorbs into it the idea of any change (51). In this philosophical line,
"Nothing 'between' things can connect them, for 'between' is just that third thing,
'between'" (220). Turner, too, writes of the dangers inherent in thinking of transition
as a concatenation of states, advocating instead the consideration of "transition as a
process, a becoming, and in the case of rites depassage even a transformation" (Turner,
Introduction 3
"Betwixt" 94). James attributes this fault of thinking to an over-confident surrender
of the analyst to the terminology of analysis: "The stages into which you analyze a
change are states, the change itself goes on between them. It lies along their intervals,
inhabits what your definition fails to gather up, and thus eludes conceptual explana¬
tion altogether" (James, Pluralistic 236).1 Paradoxically to an empirical approach, the
nature of change is such that the true significance of it is irreducible to parts, mere
moments in a larger process whose scope is only fully appreciable apres-coup.
Durrell's fictive world embodies this sense of change as beyond understanding,
beyond distillation into an easily digestible notion of truth, that which "most contra¬
dicts itself in time" {Quartet 216). Likewise, in his criticism Durrell employs a similar
whole-by-parts approach, lamenting that man is presented with a fragmentary under¬
standing of the world, the understanding of which is available only by joining the
pieces together:
Man is simply a box labeled personality. He peers out of the box through
five slits, the senses. On this earth he is permitted access to three dimen¬
sions of space and one of time. Only in his imagination can he inhabit
the whole—a reality which is beyond the reach of intellectual qualifica¬
tion: a reality which even the greatest art is incapable of rendering in its
full grandeur. It is a ridiculous and humiliating situation but we must ac¬
cept it, and be content with our provisional truths, our short-range raids
on this greater territory which permeates our inner lives. (Key 5)
In the manner I have structured this thesis, I have limited the slits available to the
reader whose scrutiny I, likewise, guide and limit to one dimension at a time (ofwhich
more later); nevertheless, I have settled upon such limitations only because they are
the ones I envision most suited to arrive at a sense of the "whole."
A Whole ofParts
As evidenced in part through Mountolives fishing trip and Balthazars pronounce¬
ments on the nature of truth, the unsettling foregrounding of transition over stability
is particularly important in Durrell's works, every one of which problematizes cate¬
gorizations, opting instead for perpetual redefining or flux; in truth, this privileging
of change informs the very model of his corpus. In 1945 Durrell wrote a letter to
T. S. Eliot at Faber, outlining the expectations for what he called his "opus," a grand
plan for a unified, structured life work comprised of three smaller works, each inde¬
pendently accessible. The first of these three, The Black Book he had already written
and published in 1938. The other two books, he hoped, would grow "like frogs' eggs"
and would outline a rite of passage following the structure of Greek tragedy:
'James' approach to change is markedly Eleatic, a tendency shared with Henri Bergson and other












The Book of Time
the acceptance and death
("Letters to Eliot" 3 54)
The arc, from "dislocation" in The Black Book through "uniting" in The Book of the
Dead (eventually to become The Alexandria Quartet) and to "acceptance and death" in
The Book ofTime (later titled TheAvignon Quintet), plots an unspecified development
from conflict to closure. The Revolt ofAphrodite, Durrell later concedes, also fits into
this larger outline, filling the space between pathos and anagnorisis as sparagmos, or
ritualized loss of the hero (Pine 34), violent physical disembodiment providing an
invasive moment of realization before acceptance.1
Durrell's model outlines a sort of rite of passage, a pre-established pattern of tran¬
sition from conflict to resolution.3 Christopher LaLonde writes that in the rite of pas¬
sage "order is transformed by transgression; the destruction of boundaries, followed
by a reconstruction of a new order in light of indeterminacy, is at the rite's heart"
(LaLonde 7), and Mihai Spariosu calls it a "game of disorder out ofwhich new orders
emerge" (Spariosu 33). For van Gennep, the rite of passage is an inescapable aspect
of life, defining a cyclical patterning in the universe, "a periodicity which has reper¬
cussions on human life, with stages and transitions, movements forward, and periods
of relative inactivity" (van Gennep 3). He divides all rites of passage into three stages:
"the rites of separation from a previous world, preliminal rites, those executed during
the transitional stage liminal (or threshold) rites, and the ceremonies of incorporation
into the new world postliminal rites" (21). And following van Gennep, Turner iden¬
tifies these three stages of the rite as "separation, margin (or limen), and aggregation"
(Turner, "Betwixt" 94).
This thesis seeks to consider each of these parts as parts of a greater whole; par¬
ticularly, I hope to provide a reading of the sense of instability and change in each
of these four works—themselves comprised of twelve books—while also putting each
work into the larger context of the opus. While there remains a small but vibrant corps
of readers and critics of Durrell's writing, much remains to be explored. The Alexan¬
dria Quartet—comprised ofJustine (1957), Balthazar (1958), Mountolive (1958), and
Clea (i960) and published in a single omnibus edition in 1962—was his first widely-
distributed work and is by far his best-received work; its single impact was so great
2Northrop Frye calls these four stages aspects of the "quest-myth" the "agon or conflict [...] the
pathos or death [...sparagmos) the disappearance of the hero [...and finally, anagnorisis] the reappearance
and recognition of the hero," noting in the end the tendency of the anagnorisis to signal the end of
earlier troubles with the successful undertaking of a hero who rights the wrongs of the agon (Frye 192).
3Furthering this reading of his opus as a rite of passage, in a letter to Henry Miller in 1955, Durell
reminds him of his plan to write "3 real novels, youth, maturity, and old age" (Durrell-Miller 278—279).
Introduction 5
that from its very introduction it elicited (unlikely) talk of securing for Durrell the
Nobel Prize in Literature.4 The success of the Quartet eventually led to distribution of
his earlier The Black Book (1938) in the US (i960) and the UK (1973), both markets
in which its graphic sexual imagery had led to it previously being denied publica¬
tion.5 The subsequent introduction of The Revolt ofAphrodite—comprised of Tunc
(1968) and Nunquam (1970) and published in an omnibus edition in 1974—led to
disappointment of his devotees, who hoped for more Alexandrian decadence.6 And
the introduction of the first book of The Avignon Quintet—comprised of Monsieur:
or The Prince ofDarkness (1974), Livia: or Buried Alive (1978), Constance: or Solitary
Practices (1983), Sebastian: or Ruling Passions (1983), and Quinx: or The Ripper's Tale
(1985) and published in an omnibus edition in 1992—suggested a possible return to
Durrell's tried-and-true Egyptian roots.
Still, despiteMonsieur earning Durrell the James Tait Black Memorial Prize in 1974
and Constance being shortlisted for the Booker Prize in 1983, the Quintet remains
largely unread—most strikingly by earlier scholars of Durrell's works, for whom the
Quintet is "unreadable."7 The Black Book, too, is more often collected among Dur-
rell's earlier, immature works, his juvenilia comprised of the novels PiedPiper ofLovers
(1935) and Panic Spring (1937).8 And The Revolt ofAphrodite, despite Durrell's own
heralding of it as a successor to the Quartet (Durrell-Miller 436), is commonly con¬
sidered one of Durrell's "less-serious" works, along the lines of other works he wrote
more to earn money than to challenge literary expectations ("Letters to Eliot" 354;
4After reading only three of the Quartet's four parts, Miller declared Durrell worthy of the prize
(Durrell-Miller 337). (See also Seymour, " Sensuous Empire.")
'Whether The Black Book was actually banned is uncertain, as correspondence with Faber (and
T. S. Eliot, specifically) suggests that publisher-hesitancy—more than outright governmental censor¬
ship—delayed the book's publication ("Letters to Eliot" 348, 351). The lack of British edition until
1973 was enough for Bolivar Le Franc to write in 1968 that the book was "still banned in England"
(Franc 97), and Ray Morrison lists the book as banned as well (Morrison 270); nevertheless, the book's
publication in the US made Durrell hopeful of a British release, and subsequent letters to Faber revisit
the possibility of issuing The Black Book ("Letters to Eliot" 356).
6Reed Way Dasenbrock, in "Lawrence Durrell and the Modes of Modernism," suggests that this
fall in critical favor can be attributed to a nostalgia for the Quartet's modernist modes coupled with
Durrell's shift to the Revolt's postmodernist style. I consider these possibilities further in Chapter 5.
7Richard Pine argues, in support of a favorable reading of the Quintet, that the books "oblige the
reader to concentrate not on any sequence or series of events but 011 the idea ofthought itself' Thus, he
argues, the Quintet "becomes unreadable [...] because, by placing too great a burden on the nature of
a language which we have been taught to take for granted, it abandons us without signposts while we
are still expecting to be conducted from start to finish by sequential narrative" (Pine 326).
8 See, for example, Ian MacNiven's "Pied Piper of Death: Method and Theme in the Early Novels"
and Ray Morrison's A Smile in His Mind's Eye: A Study ofthe Early Works ofLawrence Durrell.
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Durrell-Miller 8 i).9
Additionally, Durrell's own position makes him particularly difficult to locate: a
subject of the British Empire but denied citizenship (Ezard 5), he worked as an agent
and representative of that empire in various colonial administrative positions during
what Miranda Seymour calls "the British Empire's last gasp" (Seymour n. pag.).10
Though he writes books he claims are apolitical {Bitter Lemons 11), responses to them
are anything but (MacNiven, "Introduction" 2—5).11 And though poet by passion, he
was a novelist by profession and a travel writer by sheer pecuniary necessity—though,
in reading his novels, one cannot help being constantly reminded of Durrell's wide-
ranging interest and unsettling familiarity with the theories ofEinstein, Freud, Lacan,
Barthes, and "Foucaulet," among others (Durrell, "Endpapers" 90). Generically, po¬
litically, colonially, geographically, 20th-centenarily: Durrell's position is problematic
in its adamant refusal to conform.
For these reasons, I hope to restore the parts of the whole into the flux of the
passage. While previous studies have considered the whole of Durrell's oeuvre,12 such
a consideration often obscures the project of the opus in the larger picture of Durrell's
other novels, his poetry, his travel writing, and his biography. Similarly, other studies
have limited their range to Durrell's later novels, but these fall foul of reading an
agenda into Durrell's writing.13 In reading the liminal or the becoming of the whole
collection of parts—finding the change stretching across and between each of the
states, or novels—I hope to recognize in the passage of Durrell's opus (in the passage
of youth, maturity, dying, and death) a symbol of a universe perpetually shifting.
'Among this former group of less-serious writing Durrell includes his travel books (on Corfu [Pros-
pero's Cell, 1945), Rhodes (Reflections on a Marine Venus, 1953), Cyprus (the contentious Bitter Lemons,
1957, which won Durrell the Duff-Cooper Memorial Prize), Sicily (Sicilian Carousel, 1977), the is¬
lands of Greece (The Greek Islands, 1978), and Provence (Caesar's Vast Ghost, 1990)) his humorous
stories (Esprit de Corps (1957), StiffUpper Lip (1958), Sauve Qui Peut (1966), published collectively as
Antrobus Complete (1985)) and two other novels (White Eagles over Serbia (1957) and Dark Labyrinth
(1958)—originally published as Cefalu (1947)). Durrell's friends often implored him to abandon this
two-tiered output, encouraging him to focus entirely on his serious novels and his poetry, but an ever¬
growing need to support his ever-growing family (comprised of children and an ever-growing list of
ex-wives) made such a demand impossible. This study will be informed, in part, by these other works,
but the focus will remain on his "opus."
IODasenbrock underscores the significance of Durrell's inter-cultural positioning: "To call Lawrence
Durrell Indian would be absurd given the enormous gap between him and Indians, but to call him
English (without any further qualification) ignores a different gap" (Dasenbrock, "Novel" 89).
"See also, among others, Roger Bowen's "Closing the 'Toybox'" for a consideration of the racial and
cultural politics of Durrell's Quartet.
"Richard Pine's Lawrence Durrell: The Mindscape is a particularly impressive example.
13 See, for example, Stefan Herbrechter's Lawrence Durrell, Postmodernism, and the Ethics ofAlterity,
which uses Durrell's work to expound a theory of postmodern alterity before ultimately coming to the
conclusion that Durrell's work does not go as far as it ought to go (Herbrechter, Ethics 3 16).
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Five Dimensions
Durrell's Quartet replicates the four dimensions (three ofspace and one of time) he un¬
derstood to comprise physics after Einstein: Justine through Mountolive are designed
as contemporaneous siblings, while Clea functions as a sequel in time (Balthazar 9). It
is possible to consider Durrell's design very literally, consideringJustine to present the
first dimension: the interaction between two points on a line (the interaction between
Darley and Justine as he writes a book about her). Thus, Balthazar introduces the sec¬
ond dimension, a plane, with a third point (his critique of Darley's manuscript), and
Mountolive unfolds these two dimensions into a third with the detached perspective of
an outsider looking down upon the whole ofAlexandria and her "flora." With Clea,
we get the true passage of time, the interaction of each of these three dimensions with
a fourth.
Following Durrell's lead (and, at the same time, finding this method of limita¬
tion convenient), I have structured the first chapter of this thesis to consider the first
dimension: the line between two points. (See Figure la.) As Justine plots the relation¬
ship between Darley and Justine, it also positions the character of Darley as a point:
a subject, a self. His exploration from the distance of his Greek island of the time
he spent in Alexandria and his emergence as an artist of merit is the construction of
the separation of subject from object, self from other. Chapter One first considers
the interplay between subject and object, self and other, from the perspective of the
construction of the self from the other. Secondly, it considers the differentiation be¬
tween subject and object and the prospect ofpermeability of the two fields. Finally,
it considers the possibility of connection between subject and object, or subject and
subject.
The second chapter adds the dimension of fiction to this construction of subject
and object. As Balthazar problematizes Darley's perspective by forcing him to face the
limitations ofsingularity, it also questions his treatment of reality as afiction, in the end
suggesting that the imagination might mediate between the two, making for a more
accurate representation. Chapter Two considers this distance between reality and fic¬
tion (or reality and belief) and the means of travel from one to the other, particularly
in the actions of reading—or, the filtering of reality into belief—and writing—or, the
passing of belief into reality. Additionally, it takes into consideration Samuel Taylor
Coleridge's constructions of the primary and secondary imaginations as fundamen¬
tal in both of these actions. It then provides an understanding of Durrell's works,
mapping respective author-protagonist's efforts to read and to write.
The third chapter considers the construction of a three-dimensional world in Dur¬




(a) Hie first dimension.
Justine




(c) The third dimension.
(d) The fourth dimension.
Figure 1: Tire four dimensions of The Alexandria Quartet showing the relationship of subject and
object in Justine (a), the potentiality ofmultiple perspectives in Balthazar (b), the greater geographical
problematization in Mountolive (c), and the extension of the first three dimensions through time in
Clea (d).
troubles in the third book of the Quartet stem primarily from his inability to recognize
the inconceivable difference between Western and Eastern cultures, this chapter also
considers the constructions of the West and the East. The self/other considerations
of Chapter One are revisited in Chapter Three as considerations of European/Non-
European, ultimately reading Durrell's Mediterranean, the sea very much in the middle
of Durrell's universe, as a hybridizing place affecting all the space around it.
The fourth chapter considers time more specifically. We can imagine the fourth
dimension as a line resulting from dragging a cube in one direction—a line which we
can call time. (See Figure Id.) In this same sense is the three-dimensional space of
Durrell's Alexandria dragged forward in time, the perspectival shift a temporal one,
such that Darley's return in Clea leads to a sense ofuncanny recognition: things are the
same, but they have changed. Chapter Four considers three different approaches to
time (Albert Einstein's all-time-at-once, Oswald Spengler's history, and Ffenri Berg-
son's duree), finally recognizing in each work's conclusion a sense of the Bergsonian
purity ofthepresent—a purity achieved only by virtue of arduous establishment of the
context of one's own history.
Finally, much in the same manner that time can be represented as the straight line
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of the first dimension, Chapter Five will consider a possible sort of fifth dimension as
a branch similar to that of the second dimension14—an ostensible "break" from mod¬
ernism to postmodernism. Chapter One considers the relationship of subject/object,
and Chapter Two pluralizes that consideration into relationships of subjects and ob¬
jects, projecting a field of positions that Chapter Three pluralizes further. Likewise,
Chapter Four pluralizes the three-dimensional construction by considering a kind of
motion along a line from past to future through the present. Chapter Five pluralizes
this sense of time to consider a sense of times or eras or periods whose range extends,
in this study, along the line from modernism to postmodernism—or modernisms
to postmodernisms. The chapter first acknowledges Durrell's own theoretical under¬
standing ofmodernist literature to note the consciousness of Durrell's break with such
a tradition. The second section considers postmodernist readings of Durrell's works
to suggest an inability truly to read Durrell as a postmodernist writer. In the final sec¬
tion I hope to conclude by reaggregating previous arguments and recognizing the fuller
scope of Durrell's opus as a passage from The Black Book through The Avignon Quintet,
each book presenting a stage as incapable of presenting its own position within the
larger picture as is Zeno's arrow—at each moment analyzed and recognized (within
the bounds of that infinitely small moment) to be unmoving. In doing so, as might
already have been made obvious by the particular bent ofmy thesis, I hope also to offer
a stronger basis for considering the liminal positioning of Durrell as, in the words of
Joan Pinkney, a "'border' intellectual and artist" straddling the realms of modernism
and postmodernism (Pinkney 250), plotting a viable and prolific passage between the
two—but residing comfortably in neither.
As James suggests is inevitable in any sense of understanding, I "have conceived of the
whole world after the analogy of some particular feature of it which has particularly
captivated [my] attention" (James, Pluralistic 7). Thus do we—and thus have I hoped
to—"project order into the world by selecting objects and tracing relations so as to
gratify our intellectual interests. We carve out order by leaving the disorderly parts
out" (9). Durrell wrote in his Key that to lecture about reality is destructive as doing
so involves stopping it, as one might stop a film, to consider the contents of each
individual frame (Key 3). I am well aware of the makeup of this thesis as composed
of frames, each of which positions itself as a miniature part of a larger whole. As a
I4I borrow this modeling of the fourth and fifth dimensions as being represented in methods similar
to those of the first and second dimensions from Rob Bryanton's Imagining the Tenth Dimension.
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cinematographer composes frame by frame, I hope in the end to put these compo¬
nents back in motion once more, plotting the arc of progression through a neutral
zone whose inhabitation of the threshold is at times horrifying, at times imaginative,
always hybrid, and ever immediately present in Durrell's works. In doing so, I hope,
too, to bridge the gap of alterity, positioning Durrell's writing perpetually in a tension
at the surface, positing a medium, a means of communication, betwixt and between
otherwise ineffably different states. Only in this manner can Durrell's opus be recog¬




But the world that each ofus feels most intimately at home with is that ofbeings with histories
thatplay into our history, whom lue can help in their vicissitudes even as they help us in ours.
(William James, A Pluralistic Universe 49)
I light a lamp and limp about, thinking ofmyfriends—ofJustine... (Quartet 17)
The first book of TheAlexandria Quartet and Darley's book ofAlexandria, Justine rep¬
resents the first dimension ofDurrell's Alexandrian tetralogy. In it, Darley writes from
the vantage of a Greek island, looking back onto the city from afar, establishing dis¬
tance between himself and the object of his creation. "I have had to come so far away
from it in order to understand it all," he writes (Quartet 17), explaining this distance as
one of comprehension. By separating himself from the city, he believes he can make
of it something discrete and whole; by separating himself from the city, he seeks to
do the same for himself.
Traditionally, the first dimension is depicted as "any straight line joining two
points" (Bryanton 7). While every dimension is composed of an infinite number
of points, all of the points of a single dimension are situated along a straight line,
which, when drawn, starts at one point and ends at another. If Darley's island is one
of these two points, then Alexandria represents the other. Similarly, if the first of these
points is Darley, the second is Justine or any one of the friends he thinks about while
limping around his island cabin.
In both cases, the book represents the line drawn between the points: it connects
Greecewith Egypt just as it connects Darley with Justine, but at the same time it is that
which comes between and separates—or marks the distinction between—the points.
The book, written of Alexandria from the distance of Greece, plots the infinitude
of points between the two positions, threatening with Eleatic insistence to deny the
possibility of ever passing through all of the intermediate stages. At the same time,
while Justine is presented as the memoir of the closeness of Darley and Justine, the
chronicle of the intimacy between two lovers, that closeness—in the end as in the
beginning—is lamented as irretrievably lost.
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In his Key to Modern Poetry, Durrell writes of this distance between the subject and
the object, describing the human as being trapped perpetually in a box, forever denied
closeness or intimacy with anyone or anything. In light of the limitations set before
us, he asks, "How to begin living, then?" (Key 5—6). The question is an important one
to address before considering any of the others its anxiety must surely inspire. How
does one begin living? How does one become, in a word, one, separating oneself from
everything that is determined to be other-than-oneself?
Nevertheless, this line ofquestioning may be as problematic as it is primal. Durrell
writes in his Key.
Einstein's theory joined up subject and object, in very much the same way
as it joined up space and time. Now what is important to us here are
not the equations—even ifwe understand them—but the symbolic act of
joining what is separated. (26)
Durrell's understanding of Einstein as having connected subject and object suggests
that we ought to find, in Durrell's writing, as equal a consideration for the closeness
of self and other as for the distance between them.1 The earlier questions ofbeginning
living expand, then, to include the act of joining: How does one connect (or refuse
to connect) to the world? What might keep subject distinct from object?
Finally, one must also consider the possibility of other subjects. William James
writes of the world as comprised of other beings whose "histories [...] play into our
history" (James, Pluralistic 49). How then do selves interplay in Durrell's writing? And
how do subjects interact?
This chapter considers the subject/object, self/other relationship in Durrell's major
works. The first section will consider the formation of the self-as-artistic-subject as a
separation from the world, taking at its base the concept of the Kunstlerroman and La-
canian theory. The second section will focus on the permeability of the subject/object
divide, reflecting on the artistic creation as a corpse (along with the corporal remains
of dead characters) as the intrusion of the Kristevan abject. The final section will
concentrate on the connections between Durrellian characters—a connection whose
logical conclusion leads to personal pluralities as Benveniste's subject-as-'T" gives way
to a modified subject-as-"we."
I Writing Selves
The struggle is not to record experience but to record oneself. The book, then, does not properly
exist. There is only my tissue, myguilt, transmuted by God knows what alchemy, into afewpints
ofgreen ink and handmade paper. Understand me well. This is the ideal being we call a book.
It does not exist. (The Black Book 121)
'For more on Durrell's interpretation of Einstein see the discussion from page 110.
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Emile Benveniste writes that in spoken language, the subject is the one who says "I"
(Benveniste, "Subjectivity" 224). By situating himself in the sentence he speaks, the
subject orients the rest of his world, which forms his predicate. The written word is
only slightly different. While Benveniste writes that "in saying 'I,' I cannot not be
speaking ofmyself" (Benveniste, "Relationships" 197), the written "I" often operates
as a proxy: the author creates a world in which a subject says "I," declaring/asserting
his subjectivity—though only by the grace of the author.
In novels in which the narrator also claims to be the writer of the work, another
layer ofcomplexity intercedes. In these works, the narrator's ostensible creation is itself
the ascendance to subjectivity. The author/narrator becomes the subject of the predi¬
cate implied in the physical object of the book. Lawrence Durrell's major novels reg¬
ularly foreground the writing process, and, thus, this ascension to subject-hood.1 In
The Black Book, novelist/narrator Lawrence Lucifer writes, "This is the day I have cho¬
sen to begin this writing" (Black Book 20); in TheAlexandria Quartet, novelist/narrator
Darley copes with and eventually dismisses expectations of factual exactitude in fa¬
vor of artistic merit, finally writing "[wjords which presage simply the old story of an
artist coming to age" (Quartet 877); and The Avignon Quintet concentrates upon the
collaborative project of novelist/protagonist Aubrey Blanford and his character Rob
Sutcliffe in writing the novels that recount their efforts. Even in the Revolt, the nov¬
elist/narrator Felix Charlock outlines his writing method: "While I am writing one
book, [...] I write another about it, then a third about it, and so on" (Nunquam 16).
The creation of the work becomes a key element in each of the texts, a process often
exposed by the in-text "author."
Separation oftheArtist
In one sense, these ostensible authors assert their subjectivity by having written a
book. In another, the book is only an apparent symptom of such subjectivity; the act
ofwriting is merely a necessary step in a longer sequence of asserting one's artistry—a
sequence whose success is far from guaranteed by the proof of having produced. In
The Black Book, Lawrence Lucifer writes to overcome the creativity-sapping nature of
"The English Death," but in the end laments that he cannot "'explain' the new myth
which I am undoubtedly on the point of creating [...] there are too many words, and
too many things to put into words" (Black Book 242—43), finally conceding that "there
is no more in here than the seven hectic elements can offer me" as he gives up: "This
2Matthew Escobar recognizes the affirmation of the individual self key to Durrell's Monsieur (Es¬
cobar 52).
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is how it ends" (244).' Likewise, in The Alexandria Quartet, the growth of Darley
into a novelist ofworth happens after several failed creations—Justine, Balthazar, and
possibly even Mountolive—before the artistic success written ofat the end of Clea, the
final creation. The robotic Aphrodite 'Iolanthe' is Charlock's creative masterpiece, but
in the end 'she' malfunctions. The Avignon Quintet as a creation of Blanford seems to
derail with the novelist's obsession with creating the first book, Monsieur, through the
subsequent four parts, paradoxically ending in the fifth book with only the first book
ever having been written.
Durrell's major works qualify as Kunstlerromane. The Kiinstlerroman is a subset
of the Bildungsroman, the story of a person coming of age, differing from the latter
in that the subject is an artist arriving at his mastery of art. We see the opening
of this inquiry in all of Durrell's works. As they do not follow the protagonists' lives
from birth to adulthood Durrell's novels cannot be categorised as strict Kunstlerromane-,
nevertheless, as Roberta Seret writes, the Kiinstlerroman does not necessarily need to
begin with the birth of the protagonist-as-person, so much as protagonist-as-^rAtf:
"This specific genre traces the embryonic growth of the artist from the moment when
he exhibits artistic talents and interests to the point when he actually creates" (Seret
3). Durrell's protagonists exhibit undeveloped artistic talents in the beginnings of
each book. Defensively, Lawrence Lucifer writes of beginning to write, justifying his
timing with the seasons (Black Book 20). In a similar manner, his alter ego Horace
"Death" Gregory guiltily prolongs the silence before writing: "Really, I tell myself,
really some day soon I shall be enticed into beginning it" (68). Correspondingly,
Darley checks and revises his writing style before settling on the one Durrell made
famous with the Quartet (Quartet 87—88). Charlock writes of the pain "in allowing
the damned thing [an idea for an invention] to ferment, to form in the imagination"
(Tunc 16). And Blanford—at the end ofMonsieur, but in the relative beginning of
The Avignon Quintet, nonetheless—harbours comparable doubts {Quintet 273). Each
novel charts the challenge of its respective protagonist in mastering these limitations
"to the point when he actually creates."
In each of these books, the failing is in the inability of words to contain the full
plurality of lived experience. Darley's Justine begins "so far away from it in order to
understand it all," but his mistake is in aiming at a stationary target: "what happened
in the past" (Quartet 17). Balthazar's appearance in the second book of the Quartet
brings to light many inaccuracies in Darley's version of events—inaccuracies mainly
caused by his previous inability to understand what Balthazar explains to him: "We
are all still real people [...] whatever you try and do to us" (214). More importantly, a
3 In this regard, The Black Book embodies Ihab Hassan's sense of "literature of the self, a self in the
world, self and world made into words" (Hassan, "Quest" 420).
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mere book could never contain the whole of truth, "what most contradicts oneself in
time" (216). There are too many words and too many things to put into words.
And yet, as Gregory says in The Black Book, the struggle is not in writing experience
but in writing oneself. The problem is not in Darley denying the reality ofhis characters
as much as it is in his denial of the fullness of his own reality. In any Kunstlerroman
wherein the narrator of a work is also allegedly its creator, the creation in the end
is always of oneself (oneself-as-creator). Seret likens artistic maturation to a journey,
writing that the artist-to-be must "voyage through several stages of development" to
arrive at "art which becomes the creator's homeland" (Seret 1). The Kunstlerroman
takes as its thesis both the definition of that homeland—both the development of the
subject, Durrell's "box labelled personality" (Key 5), as well as the recognition of the
limits thereof—and the action of crossing over to it.
For each of these characters, the writing of a novel (or the creation not of an
Aphrodite but of an Aphrodite who ultimately Revolts) is only part of the project.
The creation of an art-work progresses problematically and has the potential, even in
the end, of recording only artistic failure. Even still, this act requires a separation of
the potential artist from the world, a separation necessary to maintain the illusion of
containment Darley writes of desiring in the beginning ofJustine. Lawrence Lucifer
in The Black Book may never have obtained the understanding that needs this kind of
separation, in the end writing that he has tried but failed, but Darley, despite inter¬
mittent intrusions by the world from which he tries to separate himself, is still able,
in flashes, to achieve this separation.4 This fundamental separation is postponed un¬
til the end of the work, when the ultimacy of distance affords him an opportunity
to transcend the physical bounds of the book,5 presumably only to attain the artistic
mastery he dreams of. The Revolt and the Quintet, too, end with this sense of tran¬
scendence, artists growing beyond the bounds of their respective novels.6 At this point
of separation, the artist begins his journey to the world of art he has desired, leading
himselfonward to construct the line between the two points which the separation has
defined. Just as the artist is necessary to create the art, so too is the art necessary for the
artist to create himself, as it is the only context in which he can establish this artistry.
4"Shall I reconstruct it—the scene I see so clearly [...] ?" (Quartet 314)
5 "I felt as if the whole universe had given me a nudge!" (877)
6The Revolt ends with the burning of a contractual archive and the prophetic pronouncement: "So
it will be either/or once again; it will be now or never. [...] And we will keep on this way, dancing and
dancing, even though Rome burn" (Nunquam 283). The Quintet ends as characters enter an explosive-
filled cave, Blanford declaring that if he ever were to write "the scene he would say: 'It was at this
precise moment that reality prime rushed to the aid of fiction and the totally unpredictable began to
take place!'" {(Quintet 1367).
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Separation ofthe Self
While Benveniste writes that the linguistic separation of subject from predicate is
responsible for the creation of the ego,7 Jaques Lacan cites a different—though not
incompatible—kind ofsplitting as the root of the formation of the subject. For Lacan,
the birth of the subject is due partly to a pre-linguistic distinction drawn between the
self and the world: the mirror stage, which he calls "an identification, in the full sense
[...] namely, the transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes an
image" (Lacan, "Mirror" 2). Lacan's mirror stage identifies an ideal selfwhich becomes
the calling card for all future instances of the spoken "I"—not only am I separated
from the world, but "I" is also merely a pronoun that, as such, is also separated from
the Ideal-I of which I speak. Lacan uses the German Spaltung to describe this split,
identifying it as the distance between the spoken "I" and the idealized image of the self
(Lacan, "Direction" 298). Just as the distinction of subject and object plots a space
between the two, so too does the split between the subject / and the object Ideal-I
or me plot space between the two of them, emphasizing the distance from one to the
other—as well as the fragmented situation of being an / whose meaning is forever
delayed.
The result of this split is a sense of alienation felt by every subject "by virtue of
being a subject" (298); to use the words of Lawrence Lucifer in The Black Book, "the
fantastic loneliness [...] tells me that I exist" (Black Book 153). This sense of loneliness
is manifest as a sense of having lost some connection. Richard Boothby writes of this
very sense:
For Lacan, human desire is forever haunted by the dream of 'the thing,'
the dream of re-finding a primordially lost object, of recovering an original
source of utter plenitude [...,] an object that was in fact never possessed,
an object that existed only as a mirage, indeed, that may have existed only
as the shadow of a mirage. (Boothby 30—31)
For Lawrence Lucifer in The Black Book, fantastic loneliness has become a defining
point of existence; loneliness implies some fuller state of union, but existence offers
nothing beyond dissatisfaction.
For the robot 'Iolanthe' in Revolt, the fantastic element of this loneliness is only
heightened by her own fantastical composition. The correct pronunciation of her
name, as Charlock insists, is "'I-O-lanthe!' Note that the stress falls upon the sec¬
ond syllable not the third" (Tunc 29). The unusual capitalization of the second letter
7"It is in and through language that man constitutes himself as a subject, because language alone
establishes the concept of'ego' in reality, in its reality which is that of the being. [...] Language is
possible only because each speaker sets himselfup as a subject by referring to himselfas / in his discourse.
Because of this, I posits another person, the one who, being, as he is, completely exterior to 'me,'
becomes my echo to whom I say you and who says you to me." (Benveniste, "Subjectivity" 224—225)
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raises it to the level of the first letter, the I, highlighting the very hollow nature of
her construction. What is normally depicted as Signifier over signified—spoken "I"
over idealized self—lacks, in the robotic Iolanthe's construction, a true sense of ide¬
alized self: it is depicted as "I" over nothing, the very mathematical definition of
an undefined situation. The ideal image of Iolanthe-the-screen-actress is itself merely
an "illusion," not even the "perfect illusion" Julian hopes for (Nunquam 140). Julian
certainly recognizes the falsity of the robot, but to him she is "more real than real¬
ity itself is for most people." He allows for the possibility of the Robotic version of
Iolanthe to be "more real than most of the people we know" (140—141)—perhaps
even because of the consciously fragmentary nature of her construction.8 In the end,
Julian's query—"will perhaps this creature of human habits one day, simply by acting
as a human being, REALISE she is a dummy?" (141)—is answered in the affirma¬
tive for robo-Iolanthe, opening the door for other, "real people" to question their own
constructions as dummies. Robo-Iolanthe's flight is prompted by a recognition of this
lack of "reality," the delay of signification of her self precipitated by the very hyphen
connecting—and keeping separate—the I and the O.
Iolanthe's recognition of the shallowness of this assembly is also her recognition
or unveiling of Boothby's mirage—the illusion of a plenitude felt to be lacking in the
world, the very illusion that feeds desire. For Lacan, desire is "neither the appetite for
satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference resulting from the subtraction
of the first from the second, the very phenomenon of their splitting (Spaltung)" (Lacan,
"Meaning" 125—126).9 He uses the same term, Spaltung, to describe this division of
fulfillment-anticipation from demand as he does for the split of Symbolic signifier of
spoken I from the Imaginary signified self of the mirror stage. To illustrate with what
Lacan called "mathemes,"
Desire = (demand for love) — (appetite for satisfaction) = Spaltung
"I"
_ S
idealised self S' —* s
Symbolic
Imaginary
This idea of splitting, and its resultant feeling of having lost some sense of fullness, is
fundamental in Lacan's work. Because of this Spaltung, the feeling of desire Boothby
writes of, ^n.'l'ej is reduced to tymk°l'c , and desire's fundamental lack is recognizablesignified Imaginary' o
8This fragmentarion is made most obvious in Charlock's first visit to the laboratory, where, despite
the "illusion of completeness—a whole," the bulk of her is "detached from context," detached, as it
were, from the mechanical frame of her body, which is as-yet incomplete (133).
'Freud, too, builds his model of desire upon an establishment of the separation between the subject
and the "object" (Freud, "Sexual" 45—46).
I. Writing Selves 18
in any formation ofa linguistic, idealized self. Lawrence Lucifer's "fantastic loneliness"
is indeed due to his existence, insofar as he speaks of his existence using the words "I
exist." Likewise for Iolanthe, the imago of her / is merely the reflection of a reflection,
the outline of the outline of the "veiled faces" of daily experience (Lacan, "Mirror"
3)—no more ridiculous than the situation of any "real" person, but all the more ob¬
vious because of the further remove.
The desire of the Other10—the reconciliation of demand for love with appetite for
satisfaction—is equivalent to the desire for a whole self: the reconciliation of spoken
/ with idealized self. This reconciliation (an impossibility) or mending of the Spaltung
is the Lacanian counterpart of Seret's voyage, the artist coming of age. The mastery of
the Other inherent within the idea of the artist coming of age, however, is impossible
without sacrificing the structuring system of the division between Self and Other. As
the Other is never an obtainable destination of the self, the impulse of the artist to
master his art-form is never a finished process; rather, the growth resulting from that
impulse leads to the indiscrete distinction of "mastery." For the Kunstlerroman, whose
delineation depends upon the creation of an art-object—such as the completed novel
in the hands of the reader—the illusion of "mastery" must be enough.
Rites ofPassage
In the Kunstlerroman, the action of crossing over into artistic mastery is one rife with
elements of the rite of passage. Arnold van Gennep defines rites of passage as "rites
which accompany every change of place, state, social position and age" (van Gennep
1). These transitions, found in "birth, social puberty, marriage, fatherhood, advance¬
ment to a higher class, occupational specialization, and death," are "implicit to the
very act of existence" (3). Victor Turner, building upon van Gennep's work, writes
that every rite ofpassage is marked by stages: separation, liminality, and reaggregation
(Turner, "Betwixt" 94). In the first, the ritual subject is segregated somehow from tra¬
ditional categorizations in order to enter the liminal zone, in which categorical prop¬
erties are unstable. From there, the subject passes to the third stage of reincorporation
into social fabric.
The separation of the artistic subject from the world ofwhich he writes—the sep¬
aration necessary in every defining of subject and object—describes the very space of
the Lacanian lack. The desire to overcome this "fantastic loneliness" propels the artist
I0I am using a double-variable replacement common to mathematics: "[T]he signifier ofthe desire of
the Other" is symbolized by the Phallus (Lacan, "Meaning" 128), and the Phallus "is given to designate
as a whole the effect of there being a signified" (124). The effect of there being a signified closes the gaps
in language and introduces the possibility of demand-fulfilment. Therefore, "the desire of the Other,"
or, the Phallus, or, "the effect of there being a signified" instils a perceived stability within language.
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forward to overcome and to re-attain that fuller state of existence. At the end—after
the separation of the artist-as-subject from the world-as-object, and after the indeter¬
minacy of the writing process—the artist is once again reconstructed into the fabric
of the world, though his situation within that world has changed. The indeterminacy
of that second stage is crucial to the reincorporation of a previous kind of order. Con¬
trasted with the stable conditions of juvenilia and maturity, the transition of life, or,
compared with the stabilities of artistic inexperience and understanding, the transition
ofmastery, or, even still, contrasted with the conditions of being and not being, the
development ofself represents the liminal stage. In this stage, "the characteristics of the
ritual subject [...] are ambiguous" (Turner, "Liminality" 94).
Before art can become the homeland Seret calls it, it is merely an object of desire,
marked by its distance from the interested dabbler. In this manner, the place of art
is defined against the place of the aspiring artist before he or she begins the voyage to
art. It is an intended destination, the arrival at which marks a simultaneous master¬
ing thereof. Durrell reproduces this journey geographically in The Alexandria Quartet
in Darley's return to Alexandria (Quartet 666—672) and in The Avignon Quintet in
Blanford's parallel crossing to Alexandria (Quintet 618—621), journeys which mark a
focusing of artistic ability in both.11
The emergence of the artist-as-subject ultimately depends upon an entry into the
liminal, the separation of the artist from the world. This sense of separation (and
concomitant inhabitation of the liminal) is common among artists. "Prophets and
artists," Turner writes,
tend to be liminal and marginal people, "edgemen," who strive with a
passionate sincerity to rid themselves of the cliches associated with status
incumbency and role-playing and to enter into vital relations with other
men in fact or imagination. (Turner, "Liminality" 128)
At the same time, Spariosu calls "literary and artistic productions [...] liminal worlds"
(Spariosu 32). Tire emergence of the artist-as-master, on the other hand, depends
upon a reaggregation of the artist back into the world whose inherent subject-object
differentiation he has overcome. Durrell's (and, indeed, many) Kiinstlerromane noto¬
riously end not at the emergence of artist-as-master, with the establishment of a new
order of recognition of success at having traversed the perils of indeterminacy, but at
"The Mediterranean delineates a "neutral ground" between the artistic asphyxiation of Europe and
the extreme unknown otherness of Africa. For the length of the journey, they find themselves in a
situation of neither-nor, or both-and. Van Gennep writes of neutral ground, "Whoever passes from
one to the other finds himself physically and magico-religiously in a special situation for a certain
length of time: he wavers between two worlds" (van Gennep 17—18). Tie magico-religious-ness of
transition in the Quartet is even manifest in the good omen of the dolphin breaking twice at the ship's
bow (Quartet 666). For more on the Mediterranean as a liminal place, see Ch. 3. See also Clawson,
"The Length and Greatness of its History."
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the emergence of the artist-as-subject, an establishment ofseparation of the artist from
the object of his art. The nudge of the universe at the end of the Quartet establishes
the influence of this indeterminacy, just as the rush of the "totally unpredictable" at
the end of Quintet acknowledges the "total" limitlessness of the indeterminate. Exis¬
tence offers nothing beyond dissatisfaction of the desire for reaggregation only because
the (accurate) recognition of Durrell's works as Kiinstlerromane is a recognition that,
at the conclusion of each work, places Durrell's artists in full flow of this liminal, at
once no longer categorized and not yet categorized, looking back fondly upon a world
in which the artist was once a part while simultaneously writing of feeling pregnant
with the swelling artistic creation: "like some timid girl, scared of the birth of her
first child" (Quartet 877). Fittingly, Turner writes that this aspect of not yet being
classified "is often expressed in symbols modeled on processes of gestation and partu¬
rition" (Turner, "Betwixt" 96). The other aspect, of being no longer classified, will be
considered in the next section of this chapter.
11 The Art ofDying
Durrell considers the artist's act of creation in a series of lectures he gave in Argentina
in 1947—1948, published as the critical guide A Key to Modern Poetry. "Art describes
the kind of reality which is already dead for the artist" (Key 39). Durrell shares this
view with Otto Rank'sArt andArtist. Here Rank outlines the progression of the focus
of art from the primitive through the classical and into the modern: primitive art
immortalizes the abstract and removed notion of the art-object; classical art idealizes
that model; "But modern art," he continues,
neither starts from an abstract of the living nor aims at an ideal conserva¬
tion of it, but its style-form consists in a vivifaction of the essence of the
actual. This can, however, only be achieved at the cost of real life. (Rank
7i)
The reification of "real life" into art, what Rank calls vivifaction, sacrifices the "essence
of the actual" in the process of becoming. The objectification, a death-into-art, takes
place at creation for the artist, who presents "the kind of reality which is already dead
for the artist." This vivifaction is only life-bestowing for the art-object in which it
instils the essence of the actual. For "reality," it is actually a process of objectification,
a loss of immediacy, the "kind of reality" or model represented through art becoming
distant or removed and marked as depersonalized to both artist and audience. The
created/understood art-object displaces "reality" as such. Displacement is another
transition, and Durrell's self-begetting novels—between the "reality" of the novel¬
ist/narrator and objectified art, between that reality's life and death—are the liminal
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entities of that transition.
This model of objectification, which Durrell calls death and which Rank charac¬
terizes as vivifaction (though only for the resultant object-as-representation), has the
same cost of the loss of reality, the depersonalization and hypostatization of effect
for the artist and observers. The change from subject into object—for the subject of
portrayal becoming an object of contemplation frozen in form and meaning—is, in a
sense, a death. Ifart explains reality as it has been, then the reification of the art-object
is a silencing and a stilling akin to what Durrell writes on lecturing about reality: to
do so "is to stop it—as one might stop a film" (Key 3). Once lectured, explained, or
"vivified" as art, that which is being taught, clarified, or shown loses ability to rep¬
resent itself. Any autonomy or subjectivity is sacrificed for the clarity and limited
immortality of the art-object.
Nevertheless, Durrell's own works repeatedly challenge this sense of death-after-
vivifaction; instead, there is a tendency of artistic worlds to confront the writer. Balt¬
hazar's appearance on Darley's island as some member of the ancient Greek pantheon
stirs Darley to reconsider all he had written in Justine (Quartet 213). Similarly, the
creation of 'Iolanthe' after the death of Iolanthe problematizes any notion of the re¬
ality of the art of her creation already being dead for the artists involved; in fact, it is
because Julian refuses to acknowledge her death that she is constructed. Similarly, in
Livia Sutcliffe confronts Blanford, his author, with the demand to bring him back to
life, defying any notion of his reality—native only to the pages of the manuscript in
the first book—buried within the cover ofMonsieur.
But aside from the artistic objectification found in his creative work and described
in his critical work, a more pressing kind of death permeates his novels—that of char¬
acters. Ifone aspect of liminality, the effect of being not yet categorized, is symbolized
by gestation, Turner writes that the other aspect, that of being no longer categorized,
is symbolized by death: "In so far as they are no longer classified, the symbols that
represent them are, in many societies, drawn from the biology of death" (Turner, "Be¬
twixt" 96). Imagery of death is prevalent in all of Durrell's major works. Benedicta
notes this pattern in Nunquam, saying "We tend to forget it, but people do have this
awful tendency to die" (Nunquam 219); nevertheless, it is unlikely the reader would
"tend to forget it." Lawrence Lucifer's specific note on The Black Book could be applied
more generally to all of Durrell's novels: "There is a lot about death in this; too much
perhaps" (Black Book 23 2).12 Normally, death is opposed to the process of creation,
with creation marking the start, death marking the end—creation as a process, death
I2Ian MacNiven notes both this propensity of characters to die and Durrell's pseudo-necrophilia,
writing, "Durrell deliberately blurs the distinction between life and death, and this remains an impor¬
tant theme" (MacNiven, "On Miracle Ground" 36).
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as finality. Nevertheless, Durrell writes of death differently, lengthening it into an
extended process, valuing it with so much significance that it becomes a liminal stage,
and even reversing it so that death—somewhat paradoxically—is only one of many
beginnings.
Among Durrell's many deaths are several dubious cases. Characters die and yet
continue to affect the world of their respective novels after their deaths (Pursewar-
den). Others do not actually die; they are merely mis-represented as dead (Capodis-
tria). And several others die but are suspended in a strange simulacrum of life: one
commits suicide, but complains afterwards that he was forced into the act by his au¬
thor (Sutcliffe); two die at least twice (Pursewarden, Iolanthe); two die to be born
again (Iolanthe, Clea); and a host of characters can even claim a kind of immortal¬
ity (Affad, Scobie, Ludo). fiere is evidenced van Gennep's neutral ground, in which
characters, the liminalpersonae or threshold people, "waver between two worlds," the
realm ofTurner's un-dead, in which they are "neither living nor dead from one aspect,
and both living and dead from another" (Turner, "Betwixt" 97).
In Durrell's works, liminal personae are not just those who exist uneasily between
geographical locations or levels of artistic ability, but also those whose humanity is
itself liminal. The questionably dead, for example, are people only liminally, for to be
a person one must either be or have been alive—but never both at once. At the same
time, the reified, fetishized, objectified subject, most obvious in The Revolt ofAphrodite,
occupies a similar marginal, liminal role. Durrell replaces the dyad of Life and Death
with a triad: Living, Dying, Nonliving—or, perhaps more accurately, Birth, Dying,
Nonliving.13 The "edge" lost by captured reality is absorbed into this third, the stroke
between the halves ofCause/Effect. This third creates space between the two in which
to insert itself, plots that space within the subject/object relationship, and hence is a
portrayal of the difference therein.
Subject, Object, Abject
Julia Kristeva identifies this third as abjection, an instability as problematic as Dur¬
rell's death-consciousness: "We may call it a border; abjection is above all ambigu¬
ity. [.. .Ajbjection acknowledges [the subject] to be in perpetual danger" (Kristeva
9). The presence of abjection, that which defines the border between two structural
categories, throws into relief those structuralizations, highlighting their permeability
and emphasizing the possibility of one to change into the other. Whereas the subject
''Everyone spends a lifetime in dying: "Blanford [...] told himself that a human being might be
described as simply a link between two breaths" (Quintet 1266), and time is merely a "measure of our
death-consciousness" {Key 23).
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is the speaking "I" and defines its object as everything it is not, the abject "does not
have, properly speaking, a definable object. [...] The abject has only one quality of
the object—that of being opposed to I" (1). Kristeva's prime example of the abject
is the corpse which confronts the living subject: "without makeup or masks, refuse
and corpses show me what I permanently thrust aside in order to live. [...] There,
I am at the border of my condition as a living being. My body extricates itself, as
being alive, from that border." By inhabiting that border between the living subject
and the lifeless object, the corpse "is a border that has encroached upon everything."
Doing so, it challenges the autonomy of the subject, the speaking "I" who defines the
border: "It is no longer I who expel, 'I' is expelled. The border has become an object.
How can I be without border?" Denied the border defining the "I," the subject, no
longer able to construct the imagined distance between subject and object, witnesses
the "breaking down of a world that has erased its borders" (3—4). Lawrence Lucifer
laments this reversal of fortunes in The Black Book, complaining "I cannot live because
the decomposing bodies ofmy ancestors dog me at every turn. They are not living in
their myth, but dead, influencing my dying, not my life" (Black Book 157). The border
defended by the abstract nobility of death is disrupted by the striking nearness of the
corpse, the ambiguity of a border encroaching upon everything, placing the subject
in perpetual danger of infection by the object.
This ambiguity afforded by the abject is the same ambiguity of the liminal, of
which Turner writes, "Their condition is one of ambiguity and paradox, a confusion
of all the customary categories" (Turner, "Betwixt" 97). Both highlight the change¬
ability of categorical constructions, disrupting the stability of the categories against
which they are measured by inhabiting that betwixt third position, shortening the
distance between two otherwise completely different constructions. The process of
Rank's "vivifaction of the essence of the actual" and Seret's artistic voyage likewise
marginalize that difference, describing the space between the modeled reality and the
artwork. Reality / Artwork, or Life / Death, or Subject / Object, becomes Reality /
Creation / Artwork, or Reality / Understanding / Artwork, or Birth / Dying / Death,
or Subject / Abject / Object. The extent of the incomplete, aborted transition of Life
into a state of Inanimacy marks the degree of the failure of the Kiinstlerroman model
to describe the development of artistic drive in Durrell's works—none of which end
with the artist safely in the homeland of his art.
Lawrence Lucifer is aware of the openings offered by death; he admits as much
in The Black Book, beginning the book with, "The agon, then. It begins" (Black Book
19). His agon is one mirrored in the weather of a Corfiot winter, with depressing
mud "in a solid tawny line across the bay," rain which "bubbles in along the chinks
of the windows," and wind, "musty with the smell of [...] the fine dust of the desert
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tombs—the Arabic idiom of death" (19—20). The agon he writes is one admittedly
"for the dead," and the depressing winter is only fitting because it allows "the corre¬
spondence of deadness with deadness [to be] complete" (20). Durrell is clear, though,
that the thanatological imagery he uses to describe the weather is not as significant as
the human factor of death: "No mummies, chunks of tissue latched to bone; no pil¬
lars of salt, no cadavers, have ever been half so dead as we are today" (21). Here, the
use of images such as tombs, mummies, and cadavers is merely an introduction to
the practice continued throughout the book, in which sleeping people are compared
to corpses (29), marriage is associated with death (3 6), pale people are described as
resembling corpses (43), "death is merely the aesthetic convention which the sardonic
playwright bows to" (75), to be English is to be dead (137), jailers are likened to
mummies (174), and friends are described having "the terrific face of death" (205).
Moreover, Lawrence Lucifer's prose is often interrupted by excerpts from the diary
of a former tenant of the narrator's room, Herbert Gregory, whose history remains un¬
known; Lawrence Lucifer speculates simply that "he vanished" (31). Strangely, Gre¬
gory signs his journal "Death," further glorifying his desired name by calling it "part of
the little charade I construct around myself to make my days tolerable" (38). Death,
for Gregory and the more immediate narrator Lawrence Lucifer, is an escape from
the living "English death" (243), the "mummy wrappings [...and] cultural swaddling
clothes" (9) of the repressive English climate, of which The Black Book is a chronicle
(243). The English death is a kind of zombie-like stage of living death, what Mac-
Niven calls "a limbolike passive state" tied up to what Durrell saw as the English
predilection to repression (MacNiven, "On Miracle Ground" 27). The Black Book is
his attempt to master the English death and break through it, but the novel is really
a testament to the inescapability of that cultural repression—"I wanted to break free"
[Black Book 9), "But I can't. [...] I was on the point of discovering, I think, but am
not sure" (242). The limbolike passive state of living English death is absolute.
Another of the many examples of the aborted transition from Death into Inani-
macy in Durrell's works is that of the novelist Pursewarden in The Alexandria Quartet.
Darley's more successful literary rival, he commits suicide in the first book, but it is
not until the fourth book that the complete picture is painted. Darley speculates that
the meaning of Pursewarden's death lies in his success as a novelist [Quartet 96—99).
In Balthazar, we are treated to a different scene altogether. The doctor on call arrives
at the scene to find Nessim emptying drawers and overturning papers throughout the
room, explaining, "There must be nothing for the Egyptian Police to find" (312).
What Darley in the first book of the quartet dismissed as "not mysterious" (99) sud¬
denly turns into the very heart of a mystery.
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It is Melissa who prompts Pursewarden to action in the version of the mystery ex¬
plained in Mountolive, predicting "death very close. [...] Yes, very close. You will hear
about it in a matter of hours" (531—532). She confides in him political secrets, un¬
wittingly prompting Pursewarden to kill himself, as predicted, "in a matter of hours,"
an act for which he cites in his suicide note the fact that he is "not equal to facing the
simpler moral implications raised by this discovery" (540). Pursewarden may have
killed himself two books prior, but he has yet to die.
In Clea, the last book and only "true sequel" to the Quartet, Darley returns to
Alexandria where Pursewarden's blind sister Liza reveals the incestuous affair she had
with her brother, an affair that ends when Liza falls in love with someone else. Purse¬
warden kills himself to free her for Mountolive, offering his death as "the completest
gift I can offer you as a wedding present! And if you look beyond the immediate pain
you will see how perfect the logic of love seems to one who is ready to die for it" (787).
We are given what seems to be a final version of Pursewarden's reasoning for killing
himself: a combination of his grief and generosity in response to his sister's love for
Mountolive. Later in Clea, Liza shares with Darley her cache of letters from Purse¬
warden, and together they burn the pile. It is also at this moment that Pursewarden's
figurative ghost stops haunting Darley, who had a disquieting habit of quoting his
literary rival. Yet even still, Pursewarden's death is problematic. In the original multi-
volume edition of the Quartet, one might be excused assuming his death is final, but
in the single volume edition of the series, Pursewarden is listed as an editor for the
fourth book, Clea, two years after it is first published and five years after he first dies
with the publication ofJustine (879).
Pursewarden, however, is not the only near-immortal character from the Quartet.
Scobie, for example, lives long past his death, attaining what Friedman calls "a two¬
fold immortality" (Friedman, Fictional Death 255). His parrot learns to emulate the
old man's voice and speech patterns, and he often reproduces them, to the surprise of
Clea, who adopts the bird. "Do you think one's soul could enter the body of a green
Amazon parrot to carry the memory of one forward a little way into Time?" asks
Balthazar (Quartet 333). And later in Clea, Darley learns of Scobie's canonization as
El Scob, a saint of his neighborhood.14 Another character from the Quartet endowed
I4Scobie's liminal personhood expands far beyond that of his undeath: as seasoned sailor, he rep¬
resents the seas between Britain and her empire; as spy, he inhabits the unsteady ground between the
British administration and the fledgling Egyptian government; as transvestite and homosexual, he vi¬
olates heteronormative sexual and gender expectations. Scobie's traversal across sexual categorizations
seem endemic to the setting; Balthazar, Clea, Justine, Pombal, and even Darley refuse to conform to
sexual norms. For more on Scobie, see Michael Pharand's "Eros Agonistes," in which he calls Scobie a
"secret agent and closet queen" (Pharand 68).
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with abnormal mortality is Capodistria, or Da Capo, as his friends call him. Acciden¬
tally shot while on a duck hunt, Da Capo's death taints the afternoon for his friends:
his death "hangs in the still air like a bad smell, like a bad joke" (Quartet 176). It is,
in fact, a bad joke: Da Capo, Italian for "from the head," signals for music to repeat
from the beginning. In the Quartet, Capodistria is given a chance to repeat the act of
living: rather, he is never dead in the first place. His epitaph, "Not Lost But Gone
Before," sets the stage for the annual visit when his friends pay birthday respects to
their "gone before" friend, laying on his grave flowers he buys for himself and reading
aloud his latest letter (807).
Also in the Quartet are Balthazar's and Clea's returns to life: the first from a mis¬
carried suicide attempt; the second from an accident swimming near the underwater
remains of seven mummies. The artifacts of Balthazar's near death offer a contrast
to the life in which he finds himself in convalescence upon Darley's visit. The grey
(dying) hair, bandaged (ail-but abject) hands, and false (non-living) teeth signify his
negotiation with mortality. When he is talking with Darley, he keeps glancing at the
teeth in the glass next to his bed, "a sulky furious look" (705). They are even used
to juxtapose Balthazar's fallen station with Darley's newly found vivacity when the
novelist (for no reason given in the text) bites into an apple during their conversation
(708). The hands, too, are compared to the white boxing gloves of a "champion"
(707), and the hair is labeled a sign of youthful vanity (709). Similarly, Clea's brush
with death in the harbor takes place in a liminal world, in which the dead stand "up¬
right, like chess pieces ofhuman size," "friendly and appropriate symbols of the place"
(834). Darley explains that "the dead are everywhere" and that they can "invade" our
world (833). Clea seems to be one such invasion. Indeed, when Clea is shot with
the harpoon gun, she is pinned to an underwater ship wreck, the vessel of the dead,
perhaps the very ship that once carried the macabre chess-piece symbols of the place
(848—849). Clea's return to the living is through her violent resuscitation by Darley
in "a pitiful simulacrum of the sexual act" (851) which Darley likens to a "forcible
rebirth" (852), saying it must have been as painful as a baby's first breath.
In the case of Da Capo, Balthazar, and Clea, the extreme opposites meet in their
respective "deaths": for Capodistria, the celebration of his birthday (the beginning of
his life) is held at his empty gravesite; for Balthazar, the symbols of his failed suicide
are contrasted with the description of a lively boxing champion; for Clea, her transi¬
tion into the realm of the Living is described with sexual and reproductive imagery.
Pursewarden and Scobie, too, dwell in the space of Between, residing comfortably
with neither the fully Nonliving—such as Narouz, whose death is final—nor the Liv¬
ing—such as Darley, whose life at the end of the Quartet is absolute. There is a sense
in the case of all of these characters that subjects can never fully die into objects: there
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remains some subjectivity even in objects, thereby delaying the reaggregation of the
subject into the world of objects.
The altered mutability between Living and Nonliving is noticeable even more in
the character Iolanthe, of The Revolt ofAphrodite. The very pronunciation of her name,
"I-O-lanthe," with the accent on the second syllable and often shortened merely to
I-O, stresses the computerized and fluid mortality of the prostitute/actress, "1" and
"0" being the symbols for on and off in binary code. The letters "I" and "O" also rep¬
resent the flow of data, standing for Input and Output, respectively. Iolanthe's true
nature, On/Off, Living/Nonliving, Mind/Body, is manifest especially in her posthu¬
mous reification as a robot, fashioned and owned by the firm Merlin's, product of
Charlock's AI components and Marchant's textile expertise. When Charlock first vis¬
its the lab, the way in which Marchant teasingly reveals her piece by piece—pulling
back the silk to reveal her face, covering the face and pulling back the other side to
reveal a leg "of positively Botticellian elegance," recovering the leg and drawing back
another section to reveal "the vagina, the real treasure" (Nunquam 133-34)—reifies
her form, questioning any association to human-ness or subject-ness. Charlock is
understandably disturbed by the marginality of her object-hood: "It was really quite
devastating the extent of the human condition—if you can just simply imagine an
object called 'self' operating with a frame ofmemory, habit, impulse, inhibition and
so on" (148). Iolanthe the robot is such an object: a collection of memories, habits,
and impulses of Iolanthe the actress. She is the corpse, the abject thrust upon the
living.
After she absconds, the firm chases her, finally finding her to be something quite
far from Julian's "perfect illusion":
She looked flushed, as if she had been drinking, or had had some strange
inner revelation. Her wig wasn't quite snug, and looked badly in need
of cleaning, as indeed did her whole person. The heels of her shoes were
worn down to stumps. A torn raincoat. There was a small gash in her left
calf which had been mended with a piece of surgical tape. She limped.
(2.79).
Her half-loose wig, unnatural skin, and surgically-taped leg juxtaposed with her vo¬
lition and voice, the remaining scraps of the real Iolanthe, call attention to the near¬
ness of the robot to the original model, to what was once the Living. Together, her
patched body shell and her fully functional mind cause her to be branded as un-dead,
an aborted fetus, rejected as Nonliving—or rather, thrust back into the world of the
Living. The limits of her mechanical mind—1 or 0, all or nothing—cannot cope with
the true liminality of her existence: I over 0. Is she living? Nonliving? Had she died,
but is she now alive? Was she alive, but is she now dead? The incompatibility of limi¬
nality destroys the machine-balance, and she goes insane (if such an option is available
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to robots). Iolanthe's death is a transition denied finality, leaving her uncomfortably
in a position Between.
TheAvignon Quintet has death as important to its central form,15 and in fact begins
with the death ofPiers Nogaret, the friend of the apparent narrator, Bruce Drexel. But
another death, that of the novelist Rob Sutcliffe, warrants more attention, as Bruce
and Piers are "vivified" in one of Sutcliffe's novels, and as Sutcliffe commits suicide at
the directive of his novelist-creator, Blanford. Blanford, the "realer" protagonist of the
story of the Quintet puzzles over his choice to kill Sutcliffe, wondering after finishing
the manuscript (ofwhich the first 273 pages ofMonsieur are a part), "The suicide—was
that right?" (Quintet 274). Five pages later, he receives a telegram from his now-dead
character: "Refuse to be rushed off the planet in this clumsy and ignominous [sic]
fashion. Kindly arrange to have me die by less theatrical means. Rob" (278—279). In
the second book of the Quintet, the phone rings, and it is Sutcliffe, as Blanford expects.
"'You are dead, Robin,'" Blanford reminds him, '"Remember the end ofMonsieurV"
Nevertheless, Sutcliffewill not accept the finality ofhis demise: '"Bring me back then,'
said Sutcliffe on a heroic note, 'and we shall see'" (304). In Quinx, Blanford admits to
planning Sutcliffe's death to be a mystery—almost at the level as that of Pursewarden:
"When I killed you in the novel I intended to leave some ambiguity about the matter.
[...T]he dental imprints on your washed-up body did not coincide with the records
of your London dentist. A pretty mystery!" (121 5). Sutcliffe's death, though never
one which relegates him to novel silence, is afforded an extra dimension in its very
inception.
Constance's death, once problematized, remains troublesome the length of the
Quintet. She dies long before the end of the first book; the nine-page dinner conver¬
sation Blanford shares with her is merely played out in his mind (293). Nevertheless,
she dies again in the beginning of the second book (chronologically later than the
first) and continues on living after that. The lives and deaths ofAffad, Piers, Sabine,
and others in a Gnostic "suicide club" are equally repetitive, as at any time the council
may draw one of their names from the lot as the next to be killed. At the same time,
the tradition links them inextricably to the cycle of all those of their group killed in
the past, the next to be killed representing merely the transition from past to future:
"The man behind me represents the past and the man in front the future. In between
those two poles I can say that I exist, only there, only in that Now" (1119). This
cyclical living/dying recurs also in the lives of Ludo in the Quintet and Melissa in the
15Thomas Browne and Alan Warren Friedman write that the "quincunx of novels" described by
Blanford borrows its shape from "the sacred letter x [chi]" (Browne qtd. in Friedman, Fictional Death
262), which "may be rotated to produce a circle [...] with a dot (or tree) at its center" to arrive at
the Greek letter 0, theta, "the first letter of thanatopsis," representing death (262). See also Godshalk's
"Lawrence Durrell's Game in The Avignon QuintetI
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Quartet, both ofwhom have a child.16 Typically in Durrell's writing, "In affairs of this
sort there is always a missing child. In this way history manages to perpetuate itself"
(942). These children, as in the cyclical suicide club, represent the next link in a chain
of death.
Though death is rarely fatal, it is almost always forceful—whether caused by sui¬
cide, murder, accident, or even sickness. The intensity of the transformation accentu¬
ates the border itself between living and nonliving. The transition or border, "neutral
ground," becomes an unstable state of existence in Durrell's novels, evident in un¬
solved mysteries, such as the deaths of Pursewarden, Piers, Sutcliffe, and Constance,
recurring deaths, such as those of Affad, Piers, Ludo, and Melissa, reversible deaths,
such as Clea and Iolanthe, merely mis-represented deaths, such as Capodistria, and
perpetuated lives, such as Scobie. In none of these deaths is death the final word or
act; in many it is the beginning of a chain of other events without immediate end, a
stage of development pushed to the forefront.
In all of them, the focus on the abject, denial of final transition, is also a denial of
the final stage of the rite of passage, the reaggregation into the world: if the subject is
formed from a separation from the world (as Edenic Adam formed from dust), death
represents the objectification and return to the world: a return to the earth, dust to
dust. In Durrell's works, on the other hand, there is no final objectification or return
to the voiceless object: subjects are endowed with a subjectivity far richer than that
typically reserved for either of Balthazar's categories, "as real people or as characters'"
{Quartet 213). The next section of this chapter considers the extent of this subjectivity
and the collected, shared identity of Durrell's liminal personae.
hi Spare Parts
While the works certainly have instances of creating selves or un-creating selves (de¬
scribing and acting upon the permeability of subject to turn into object), far more
often are there instances between these extremes: lives made up of interstructural sit¬
uations between the birth of and the death of the subject. In Durrell's writing this
"simple" act of living is never so simple, though the subtleties thereof might be less
obvious than his depictions of the subject in both its formation and its death. As the
16Ludo, known for his designer honeys he sells from his caravan, is unluckily killed in a raid by the
French Resistance, and his mutilated corpse is lent a "fictitious life" by a "sleepy carpet of bees which
covered his bloodstained frame in its tattered shirt" (941-942). The Honey Man, he is connected to
Melissa, an earlier fatality of The Alexandria Quartet, through her link by name and profession to the
nymph in Greek mythology who taught humans the use of honey. Ludo, as his name might imply, is
the victim of luck, for had he not been on the road at the time (a necessary risk for his livelihood), he
would not have been killed. Melissa, vendor of a different kind of nectar, also dies from the hazards of
her job: an incurable STD ravages her health throughout her final years.
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corpse problematizes the stability of life by showing its connection to death—at the
same time disputing the boundary between living subject and dead object—these sub¬
tleties challenge the autonomy of subjects by showing the connections between them;
or, they offer an alternative to the limitations of separation by depicting a different
kind of construction.
If the process ofwriting the ostensibly autobiographical account of one's accession
to art is also a process of writing oneself and extracting one's subjectivity from the
world, then the dying of a subject is a re-entry into that world, a transition of subject
into object. These processes describe and delineate a duality of subject / object, a
duality that assumes pureness of function of the subject and the object. Lacan writes
of the formation of the self that the "I" is formed "before it is objectified in the dialectic
of identification with the other, and before language restores to it [...] its function as
subject" (Lacan, Ecrits 2). Emile Benveniste elaborates, writing of the formation of the
subject that it is "in and through language that man constitutes himself as a subject,
because language alone establishes the concept of'ego' [...] 'Ego' is he who says 'ego.'"
(Benveniste, "Subjectivity" 224).
The act of the writer writing the novel in which he describes the act ofwriting the
novel (Durrell describesJustine as a "novel about the actual process ofwriting" (qtd. in
Alyn 62)) is the very constitution of the writer as a subject, the writer using language
to establish his authorial voice just as he uses the completion of the novel to establish
his artistic value. As Darley writes of Alexandria, he uses the first person form, I, to
set himself up as a subject, constructing the same twofold linearity that is reversed by
Balthazar's surprising of Darley in Balthazar. Balthazar's subjecthood seems assured
by his voice and the manner he addresses Darley "you" just as he uses "I" to describe
himself. "I am real!" he exclaims, asserting his subject in the first before continuing:
"We are all still real people [...] whatever you try and do to us" (Quartet 2x3).
If "I" and "you" present what Benveniste calls a "correlation ofsubjectivity" (Ben¬
veniste, "Relationships" 201), the third person, on the other hand, describes a lack
of subjectivity; it describes an object and "is the only one by which a thing is predi¬
cated verbally" (199). Benveniste questions the terminology of the third person form,
suggesting that it is a "non-person" form altogether:
When I get out of "myself" in order to establish a living relationship with
a being, of necessity I encounter or I posit a "you," who is the only imag¬
inable "person" outside ofme. These qualities of internality and transcen¬
dence properly belong to "I" and are reversed in "you." One could thus
define "you" as the non-subjective person, in contrast to the subjectiveperson
that "I" represents; and these two "persons" are together opposed to the
"non-person" form ( = he). (201)
The third-person narration o£Mountolive, then, is non-personal in its anonymity, just
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as that narrator's relationship to the spoken-of is uncertain: as pure object, the already-
dead work of art, the events ofMountolive transpire beyond the questionability of any
narrator.
And yet, the third person construction in the beginning of the Quintet projects a
different sort of subjectivity and personhood altogether. Monsieur begins with Bruce
on a southbound train, a journey familiar to him, because it is "the one we had always
taken"—one he had always taken with friends. As he travels, the style of the narra¬
tion shifts noticeably between persons, vacillating between the first and third: "How
well I remembered, how well he remembered! The Bruce that I was, and the Bruce I
become" (Quintet 5). The shift itself is jarring for the reader who expects a modicum
of distance between first and third persons; as Benveniste writes, "in the third per¬
son a predicate is really stated, only it is outside 'I-you'" (Benveniste, "Relationships"
197). As one paragraph ends berating the perpetual lateness of "our train," the next
begins, explaining narratorily that "These were the reflections of the lone traveller in
the lighted third-class compartment at the rear of the train." Bruce separates his per¬
spective from his body, detaching linguistic subject from physical object, describing
how "In the tarnished mirror this man is watching himself." Authorial distance weaves
and wavers between narratorial person and non-person, between subject and object,
describing in one line that "The late traveller was myself" before speculating in the
next that "He must be trying to objectify his thoughts and emotions by treating them
as one would in a novel" {(Quartet 5—6).
A Train Subject
The intimacy suggested between these first and third persons describes a construct at
odds with Benveniste's description of the third as a non-person form; "the Bruce that
I was" is very much implicated in both "the Bruce that I become" and the Bruce that
"I" is. The uncertainty of distance between narrative subject and object of narration
describes a different kind of subjectivity. On the unreliability of his transportation,
Bruce explains that his is "A train subject to unexpected halts, unexplained delays,"
nevertheless offering a vehicle for transition from "a northern winter into a nascent
spring" (Quintet 5). Bruce himself is "a train subject," traveling among identities all
connected at multiple stops. The construction is not unusual in Durrell's writing,
which delights in relationships among subjects and their alter egos, between real and
fictional counterparts, the blurring of authenticity with robotic artificiality, and the
play among imaginary friends whose lives mutually interpenetrate different ontologi-
cal levels. Tire plurality of Balthazar's declaration, "We are all still real people," presents
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a network of collected subject(s), disclosing the possibility of plurality inherent in ev¬
ery singular.
In The Black Book, Gregory describes a similar duality in the "presence ofoneself!":
The eternal consciousness of oneself in substance and in psyche. The eter¬
nal consciousness of that shadow which hangs behind my shoulder, watch¬
ing me flourish my ink on this nude paper. What a recipe for immortality!
The one self and the other, like twin generals divided in policy, bungling
a war. The eternal, abhorrent presence of oneself. (Black Book 31)
Like Bruce, Gregory writes of himself in a kind of third person, distancing his per¬
spective from "that shadow which hangs behind my shoulder." Unlike Bruce, he is
not very clear to whom this shadow belongs, though he, too, seems to imply a differ¬
entiation between physical and psychological selves. To a reader, this shadow hanging
behind his shoulder is reminiscent of Lawrence Lucifer, the narrator and ostensible
author of The Black Book, who includes long extracts from Gregory's diary. Between
these extracts, Lawrence Lucifer provides commentary, questioning and speculating
on Gregory's motives:
I am pondering on Gregory and Grace and the curious design he made of
them both in the little green handwriting. Gregory is a sort of chessman,
like a green bishop, entangled in his pawn, and writing with the quiet
venom of a player who has forgotten the rules. (31)
Lawrence Lucifer entangles the various modes ofGregory: he is a bishop and a pawn,
both chessman and player. The "curious design he made" (my emphasis) suggests a
sense of autonomy in Gregory's account, but the Gregory who as a player "has for¬
gotten the rules" may be a mere pawn of Lawrence Lucifer's construction. Which
he—Gregory or Lawrence Lucifer—is responsible for the curious design of Gregory
and Gracie?
The first long extract of Gregory's diary sets out these problems, identifying that
the central concern is "the question of the ego, the little me. The I, sitting here" (32).
For Lawrence Lucifer, too, the question is of identity: "Who Gregory was, I have
not properly discovered yet" (32). Later, though, he writes of extracts from Gregory's
diary, describing them as "the tender id of this book" and in part implicating Gregory
as "the other me" (55). This intimacy between the id and the ego, between Lawrence
Lucifer and his alter ego, provides an antidote to the "isolation," the "loneliness,"
the "forbidden territory which lies between us" (39, 53, 58).17 Gregory describes
I7Durrell's motif of loneliness in The Black Book can be read alongside that of Henry Miller in The
Tropic ofCancer. Acknowledging his artistic debt to Miller, Durrell sent him an early manuscript of
The Black Book ("I am going to send it to you to read first when it's done, because technically it's
very influenced by you" (Durrell-Miller 55)), hoping to breach that forbidden territory between two
strangers("you can imagine how flattering your curiosity was" (Durrell and Miller 4)); finding himself
successful, he also found, in Miller, a literary mentor and lifelong friend. For more on the literary
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the despair of loneliness and his hopefulness for connection in a manner remarkably
similar to Bruce's train subject:
It is a fancy ofmine that each of us contains many lives [...]. They are laid
up inside us, shall we say, like so many rows of shining metals—railway
lines. Riding along one set toward the terminus, we can be aware of those
other lines, alongside us, on which we might have travelled—on which
we might yet travel if only we had the strength to change. You yawn? This
is simply my way of saying I am lonely. (Black Book 37—38)
Gregory's fancy of the potentially many lives of everyone—and the possibility of
changing tracks and drawing nearer to others which had before seemed parallel, and
thus ever distant—bespeaks his desire to draw closer to others to combat perpetual
loneliness. As every track leads toward the terminus, every track also radiates out
from it, suggesting both the inevitability and the originality of a state of human con¬
nection.
TheAlexandria Quartet describes a persistence ofcharacters whose identities as they
are described ought to be mutually exclusive. The eponymous Justine of the first book,
whom Darley writes as being in love with him, cannot be the Justine of the second
book, the Justine whom Balthazar lists among the "Fallacies and Misapprehensions"
of Darley's first novel: "Number 4. That Justine 'loved' you" (Quartet 216). The sin¬
gular picture Darley paints of characters in Justine may be at odds with the complexity
of personhood, putting them, as Clea writes, "in a very special position" (378). That
the first three books of the Quartet are called "siblings" which "interlap, interweave,
in a purely spatial relation" (Balthazar 9) implies that, if nothing else, these spatial
boundaries will be respected, but the way in which Balthazar presents a set of char¬
acters incompatible with those from Justine—albeit basing that incompatibility on
the limits of any one perspective—yet ties these selected fictions inextricably, makes a
greater gesture to the use of alter egos elsewhere in Durrell's work.
In The Revolt ofAphrodite, Charlock, like The Black Book's Gregory, describes a
disassociation with himself. Waking in an asylum in Nunquam, he wonders "April
to October, but where were those vanished weeks, and where was he? I would give
anything to know." Like Bruce, he slips between third person and first person. Like
Bruce, he uses the mirror to hinge his perspective outward, recognizing externally what
he cannot know internally, the recognition of the sameness of "he" and "I," but unlike
Bruce he also assumes the position of the second person in the process: "Nothing of
all this did you notice until the image in the mirror one day burst into tears. [...] The
pain of regained identity. Ahhhh!" Finally, he is able to reconcile the two persons in
relationship of Durrell and Miller, see also James Gifford, '"The unknown is constant': The Fiction
and Literary Relationship of Lawrence Durrell and Henry Miller."
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one in a moment of synchronized knowledge, as "I know it now, and the other knows
it too—we slide into one identity once more, as slick as smoke" (Nunquam 12).
Describing his interactions with the doctors and nurses on the ward, he calls him¬
selfschizophrenic, wielding the word as a weapon: "doctors are scared ofschizophrenes
because they can read minds, they can plot and plan. They pretend to pretend" (13).
Schizophrenia here describes Charlock's state of having multiple personalities vying
for control; if Charlock is at once "I," "you," and "he," mind-reading is little more
than a shift in perspective.18 Using the work of Fredric Jameson, Donald Kaczvinsky
describes schizophrenia in the Revolt as "the loss of the sense of history on the indi¬
vidual and cultural level," particularly as found in postmodern societies (Kaczvinsky,
"Postmodern Society" 65). For the sufferer of schizophrenia, then, he writes that "life
is a series of disconnected presents" (66). In the Revolt, however, this loss of individual
history opens up to him the possibility of transcending the bounds of the individual.
In sorting through Caradoc's transcriptions, Charlock notices similarities with those
of others and speculates on the construction of human identity:
is everyone built on this pattern?—like a club sandwich, I suppose. But
here for example is a vein which would be more suitable to Koepgen
—perhaps it is the part of Caradoc which is Koepgen, or vice versa. I
mean alchemy, the great night express which jumps the points and hurtles
out of the causal field, carrying everything with it. Alchemy with all its
paradoxes—I would have logged that as Koepgen's private territory. But
no. The vein is there in Caradoc, under the fooling. {Nunquam 17)
This club-sandwich patterning of personality is an interleaving of different fields.
What Charlock calls "Caradoc" and what he calls "Koepgen" are not so neatly divided;
they are parts of one another. He applies the metaphor of alchemy, the transmutation
ofone element into another, to describe the migration of identity among parts. In The
Revolt ofAphrodite, Gregory's tracks no longer delimit the path a person might take.
For Charlock, Bruce's train jumps the tracks, carrying "everything"—the singularity of
personality, the dualities of subject/object and cause/effect—with it. Charlock's fight
in Tunc to separate himself from the undifferentiated mass of the firm makes way in
Nunquam for his acquiescence of the firm's control. Iolanthe the actress, whose iden¬
tity in death is assumed by the firm in the manifestation of'Iolanthe' the robot, is the
only character of the Revolt capable of—or, in the end, even interested in—revolting
l8Schizophrenia, from the Greek'split mind,' used clinically describes a series ofsymptoms associated
with disorganized thinking. Used popularly, it describes a "split personality," or the state of having
multiple personalities at hand. This second, clinically incorrect meaning is very common, even in the
early twentieth century; in an article written in 1933, for example, T. S. Eliot equates schizophrenia
with the possibility of being "virtually two men" (Eliot qtd. in McNally 75). It is unlikely that Charlock
as a schizophrenicwould be asked to impose order among Caradoc's transcriptions ifDurrell is using the
clinically correct (but popularly unknown) meaning of the word. See Kieran McNally's "Schizophrenia
as Split Personality" for further information on the word's usage.
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from this corporate identity. And Charlock's act of destruction of the firm's archives
at the end ofNunquam can be read as an act of destroying the possibility of differen¬
tiation in an increasingly schizophrenic world—a world in need of a physical archive
to provide it with a sense of history.
Alter Egos
While Bruce presents the first instance of plurality of subject in Quintet, he is far
from the only example of this kind of a traveling subject, halting and delaying while
at the same time shifting position. In Constance, the meeting between Blanford and
Sutcliffe, the latter supposedly being a character created by the former, is described as
a meeting between "several different versions of a self" (Quintet 921). They present
the most obvious example of the split in subjectivity, later explicitly equated with the




Furthermore, when Blanford asks "How much longer have we got together?" Sutcliffe
makes explicit the connection between the two: "his alter ego replied: 'One more
book, one more river. The body and soul must end their association. I know'" (1187).
This connection between Blanford and Sutcliffe, and indeed the connection be¬
tween—and the plurality within—many characters in Durrell's work, describes a situ¬
ation different from the well-defined subjectivity Benveniste describes in the linguis¬
tic formation of subject, the saying of "ego." The sense of "myself" that Benveniste
writes of transcending to form relationships ("I get out of 'myself' in order to estab¬
lish a living relationship with a being") in Durrell is not a stable self comprised of
an impermeable internality of "I" (a sense of subject) and an accessible externality of
"you" (the not-self, the object of "I"). Instead, the subject in Durrell's works comprise
a strange plurality, a joining of "I" and "not-I." Benveniste writes that "the oneness
and the subjectivity inherent in 'I' contradict the possibility of a pluralization"; never¬
theless Durrell's subjects themselves contradict any sense of this oneness. They present
"a junction between 'I' and the 'non-I'"; their "I" is a "we," comprised of something
other than "a multiplication of identical objects"; rather, they present a junction of
disparity that, taken at once, "forms a new totality which is of a very special type"
(Benveniste, "Relationships" 202).
Of the sense of "we," Benveniste describes something very similar to Turner's sense
of the "liminal group" composed as a "community or comity of comrades and not a
structure ofhierarchically arrayed positions" (Turner, "Betwixt" 100). Benveniste's we
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"is not a quantified or multiplied T; it is an T expanded beyond the strict limits of
the person, enlarged and at the same time amorphous" (Benveniste, "Relationships"
203). Blanford and Sutcliffe as constructions expand beyond the strict limits of the
person, and while Blanford claims to be Sutcliffe's creator, he holds no structurally
superior position. Similarly, Constance is the double of Constanza (Quintet 1270),
Egon von Esslin's twin sister, just as she is also to a degree the double of Pia, Sutcliffe's
wife-turned-lesbian (185). And Trash is a multiple ofThrush, as Sylvie is of Sylvaine
and Sabine, the de Nogarets are of the Ogres, and the many queer sexual triads (Piers-
Bruce-Sylvie, Hilary-Livia-Constance, Pia-Sutcliffe-Trash, Sylvie-Livia-Blanford) are
of one another.19 This joining together of aspects of different characters under the
banner of singularity evidences Sutcliffe's vision of the novel he is writing: "After all,
why not a book full of spare parts of other books, of characters left over from other
lives, all circulating in each other's bloodstreams—yet all fresh, nothing second-hand,
twice chewed, twice breathed" (693).
This we of the train subject, most noteworthy in the Quintet's alter egos and al¬
ter personae,20 abounds in all of Durrell's depictions of subjects, growing only more
obvious in his later works. Moreover, it underscores the inability of the subject, once
written or lived, to truly ever die into a state ofvoiceless object-hood: the Pursewarden
whose death in Clea seems a finality will always eventually have come to be the editor
of that very book. Though the construction of the self as subject begins the very mo¬
ment Lawrence Lucifer, Gregory, Darley, Charlock, Sutcliffe, or Blanford write (or
say) "I," their respective constructions as artists reside beyond the limitations allowed
by language. The entry into that beyond, the liminal edge of subjective artistry, lends
the power to characters in those novels to follow Sutcliffe's diktat, which he enacts by
delivering: "Be ye members of one another" (693).
Benveniste writes that "the verbal person in the plural expresses a diffused and am¬
plified person. 'We' annexes an indistinct mass of other persons" (Benveniste, "Rela¬
tionships" 203). The construction of we lacks any inherent structuring to it; it demo¬
cratically conjoins a group of "I" and "not-I," blurring, as Benveniste writes, "the too
sharp assertion of T into a broader and more diffuse expression" before offering, in
the end, access to "the 'we' of the author or orator" (203). This ascendance to an
authorial "we" is considered further in the next chapter.
I9Marie-Christine Veldeman further explores the threesomes in the Quintet in "Love at Verfeuille:
Duality of a Trinity."
20See, especially, Melody L. Enscore's "Systemic Imagery in Durrell's Avignon Quintet
Chapter 2
Selected Fictions
Ifwe were readers only ofthe cosmic novel, things would be different: we should then share the
author'spoint ofview and recognize villains to be as essential as heroes in the plot. But we are
not the readers but the very personages of the world-drama. In your own eyes each ofyou here
is its hero, and the villains are your respective friends or enemies. The tale which the absolute
readerfinds so perfect, we spoilfor one another through our several vital identifications with the
destinies ofthe particularpersonages involved. (A Pluralistic Universe 48—49)
It is impossible to describe with ivhat emotion I read his words—sometimes so detailed and
sometimes so briefly curt—asfor example in the list he had headed "Some Fallacies andMisap¬
prehensions" where he said coldly: "Number 4. ThatJustine'loved'you." (Balthazar 22)
If Darley's literary reification ofAlexandria in Justine represents the first dimension—
length—in Durrell's Quartet, then the introduction in Balthazar of another perspec¬
tive represents the second: width. With the presentation of Balthazar's "Interlinear,"
the linear consideration of Darley is problematized to become planar, opening it up
democratically for the consideration of everyone in the Quartet—who are not merely
characters of Darley, but are subjects in their own rights. Thus, for the purposes of this
study, the second dimension of "width" is actually a dimension offering the possibil¬
ity of plurality of treatment of an artistic object. Darley's depiction of Alexandria is
exposed as being not a depiction of the true history of their shared Alexandrian expe¬
rience, but rather a depiction of the story as he has internalized it, a selected fiction
based on his experiences in and interaction with a world he can only imagine to be
anything but fictional.
This interplay of a kind of second dimension, a relation of fictionality to "reality,"
is fundamental to all of Durrell's major fiction. The idea is explored elsewhere in
the Quartet, for example in Justine's note that "Only the city is real" (Justine 9) or
in Balthazar's note that, while "The characters and situations in this novel [...] are
entirely imaginary [...]. Nor could the city be less unreal" (Balthazar 9). In The Revolt
ofAphrodite, too, the robot 'Iolanthe' is "so damn true to life" that she is "more real
than the reality itself" (Nunquam 174, 140). And The Black Book's ontological levels of
Lawrence Lucifer, a novelist writing about his housemates—as well as about Gregory,
another former diarist and inhabitant of the Regina Hotel, who also writes about
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their common housemates—describes a similarly dizzying relationship of characters
to author.
But ofDurrell's works, TheAvignon Quintet offers perhaps the most pressing exam¬
ple of the interplay between fiction and reality—the presentation of a reality which,
itself, cannot be anything but fictional. For example, Sutcliffe, a major character of
the novel, is actually a creation of Blanford, the novel's protagonist. At the end of
Monsieur, Blanford receives a mysterious telegram from his character (Quintet 279)
and writes about "suing himself for libel" (273) in light of Sutcliffe's jokes at his ex¬
pense. And Blanford questions his own sense of being, wondering if he might be
perhaps "an invention of someone like old D—the devil at large," before placing "D"
(the devil? Durrell?) as the ultimate begetter of the characters in a faux lineage of the
novel (279, 294). And the novel ends in the middle of Blanford's epiphany on the
relationship of fiction to reality, cut off by the intrusion (in the material world) of the
book's back cover—the 1992 edition ofwhich extols the virtues ofDurrell's treatment
of his "prime themes of'fiction' and 'reality.'"
His travel narratives, too, though destined to be read as "truer" to reality than his
works of fiction, often confuse the real with the imagined. In the acknowledgments
to Sicilian Carousel, for example, he calls "the characters" of the travel narrative "imag¬
inary" (Sicilian 9). In Bitter Lemons, too, he denies the political overtones of that book
in favour of placement as "a somewhat impressionistic study" (Bitter Lemons 11). He
does much of the same thing in his other books, Reflections on a Marine Venus and
Prospero's Cell, denying the authenticity of his characterization, preferring instead for
the people of his books to be considered naturalized citizens of his imagination.
Despite—or perhaps because of—all these juxtapositions of fiction and reality,
there remains a lot to explore regarding the two terms, though much critical atten¬
tion has been paid already. Lee Lemon opens the confusion between the two to the
world of the reader, writing that Durrell is noteworthy particularly for "his ability
to persuade his readers to accept [...] the intricacy and the mystery of the world we
habitually simplify in order to understand" (Lemon, "Imagination of Reality" 37).
W. L. Godshalk, too, confronts the problem of confused reality and fiction in Dur-
rell's writing, resorting to coining the confusing (but useful) terms "Actively Active"
and "Actively real" (Godshalk, "Death" 105). Nevertheless, this concession seems to
sidestep the real issues in Durrell's writing—namely, the nature of these nested Ac¬
tions, the interplay of Action and reality, and the very "real" blurring between the two
which challenges this tidy separability. What is it one writes about when writing about
Action? What does one mean by reality? And are the two mutually unintelligible, or is
communication between the realms possible? In this chapter, I will examine the ideas
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of fiction and reality, considering the constructs alongside existing explorations of re¬
ality, imagination, metafiction, structuralism, narratology, and the acts of reading and
writing, before applying the concepts in a progressive analysis of Durrell's novels. In
the first section (beginning on page 45), I will examine Darley's approach to reality in
the Quartet; in the second (from page 53), I will consider that of Charlock in Revolt;
and in the final section (from page 59), I will focus on Blanford in the Quintet before
bringing these readings together with further consideration of The Black Book as well.
Before these considerations, however, I will explain my theoretical approach.
Between Fiction and Reality
Man is simply a box labelledpersonality. He peers out ofthe box through five slits, the senses.
On this earth he is permitted access to three dimensions ofspace and one of time. Only in
his imagination can he inhabit the whole—a reality which is beyond the reach of intellectual
qualification: a reality which even the greatest art is incapable ofrendering in itsfullgrandeur.
{Key to Modern Poetry 5)
In Key to Modern Poetry, quoted above, Durrell establishes a tripartite ontology of
selfhood in relation to the world: there is something like humankind, there is reality
(the world which is segregated from and beyond the understanding of humankind),
and there is the third, intervening and communicative realm of imagination. The first
is limited by the ability of the senses to comprehend data accurately; moreover, the
whole of reality cannot be entertained in the mind at one time, as it is experienced in
fifths (the senses), fourths (the dimensions), or twenty differing combinations thereof
{Key 5).
To complicate matters, the second aspect, reality, is "beyond the reach of intellec¬
tual qualification" (5). It is not a matter of sight or touch needing greater resolution;
neither is it the dogged aspect of time slowing human understanding of reality. Rather,
Durrell tells us, reality is complicated by design. In describing reality as beyond the
faithful rendering of art, Durrell equates art to an extension of this human drive to
understand reality—a drive that can never be satisfied.
Reality is similar to those other "great conceptual abstractions like 'truth', 'beauty'
and 'eternity'," in that we can hold no reasonable expectation to reduce it in any easily
comprehensible manner. They are all "irreducible qualities": "The materials we use
for thinking are so unstable that it is unlikely we shall ever reach a final definition,
a final judgment upon them" (3). Reality, as something transcending experience, is
something humans cannot expect to fully touch upon in any explanation. Charles
Saunders Peirce writes that all we can know of reality is based on opinion (Peirce,
"OfReality" 57). Somewhere after our observations lie the subjective elements of our
understanding of reality.
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In Durrell's model, imagination is the keystone. Imagination allows for "provi¬
sional truths, our short-range raids on this greater territory which permeates our inner
lives" (Key 5). It allows for seams to appear seamless, smoothing deficiencies in un¬
derstanding so that the one (reality—or the human recognition of our inefficiency in
understanding it) does not render the other (human) unable to act. Robert Scholes,
drawing inspiration from Peirce, further explains: "In life, we do not attain the real.
What we reach is a notion of the real which contents us enough so that we can found
our behaviour upon it. In a word, we arrive at belief" (Scholes, Fabulation 7). Peirce
calls this belief "the demi-cadence which closes a musical phrase in the symphony
of our intellectual life" (qtd. in 7). Durrell's understanding of reality being beyond
intellectual qualification seems to be compatible with the pragmatic model espoused
by Peirce.1 Durrell's imagination., that which allows us to compromise a provisional
understanding of the world we otherwise have no chance of ever fully knowing, leads
humanity to an understanding of the world that matches evenly with Peirce's belief.
Because of the simplifying work of our imaginations, we believe we can comprehend
reality.2
In his Biographia Literaria, Coleridge describes two different varieties of imagina¬
tion, further expanding the vocabulary we have to talk about imagination, belief, and
reality.3 The first of these, the primary imagination, corresponds directly with Dur-
rell's notions of imagination as the encapsulating element of reality: "The primary
imagination I hold to be the living Power and prime Agent of all human Perception,
and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I
am" (Coleridge 175). Coleridge's primary imagination is what collates the disparate
fragments of human perception into the semblance of a whole. Primary imagination
allows for a finite reduction of the infinite world, a simplifying understanding not
unlike the act that for Peirce culminates in belief.
Coleridge's secondary imagination, on the other hand, is a more creative mode of
imagination:
It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create; or where this process
is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to idealize and to
unify. It is essentially vital, even as all objects (as objects) are essentially
fixed and dead. (175)
'In The Avignon Quintet the psychoanalyst Schwarz (in conversation with Constance) champions
pragmatism as the best way to view reality: "Pessimist!" "No, realist. Pragmatist!" (Quintet 1148).
2It is important to note that the effect of this process of privileging imagination makes it tran¬
scendent (in this model) to the reality it ultimately constructs. See the inverted model of "Histoire,"
"narrating," and "Recit" enclosed by parentheses at the left side of Figure 2 on page 45.
3The choice of Coleridge here to explain Durrell's model of the imagination is an informed one,
as he admired the Romanticists for their treatment of imagination. When asked in an interview if he
identified with Romantic values, he replied, "Romantic values? Yes, if you wish; in the sense that what
I call life I see as an act of the imagination, a poem." (Durrell, "Persuading the World" 71)
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Secondary imagination is responsible for projecting a reality that is not true. The pri¬
mary imagination, in forming an understanding of the world perceived by the senses,
builds a model for the secondary imagination to dissolve into constituent parts, recre¬
ating aspects of that reality. In idealizing and unifying, the secondary imagination
etches into belief a secondary reality, based upon but differing from that primary one
collected by the primary imagination. It recognizes the compromised perspective on
which belief is based and uses the limits thereof to describe something different.
Elsewhere in Durrell's writing, this compromised perspective of belief is equated
with fiction. In The Alexandria Quartet, for example, Darley's mistaken assumptions
about the lives of his friends lead him to compose a fiction roughly corresponding
to his time spent in Alexandria; the single-volume Penguin editions of those books
even carry a strongly worded note from the publisher, indicating that the books are,
in fact, works of fiction.4 Subsequently, we can summarize Durrell's model as one of
imagination intervening between fiction and reality, filtering and opening access from
one to the other.
Gerard Genette describes a similar system to codify a language of narratology,
drawing distinctions between histoire, ('story'), narration ('narrating'), and recit ('nar¬
rative').5 The histoire is the "signified or narrative content," including plot elements
and actions, and the recit is the "signifier, statement, discourse or narrative text it¬
self." Narrating, meanwhile, is "the producing narrative action and, by extension,
the whole of the real or fictional situation in which that action takes place" (Genette
27). Genette's model of narratology corresponds well with Durrell's ontology: histoire
corresponds to the fiction the author holds of the world, in that it is often based on
(and derivative of) it;6 recit corresponds to reality, because the recit is represented,
in part, by the physical aspect of the book or text in the world; moreover, narrating
resembles imagination, because just as imagination is the encapsulation of reality into
belief, narrating is the sublimation of the histoire into the recit7
Umberto Eco summarises Hjelmslev's model of the sign function as a "Theory
of Communicational Acts," which he breaks down into sender, message, and addressee
'The standard disclaimer, on the copyright page ofeach of the four books, goes further than Durrell's
"Only the city is real" in suggesting that Alexandria itself is fabricated: "This is a work of fiction. Names,
charaters, places, and incidents either are the product of the authors imagination or are used fictitiously,
and any resemblance to actual persons, living or dead, events, or locales is entirely coincidental."
5In order to avoid confusion, when I refer to these terms as Genette uses them, I will use the French
terms histoire and recit with the English narrating, as "story," "narrative," and "narration" are too similar
in their English meanings.
6Eco writes that when reading, the reader "assigns those subjects to a possible world [...] between
this world and the world of his experience" (Eco, Role 17).
Nevertheless, as we shall see later, the histoire of a novelist like Darley in Justine, while correspond¬
ing to the fiction he holds of the world, is one he mistakes to be the histoire of the reality he cannot
actually access.
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(Eco, Semiotics 53). The sender is the author (fictional or otherwise), the message is
that text which is being sent, and the addressee is the reader (fictional or otherwise).8
Just as Durrellian fiction is an aspect of one person's place in the world, and just as
histoire represents one idea transcendental to a text, so is sender dependent upon the
placement of a single person and transcendental to the idea of something being sent.
The message corresponds to the narrating (which describes the act of broadcasting)
and the imagination (responsible for the ideation of reality into beliefor fiction). And
the addressee, or reader, has immediate access only to the recit, the text, and resides in
the world of reality external to the histoire or fiction.
While Coleridge writes of perception and creation, the models of Genette and
Hjelmslev focus more on the creation and transmission of a recit than they do on
the act of interpretation of that text; Wolfgang Iser, on the other hand, takes up the
perspective of the reader, considering the act of interpretation in a model similar to
that detailed in Eco. His three components are the text, the work, and the reader, which
both correspond to and problematize the other models. Unlike Genette's narrating,
Durrell's imagination, and Hjelmslev's message, Iser's work operates on an implicit
level:
If the virtual position of the work is between text and reader, its actualiza¬
tion is clearly the result ofan interaction between the two [...]. This is not
to deny the vital importance of each of the two poles—it is simply that
if one loses sight of the relationship, one loses sight of the virtual work.
(Iser, "Interaction" 21)
In Iser's model, the text represents the words written by the author. The reader reads
the text, idealizing it as the work, an interpretation of the words of the author. But
Iser's model can also be seen as an inversion of the model proposed by Genette and
Durrell, with the author- or narrator-as-subject replaced by the reader-as-subject. Fur¬
thermore, the work is something fashioned in the act of reading. In this sense, reading,
as the explication of the histoire from the recit, corresponds to (and is complicit with)
Genette's narrating, as the sublimation of the histoire into the recit. Just as for Genette
the histoire is what a narrator puts into a recit, so too is Iser's work what the reader
"gets out of" a text.
Reading, Writing, and Imagination
These concepts of reading and writing (or narrating) are natural cognates to Barthes'
terms scriptible and lisible, translated as "writerly" and "readerly," respectively. For
Barthes, readerly describes "classic texts" that are "negative, reactive value: what can
8Eco finds Hjelmslev's model to be too simple to describe accurately the act of communication;
nevertheless, the model is convenient enough for the limited needs of this study.
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be read, but not written." They constitute a lack of choice on the part of the reader,
allowing him only to accept or reject the propositions of the text (Barthes 4). They
depend especially on the condition of a text being straightforward. Most readings of
Justine out of the context of the rest of The Alexandria Quartet would describe a more
readerly text, one whose meanings are straightforward and one offering the reader
only the option of accepting or rejecting the propositions therein. The reader of such
a text must either accept the entire set of propositions or accept none of it.9 At times,
however, a text is not so candid with its meaning. In The Avignon Quintet, for ex¬
ample, Blanford is frustrated when his character Sutcliffe calls on the telephone, not
because Sutcliffe represents a fiction, but because in that fiction Sutcliffe is supposed
to be dead: '"You are dead, Robin,' said Blanford. 'Remember the end ofMonsieur?'"
Sutcliffe is not so easily shaken off: "'Bring me back then,' said Sutcliffe on a heroic
note, 'and we shall see'" (Quintet 304). Later Sutcliffe, flirting with Blanford's love
interest Constance, sends Freud's couch to her in the mail. In this example, there are
three different levels of intermingling reality and fiction: that of Sutcliffe (creation of
the narrator), that of Constance (fellow inhabitant of the world of the narrator), and
that of Freud (inhabitant of both the world depicted in the text and the world of the
reader).
This kind of text presents a challenge to the reader because the grammar of the recit
is hard to follow. According to Iser, "In literary works, [...] the message is transmitted
in two ways, in that the reader 'receives' it by composing it" (Iser, "Interaction" zi).
The Reader "reads" by bridging gaps in the text. These gaps have been laid out by the
writer with purpose for the reader to be guided through a text, and they are formed by
"mark[ing] off schemata and textual perspectives from one another" (24). In reading,
the reader effaces this blank between the schemata and text. Barthes' writerly text,
however, represents an open system with no pre-established schema to transverse:
The writerly text is a perpetual present, [...] ourselves writing, before the
infinite play of the world (the world as function) is traversed, intersected,
stopped, plasticized by some singular system (Ideology, Genus, Criticism)
which reduces the plurality of entrances, the opening of networks, the
infinity of languages. (Barthes 5)
Unlike the readerly, the writerly text introduces multiplicity. It is "novelistic without
9Some possible propositions might be those included in the following set: "Darley loved Justine"
and "Justine loved Darley" and "Nessim's bizarre behaviour was a result of his despondency over his
wife's cheating on him" and "Justine fled Nessim's murderous rage at the end of the novel." The reader
ofJustine who has not also read the other works of the Quartet does not know of the other possibili¬
ties introduced in those books that challenge the set-nature of these propositions established in Justine.
For example, while Darley did love Justine, Justine's love of Darley is less sure and the cause of Nes¬
sim's bizarre behaviour is most certainly not Justine's acts of adultery—which he himself (may have)
sanctioned.
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the novel, poetry without the poem, the essay without the dissertation, writing with¬
out style, production without product, structuration without structure"; conversely,
readerly texts are "products (and not productions)" (5).10
In both, the reader has to traverse the minefield laid out by the author in preparing
a recit. While the readerly text has a pathway cut through to the end, the "correct"
answer to a motivating question, or the histoire, the writerly text offers no such help.
This minefield is what Barthes would call "a galaxy of signifiers, not a structure of
signifieds" (5). This plurality of pointers mobilizes the recit, opening "access to it
by several entrances, none of which can be authoritatively declared to be the main
one" (5). Whereas the readerly text's grammar is apparent, that of the writerly text is
nonexistent or misleading (6). To consider the propositions ofJustine in light of the
rest of the Quartet, the reader is forced to consider between different units ofdifferent
sets, none ofwhich seem "more" correct than others. TheAlexandria Quartet presents
an unclear grammar to the reader who is used to the tendency for the text to present
surmountable gaps for the reader to bridge; instead, the gaps in the Quartet overwhelm
the reader in the middle of the process of "receiving" the text, in the production of a
text before it can be said to be a product.
The writerly text, then, is one in which the reader is free to take on the lack of
structuring grammar in a text and bend it to his or her free will. The more readerly
text presents an exercise of Coleridge's primary imagination; texts that are more open
or more writerly, on the other hand, challenge the secondary imagination. In con¬
fronting a readerly text, the reader merely understands the reality of the text that is
presented. The reader is not transgressing his or her placement as reader, addressee,
or mere informed member of the reality external to a particular narrator's boxed-in
personality. The reader of a closed text uses imagination as an agent of perception,
corroborating sensory data. In reading an open text, on the other hand, the reader
must re-create, idealize, and unify, using imagination to decide and project. Reading
a writerly text involves making choices, in effect writing a histoire, sublimating fiction
into reality, acting as both sender and addressee of the message the reader creates.
I shall call reading the act ofColeridge's primary imagination. In repeating within
the finite mind the infinite act of creation, it is necessary that some elements be dis¬
carded, whether purposefully or negligently. Thus, reading is perceiving and interpret¬
ing while at the same time reducing and simplifying. I shall call writing, on the other
hand, the act of the secondary imagination. In dissolving, diffusing, and dissipating
that infinitude which has been read, the secondary imagination is then able to re¬
unify the constituent parts creatively, to re-create and to idealize new creations. Thus,
IOThis very nature of the writerly text makes it an ideal, "not a thing," something "we would have a
hard time finding [...] in a bookstore" (5).














Figure 2: The limited interaction of a subject with reality through imagination (which recreates a fic¬
tional reduction of that reality). Durrell's model ofFiction/Imagination/Reality is shown in the middle,
flanked by Genette s model of narrative discourse (on the right, as he explains the act ol writing a text,
and on the left, as I use it to explain the act of reading the world). The arrows connecting Durrell's
Fiction, Imagination, and Reality show the connective tissue of Coleridge's imagination: reading rep¬
resents an act of the primary imagination, and writing an act of the secondary imagination. As the recit
resulting from an author's act ofwriting is a text existing in "reality," its histoire, too, is a product of the
author's internalized "fiction" of that reality. The more readerly text elides the upper half of the figure,
implying a connection from the lower-right recit to the lower-left histoire, while the more writerly text
emphasizes the vertical complications (nevertheless existent) in every text.
writing is creating and projecting while at the same time complicating and opening
outwards the worlds which are created. (See Figure 2.)
Generally, imagination, then, is responsible for both reading and writing: for com¬
prehending and creating, for moving a simplified understanding of reality inward and
for projecting an alternate version of reality outward. The imagination is the realm
between fiction and reality, between the histoire and the recit, between the finite and
the infinite. The readerly and the writerly are complementary aspects of one idea,
respectively represented by the ebbing and flowing complementary performances of
reading and writing. In this chapter, I will explore these corresponding aspects of
imagination in Durrell's novels, identifying which, if either, plays a primal role.
i Rendering in its Full Grandeur
Fredric Jameson tells us that "texts come before us as the always-already-read." Read¬
ing texts (and the act of interpretation in general) is fundamentally conditioned by
the cultural filters through which we do the reading or interpreting:
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we apprehend them through sedimented layers ofprevious interpretations,
or—if the text is brand-new—through the sedimented reading habits and
categories developed by those inherited interpretive traditions. (Jameson,
Unconscious 9)
He continues, describing interpretation as "an essentially allegorical act, which consists
in rewriting a given text in terms ofa particular interpretive master code." This "master
code" is something we cannot escape; we can, however, identify these codes through
a process that "will then lead to an evaluation of such codes," which is essential to
any act of interpretation (10).11 In this section, I will consider the consequences of
Jameson's understanding with regard to the Quartet, reading in it Darley's own act of
reading the world before considering his treatment of it in writing.
Reading
In a scene in Justine, Darley describes lying on the beach with Justine: "I lay with
half-shut eyes while Justine (how clearly I see her!) was up on one elbow, shading
her eyes with the palm of one hand and watching my face" (Quartet 44). The par¬
enthetical interruption of Darley's narratorial past-tense description of the events on
the beach—what Genette would call an analepsis ("any evocation after the fact of an
event that took place earlier than the point in the story where we are at any given mo¬
ment")—with the present tense of the first narrative ("the temporal level ofnarrative")
problematizes any simple reading (Genette 40, 48).12 This sentence could be read any
one of three ways: eyes half-shut on the beach, seeing Justine clearly while narrat¬
ing; eyes half-shut on the beach, seeing Justine on the beach clearly despite eyes being
(half) shut; or eyes half-shut while narrating, seeing Justine clearly while narrating.
Jameson's "sedimented layers" of interpretations shield from us all but the first
reading: Darley sees Justine clearly at the time of narrating, and at the time of the
histoire his eyes had been half shut. In this circumstance, the present tense of his nar¬
rating self—the primary imagination that interprets Darley's perspective of the world,
simplifying it into belief—bleeds through his analepsis, infecting his perspective with
a corrupt vantage. In this reading, the extent of the analepsis is considered mixed—a
term used by Genette to describe analepses "whose reach goes back to a point ear¬
lier and whose extent arrives at a point later than the beginning of the first narrative"
1'Jameson also writes that "[t]he literary or aesthetic act [...] always entertains some active relation¬
ship with the Real [...by drawing] the Real into its own texture" (81). Based on the Lacanian myth of
a pre-Spaltung existence, what Jameson calls Real is as worthy of skepticism as Durrell's sense of "Real¬
ity," but it is at least overtly aware of the implicit reduction before any act ofwriting, the parenthetical
left side ofmy Figure 2.
12It is possible, even, to read the parenthetical interjection as prolepsis ("any narrative maneuver that
consists of narrating or evoking in advance an event that will take place later" (40)), looking forward
to the moment of narrating from the temporal position of the beach.
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(49)—as the analepsis includes description concurrent with the "Erzdhlzeit (narrative
time)" (33). He writes about having his eyes shut, but he cannot help acknowledg¬
ing within the act of narrating the clarity of his sight. In such an interpretation, he
narrates the histoire as a digested bolus of what had been his reality; in short he ac¬
knowledges that he is reading, exercising his primary imagination to reduce the fully
incomprehensible truth of reality into an easily presented belief.
Nevertheless, the passage is not unambiguous; it is also possible he is claiming to
have seen her clearly on the beach in spite of his half-shut eyes. In this interpretation,
the extent of his analepsis is external, the "entire extent remains external to the extent
of the first narrative" (49), though the tense slips parenthetically into that of the scene
instead of remaining loyal to the act of narrating. Here, the past-tense distance of
"erzdhlte Zeit (story time)" is effaced in favor of the immediacy of the present-tense
recit time (3 3), lending a primacy to the histoire over the recit. This interpretation lends
an emotional intensity to Darley's recollection: he is so moved by the memory ofJus¬
tine and the beach that he loses his narrating self in the fullness of the recollection of
the histoire. The histoire outgrows the narrating, forcing the latter to defer; however, in
refusing to recognize the act of narrating, the histoire sets itself up as a primary reality
rather than a reduced belief, standing in for that "which even the greatest art is inca¬
pable of rendering in its full grandeur" {Key 5). This appraisal fits well with Darley's
misunderstanding of his position in the novel, and it (like Darley) is undermined in
the novel's progression beyondJustine—especially in Balthazar, in which Darley learns
that his perspective ofJustine is far from accurate. Darley's misrecognition of belief as
reality, the already-read for the freshly interpreted, is indicative of his troubled posi¬
tion throughout The Alexandria Quartet and suggests that, though he may be engaged
in an act of reading rather than that ofwriting, he is unaware of the distinction.
There remains yet a third understanding of the parenthetical exclamation: Darley
might be attributing the clarity of his sight in part to the half-shut nature of his eyes
in the time of the narrating. In this interpretation, Darley's description of the beach
is no analepsis at all, as the primacy of the narrating act is never fully disregarded;
rather, the present-tense narrating act is the histoire. Darley's half-shut eyes magnify
the distance from which he is describing this scene, granting it unusual fullness in its
scope as he thinks of her and creates her in his mind. He reads the scene, using his
primary imagination to simplify and understand the moment he describes, but it is
a fictional moment, created by the secondary imagination, by an act ofwriting. He
is reading the already-read text of the relationship he (believes he) had with Justine;
the text is already-read because it is one he had already written. In writing from the
distance of his solitary island life, Darley profits from leaving his eyes half-shut in an
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effort to focus on the fiction he prefers. Nevertheless, he mistakes his fiction for the
reality upon which it is based.
Justine is largely an exploration of that fiction. In Balthazar, Darley learns that
the manuscript of the earlier book is riddled with errors about which Balthazar feels
necessary to correct him in his Interlinear. Balthazar says to him "We are all still
real people [...] whatever you try and do to us" (Quartet 214), refusing to accept the
simplified fictions of Darley's manuscript. Thus prompted, Darley declares, "I must
set it all down in cold black and white, until such time as the memory and impulse of
it is spent" (217). He must write (sublimating fiction into reality, transcribing histoire
into recit) until memory (and the fictive element thereof) is spent, until it passes fully
into the "cold black and white" realm of reality, leaving behind nothing more than
reality.
He begins this quest in the second chapter by introducing many mirrors and
much overt mimicry: "parlour ofMnemjian, with its mirrors [...] and the delicious
mimicry," "Briefly we met [...] in the mirrors," "I have [...a faded] photograph of
this morning ritual [ ] It is a speaking likeness," "Keats's photograph traps him"
(218). These broken images, like shards of a shattered mirror reflecting different
scenes, flicker back and forth before resting on the last, the object trapped in Keats'
photograph: Toto de Brunei. In the span of a page, he is conflictingly described as
trapped in a photograph, as "an originaland as "a Gentleman of the Second Declen¬
sion," (218—219). Toto is, at once, a representation or derivative and an example of
originality. The Technicolor warmth of Darley's fiction never truly gives way to real¬
ity's grey-scale sang-froid. In fact, in the description ofToto that follows, the authority
of language (and text) are immediately undermined:
[Toto] spoke indifferent English and French, but whenever at a loss for
a word he would put in one whose meaning he did not know and the
grotesque situation was often delightful. This became his standard man¬
nerism. In it, he almost reached poetry [...]. He could do this in three
languages. It excused him from learning them. He spoke a Toto-tongue
of his own. (219)
Toto's inability to communicate effectively suggests that the impulse to "set it all down
in cold black and white" is to engage in a losing battle. As the first exercise in Darley's
newfound matter-of-fact style, he embodies the impossibility of effective expression
and the perpetual distance between meaning and representation.
Nevertheless, Darley recognizes his "mania to perpetuate, to record, to photograph
everything" as a "haunting fear ofmissing a fragment of reality" (219—220). Darley's
slavish desire to understand and absorb as much as he can of reality is ultimately
a desire he cannot satisfy. In the end, all he can do is succumb to the simplified
nature of his belief and begin writing his selected fictions. He seems to have come
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to terms with his exercise being an artistic undertaking in the third chapter, where he
punctuates a paragraph of poetic description with a parenthetical and authorial aside,
"(Finewriting!)" (234), but such artistic abandon is short lived when, only a few pages
later, he wonders, "how am I to make comprehensible scenes which I myself see only
with such difficulty [...] ?" His intentions to faithfully represent reality become clear
when he laments the lack ofclarity in his subject matter: "It is hard to compose them
in a stable colour so that the outlines are not blurred" (239). Despite recognizing
the limitations of his perspective, Darley is determined to follow (the unrecognized
shortcomings of) his primary imagination in creating a faithful rendition of reality.
Writing
Balthazar's intervention, through notes left in his Interlinear, eventually spur Darley
to abandon reading for writing. "To imagine is not necessarily to invent," Balthazar
tells him, encouraging him to "cement these apparent gaps in our actions with inter¬
pretations of his own to bind them together" (275), describing the process in terms
very similar to those of Iser. Finally, in the seventh chapter, Darley ends the process
of reading and begins the process of writing. "Shall I reconstruct it," he asks, "the
scene I see so clearly, and which his few crabbed words in green ink have detonated in
my imagination?" (314). In abandoning the primacy of his simplified belief, Darley
begins to exercise his secondary imagination, creating an equally viable set of pos¬
sibilities. He quotes Pursewarden—"There are only as many realities as you care to
imagine" (3 1 5)—and describes scenes he could never have known about (31 5—328),
surprised to find his own cameo appearance as an extraneous character (326).
At the end of Balthazar, Darley recognizes that in revising his manuscript he has
stumbled upon something different from that which he had originally begun. His
"objective 'truth to life'" becomes instead a truth "to fiction" (338) as he considers the
implications of extending "the frontiers of original truth" (339). His focus has shifted
from the primary imagination of reading the world to a secondary imagination of
writing a new one.
Mountolive continues the movement toward the secondary imagination, present¬
ing what outside the context of the Quartet would be a closed text. This third book
is unusual in the Quartet because it is not written in the voice of a character; instead,
it is written from a perspective of detached omniscience. Focusing on the diplomatic
career of Mountolive, the novel spans decades, beginning with Mountolive's arrival
in Alexandria and a description of the Hosnani household when Nessim and Narouz
are young (earlier than the extent ofJustine or Balthazar), and ending with Narouz's
death, for which Mountolive is partly responsible. It consists of no obvious analepses
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or prolepses (and those that are in the text are almost entirely internal), and any cor¬
relation of reality and fiction is minimized; nevertheless, there are moments in the
text when the narrating act supersedes its ostensibly final product, and the duality of
fiction and reality prevails.
The text opens describing the circumstances of Mountolive's visit to Alexandria.
No first-person present-tense voice ofa narrator introduces Mountolive or his thoughts.
Instead, a third-person, past-perfect vantage informs the reader that Mountolive "had
been sent to Egypt," that he "had forgotten," and that a letter of introduction "had
brought him to the Hosnani lands" (397). The combined circumstances of the young
Mountolive's introduction into a setting he has previously not known, in conjunction
with the unwieldy tense of the text, distances the reader from Mountolive's experi¬
ence. There is no illusion that Mountolive's activities are recorded by him or that they
are transcribed as they happen; the Erzdhlzeit (recit, or narrative, time) is much later
than the erzdhlte Zeit (histoire, or story, time). But more than this temporal distance
signaled in the recit, the ending of the second paragraph serves to disrupt and distance
the histoire from the narrating. The fourth and final sentence of that second paragraph
is the single word, "Yes," incomplete in its grammar and confusing in its meaning. The
word signals agreement or complicity with some aspect of the recit, but in doing so, it
also establishes a distance from that text. Though Mountolive is unique in the Quartet
for its lack of authorial /, the "Yes" of the second paragraph is not unlike the paren¬
thetical exclamation "(Fine writing!)" of Balthazar, implying that there is someone
external to the texts, finding them agreeable (and bearing witness to the state of every
text, ultimately, having been narrated however covertly).
More than that, the themes of reality and fiction, recurring often in the first two
books, return in Mountolive, though under different guises. While the subject matter
ofJustine centers on the recollection and reclaiming ofAlexandria, and Balthazar fo¬
cuses on the discrepancy between that recollection and Balthazar's perspective, Moun¬
tolive concentrates on the inconsistency between the imagined and real forms of East
and West—two qualities as irreducible as fiction, truth, and beauty. For Mountolive,
being in Egypt is likened to being "inside the canvas his own imagination had painted,"
and the act of perceiving elements of the countryside is described as "transplanting a
whole huge intact world from his imagination into the soil of his new life" (406). For
Leila, Mountolive was the confirmation of the "prototype of a nation which existed
now only in her imagination" (412). In meeting him, she recognized the fulfillment of
the "absurd book-fed dream" she had "discovered and translated [...] as if her absurd
thoughts were reducing the whole thing, diminishing the scale of it to something [...]
shadowy and unreal" (412). But Leila is not alone in constructing expectations from
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books. Mountolive experiences "a kind of ecstasy to find a sort of poetic correspon¬
dence between the reality and the dream-picture of the East which he had constructed
from his reading" (414). And later, when Mountolive returns to Egypt by plane, the
ground "rose to meet them," pinpricks of recognizable landmarks ("nippled minarets
and towers of the famous tombs; the Moquattam hills [...]") fading into clarity, the
whole effect is described "as if the whole of Egypt were settling softly into an inkwell"
Just as, for Darley, reality is displaced by the reduced effect of his belief, so too
is the reality of Egypt and England reduced into belief for Mountolive and Leila.
Mountolive mistakes the canvas his imagination has painted for the reality he is in,
and instead of reading the histoire of Egypt, he reads the already-read, already-written
text of his belief, "transplanting" his imagination into the fertile soils on the banks
of the Nile. Leila, too, mis-recognizes the reduced, removed, already-read notion of
Englishness in Mountolive. Both Mountolive and Leila displace reality with fiction,
mistaking one for the other, recognizing a discrepancy between the two only too late.
For Mountolive, Leila was "something like a second, almost mythical image of the
reality which he was experiencing." ft is all he can do to try to "marry the twin images
in a camera periscope in order to lay his lens in true focus" (510), but the images are
nothing more than "two dreams overlapping, displacing one another" (619). So long
in the habit of reading and reducing, they are unable to write and create; nevertheless,
they recognize the problems of not trying. Leila describes how she has "been living
with you [Mountolive] so long in my imagination" that she "must almost reinvent
you to bring you back to life" (507)—she must almost write or create a new reality of
Mountolive to reside outside of her imagination.
Curiously enough, just as the unnamed author ofMountolive describes these reduc¬
tions of reality into belief, he is also expanding and exploding his fiction into reality,
transcribing histoire into recit. In doing so, he cannot curb his desire to peek out from
behind the curtain to exclaim his happiness at the product, and he describes the whole
ofEgypt settling into an inkwell to be written out on the paper of the manuscript. The
themes of primary and secondary imagination, though focalized through no obvious
author-protagonist, still find purchase in the textual explorations ofMountolive.
In the final book of the Quartet, Darley reads Pursewarden's "Conversations with
Brother Ass," his fictionalized dialogues on the purpose ofwriting. The biggest thing
to come out of it, though, is Pursewarden's declaration on the fictionality of living.
"Brother Ass, the so-called act of living is really an act of the imagination," he writes:
I3In Chapter 3, I will consider the larger-scale implications of Mountolive's reading of Egypt as
Orientalist, a converging of the imaginative with the geographical—a converging of the second and
third dimensions of this study. See the discussion from page 83.
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The world—which we always visualise as "the outside" World—yields
only to self-exploration! Faced by this cruel, yet necessary paradox, the
poet finds himself growing gills and a tail, the better to swim against the
currents of unenlightenment. [...] If he were to abandon his role all hope
of gaining a purchase on the slippery surface of reality would be lost, and
everything in nature would disappear! (772)
Pursewarden affords writers the unique perspective of recognizing the everyday use of
imagination in understanding the world. To the writer—who through writing is well
practiced in the use of imagination-—the continuous act of reading to interact with
the world is very obvious. Limited as humankind is by its inability to step outside
of the box labeled personality, it copes by standing the simplified belief in for the
real thing. The writer's privileged position of understanding allows him or her the
equal responsibility to write, gifting the internal world (misinterpreted as '"the outside'
World") with something new to challenge the "currents of unenlightenment"—the
simplifying current of the primary imagination.
In reading Pursewarden's letters to Liza, Darley happens upon further understand¬
ing to much of the matters he had been considering earlier in the Quartet, namely that
his early project, to understand or to fully record the truth of his time in Alexandria,
could never have been realized. He writes, "There was no answer to the questions I
had raised in very truth" (791), recognizing the feebleness of any attempt to arrive at
the truth from which any act of interpretation derives. More than that, he begins to
see fiction in the version of reality he believed he could capture, acknowledging at last
the true penetration of invention:
I began to see too that the real "fiction" lay neither in Arnauti's pages nor
Pursewarden's—nor even my own. It was life itself that was a fiction—we
were all saying it in our different ways, each understanding it according to
his nature and gift. (792)
The same idea is expressed in Balthazar in the words of Pursewarden, who "some¬
where" writes, "We live [...] lives based upon selected fictions" (210). We select from
truth the fictions we want to work with and can only have access to those selected
fictions. Our lives, then, are based on those simplified beliefs.
Darley's project in the Quartet—shifting from his original aim in Justine (to record
everything as he remembers it) to that of Balthazar (to understand the truth behind
what happened), Mountolive (assuming Darley is the author, to describe a possible
world), and Clea (to understand the problems of the creation of a possible world)—is
always an exercise of Jameson's allegorical act of interpretation. Darley's readings of
Alexandria and Alexandrians are always filtered through the sedimented layers of his
expectations, which themselves are based upon the simplified version of reality in
which he lives. The inaccessible reality ofDarley's time in Alexandria acts as Jameson's
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"master code" which guides the allegorical acts of interpretation and creation. Over
the course of the Quartet, he abandons the primary imagination, the act of reading
that which has already been read, for a version of the secondary imagination, the act
ofwriting, re-appropriating the units of the primary imagination to re-figure them in
a new creation.
11 Writing and Unwriting
Just as Darley represents the author of The Alexandria Quartet, narrating the coming-
to-being of the recit while learning about the joined limitations of reading and writing,
Felix Charlock represents the author of The Revolt ofAphrodite, Durrell's two-part novel
comprised of Tunc and Nunquam. A displaced scientist on an artistic binge, Charlock
records the happenings ofhis life from the time he leaves Athens as a hobbyist inventor
until the time he gains control over Merlin's, the multi-national firm owning much of
the world.
Though he writes of his childhood, his parents, and even his genetic sequence, he
determines the beginning ofhis life to be at a slightly later date: "I could date my exis¬
tence from the moment when, with a ball of thin twine and two empty cigarette tins, I
managed to make an imitation of the telephone" (Tunc 16). In imbuing this moment
with such importance, Charlock's imitation of the telephone—itself an imitation of
the reality of the voice, which is, further, the metonymic reduction ofhuman—reveals
a mania for recording and for simplified beliefnot unlike that ofDarley in the Quartet.
Running Ink
Not unlike Darley, Charlock manifests this mania by writing—what he calls "occupa¬
tional therapy [...] in the form of these autobiographical notes" (16). And not unlike
the writings of Darley, these autobiographical notes purport to comprise the content
of the books authored by Durrell and offered as TheAlexandria Quartet and The Revolt
ofAphrodite, respectively.
Early in The RevoltofAphrodite the novel's narrator Charlock describes the machine
he uses to write the books Tunc and Nunquam-.
The dactyl was designed for those who talk endlessly to themselves, for
Everyman that is. Also for a lazy man, such a one as myself who has
an abhorrence for ink and paper. You speak and she records: more than
that, she transcribes. The low feminine voice (the frequency dictated my
choice) encodes the words and a tiny phonetic alphabet, no larger than a
lama's prayer wheel, begins to purr. From the snout marked A the tip of
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the foolscap protrudes, and goes on slowly extending until with a sniff the
whole page is evacuated, faultlessly typed. (15)
The construction of Charlock's books is automatic, happening simultaneously as he
recollects various circumstances. The dactyls themselves he alleges to have designed for
the Everyman, the universal human being who has need of effortlessly collecting and
recording an otherwise exhausting amount of data. Charlock himself stands in for this
Everyman; like Darley, he has an insatiable desire to record and to collect everything
that happens to him. Moreover, as Everyman, his position within the novel is one
that is presented as unmitigated by position in space and time: he is everyman and
(as author) is everywhere.
The first section of the book, in which he describes some of his past and introduces
the idea of the dactyls, is broken up into multiple scenes. These scenes themselves
are separated by rows of asterisks, marking change. On page 15, however, Charlock
mentions that his dactyls are so exact, there are "code-tones" to turn them on or off like
a switch. Once the machine has sensitized "to an individual voice to such a degree,"
the transcription and dictation should be both flawless and automatic. On the next
page, Charlock mentions his code-tones: "'Konx' will set her off, while 'Om' will
cut her out" (16). It is almost as if, in mentioning this fact, Charlock sensitizes the
reader to his voice: the scenes now end with the code-tone "Om" at the end of every
dictation, before the separating asterisks.
Unlike the sensitized dactyl (writer), which through code-tones automates the pro¬
cess ofwriting while also narrowing the distance between written (text) and dictation
(what is being told),14 for the sensitized reader these same code-tones interrupt the
narrative, introducing more gaps in the text and making more apparent all the indi¬
vidual processes of reading (and writing). In knowing that Charlock is writing the
story, it is difficult to ignore that it is written. For Charlock, an inventor, the whole
process of inventing ("I gradually came to equate invention with creation") resides in
letting oneself go, in "allowing the damned thing to ferment, to form in the imagina¬
tion" (16). The "damned thing," ofcourse, is the correspondent product ofColeridge's
secondary imagination. Charlock's code tones, his action of "letting go," creates for
the reader a stumbling block in signification, creating still further distance between
the narrative and the story that it contains.
I4I am expanding Charlock's act of narrating to find within it multiple steps: while the words he
speaks are the recit of his histoire, they are also the only histoire (the signified) of the dactyl's recit—the
resulting physical text which is a signifier for Charlock's act of speech. These multiple steps present
multiple potentials of error, thereby further emphasizing the act of narrating, especially in the inclu¬
sion of the dactyl's code tones, which—when using a "sensitized" dactyl, at least—should never be
transcribed.
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Thinking Weed
IfCharlock's modified system ofcreation consists of letting himself go, it is important
to consider what exactly it is that comprises Charlock. Etymologically, his name is
interesting for what it says about his character. "Charlock," as he tells us early enough
in Tunc, is a kind ofweed. As the "thinking weed," he embodies the dual uncultivated
and hardy characteristics of the weed while at the same time offering the intellectual
rigors of a natural scientist. "Felix," on the other hand, signifies his artistic side. De¬
riving from the same root as "felicity" or "felicitous," on one hand "Felix" signifies
happiness; at the same time, though, it carries with it the implication of "the ability
to find appropriate expression for one's thoughts." By virtue of his privileged position
as author of the books he writes, his means of expression can never be anything but
apt—or at least his expression can never accurately signify its own limitations. At
the same time, these words associated with "Felix" carry with them the meaning of
"a particularly effective feature of a work of literature or art" ("Felicity" def. 2a, zb).
Again, as author, he is an effective feature of the books he writes; he is the effective
feature of the work of literature, as the only particular feature to effect anything.
As author, he is an effective feature of a work of literature; equally so as inventor,
he is the effective author of many inventions. These two halves of Felix Charlock,
the literarily effective natural scientist, complement each other. His ability to find
appropriate expression for his thoughts (via his dactyls) is dependent upon his ability
to effect works of art (techne), just as his ability to effect works of art (his books) is
dependent upon his ability to find appropriate expression for his thoughts. As the
text progresses, Charlock's felicity grows. His abilities become more finely tuned just
as his writing style gains new clarity—most obviously in the second book.
In the beginning ofNunquam, Charlock awakes to find himself in an asylum where
he is being treated for acting on the impulses he describes in the beginning of Tunc.
In that first book, he details the problems of expression, lamenting the immediate ac¬
cessibility of trivia: "the more superficial being self-evident, but the more profoundly
buried inexpressibly difficult to expose, despite my relative experience with words"
(Tunc 16). This inexpressibility is immediately obvious in Nunquam s opening on¬
slaught of questions and focalizing of Charlock through a third-person "manifesta¬
tion ofmyself so vaguely realised that it is hard to believe in him" (.Nunquam 11). He
does not recognize where he is ("Well, where am I, then? In what city, what coun¬
try?" (11)) and searches his surroundings in order to "establish himself in the so-called
reality which depends [...] on memory" (11), but wherever he looks, he meets resis¬
tance: his clothes have no markings, an unseen radio plays indistinguishable music,
and the diary he finds has been expurgated (11). The so-called reality, which depends
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on memory, is nowhere in sight. Even a copy of the Bible chained beside his bed con¬
spires against him typographically, joining Charlock's fictional confusion to a physical
reality which resonates in a particular way for the reader, for "it is quite illegible, the
ink has run" (11). Despite Charlock's relative experience with words, reality remains
illegible; the ink ofmemory, responsible for simplifying reality into belief, is smudged,
delaying the transmission of the message of reality to fiction at the same time it delays
the transmission of fiction to reality. Instead of a real book of fiction, a recit which is
readable (lisible) to interpret a histoire, Charlock (and the reader) is left with a book
whose very consciousness of construction effaces its meaning.
The Vital Technique
Nevertheless, where Charlock in the Revolt differs from Darley in the Quartet is sig¬
nificant. Darley's impression—shifting as it does—of events in Alexandria informs
the Quartet's structure and plot and reinforces the reader's expectation of his hav¬
ing written it (even if only fictionally); the reader can only surmise that the book he
writes throughout the length of the tetralogy is the Quartet. Charlock, on the other
hand, confesses to writing something else entirely from the writings of his dactyl, the
writings which comprise the Revolt: "As for these scribblings which emerge from my
copying machines, the dactyls, these are not part of the book I was talking about, no.
[...] While I am writing one book, [...] I write another about it, then a third about
it, and so on" (16).
The books of Tunc and Nunquam, then, are nothing more than records that exist
beside other, real artistic projects. The "book I was talking about," for example, is one
such project. Other works of art (techne) include his many inventions, which (cor¬
responding well to Charlock's interpretation of reality as dependent upon memory)
are largely aids of the primary imagination, helping it to perceive (hearing aids) and
to record (datyls). Even Abel, despite the relative increase of its intricacy compared
to that of Charlock's other inventions, is an extension of the primary imagination,
offering super-human perception to recognize trends in personal histories. These in¬
ventions allow for the finite reduction which corresponds to Peirce's belief, though the
term lacks the same semantic potency when speaking ofmechanical objects; this finite
reduction is manifest in the pages typed out by Charlock's dactyl, the spooled tapes of
recordings of conversations, and the report ofAbel blazing "blue, topaz, green, white"
on the fascia of its "photoelectric eye" (Tunc 12). These reductions are the "objects {as
objects)" Coleridge calls "essentially fixed and dead," when compared to the products
of the "essentially vital" secondary imagination (Coleridge 175).
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Ofall ofCharlock's inventions, though, that of the robot 'Iolanthe' is undoubtedly
the most ambitious. Indeed, the very choice of Iolanthe as a model for the robot
reveals the influence of the themes of reality and fiction that are prevalent throughout
the rest of the novel. In her life, Iolanthe represents a dual reduction of reality. As she
is an actress, she always presents the simplified reality of the characters she portrays,
whether they "swim up out of the screen" (Tunc 195) or are prostitutes with bad wigs;
the images always lack a third dimension. Moreover, the reality of Iolanthe-the-person
is sublimated by the easily digestible version of Iolanthe-the-persona, the simplified
belief that stands in for the infinitude of that reality. Like any screen star, she attracts
a plenitude of fans (not least being Julian himself), many ofwhom mispronounce her
name by placing the accent on the third syllable (29). In time, the two pronunciations
represent two different things: one being the uncomplicated Iolanthe of Charlock's
Athenian, pre-Merlin love; and the other being the screen goddess able to captivate
and command a panoply of press agents by walking into a room. In public, Iolanthe
grooms this persona ofmispronunciation, posing for posters and product placements
to feed into her image of international beauty. In the end, her grooming of this act
of simplified perception and false recognition (in undergoing a shoddy operation to
inject her breasts with paraffin in order to maintain an image) leads to her death.
After death, that simplified belief is replaced by another, the figure of Iolanthe-
the-robot which comes to signify the reality of Iolanthe's life and which, relative to
it, cannot forestall its own subordination. As designed by Charlock and Marchant,
'Iolanthe' the robot continues this tradition of inventions acting as agents of percep¬
tion. In embedding the memories (and, thus, personal reality) of Iolanthe into the
memory banks of a modified Abel, Charlock expects Robo-Iolanthe to play the role
of reduction of Iolanthe-of-reality. Like the typed pages of the dactyl, Robo-Iolanthe
is a finite physical manifestation of the infinite reality; she performs the "predictions"
ofAbel—which are really just readings (and thus reductions) of something which is
already there—in the same sense that the dactyl, upon hearing the code-tone "Konx,"
performs the reduction of Charlock's speech into recognizable units of letters, words,
and sentences. In this sense, Robo-Iolanthe's intended design is of an object as object,
fixed and dead.'5
As Robo-Iolanthe develops, however, she proves to be much more than the agent of
perception, the simple refiguring of Abel that Charlock and Marchant had assumed
she would be. Instead, she is "so damn true to life" that she is "more real than the
reality itself" {Nunquam 140—141). She begins to act "essentially vital," freeing herself
from the watch of Henniker, projecting new situations unforeseen by her captors /
''The limitations ofwhat ought to be available to Robo-Iolanthe in many cases are symptomatic of
the reified art-object, vivified in its creation, as noted in Chapter 1 on page 20.
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creators, and complicating the simplified version of reality on which she has been
initially based. The fatalistic and almost-acquiescent predictions of Abel give rise to
a new efficacy; unlike the earlier pogonometric processor on which she is based,16
Robo-Iolanthe enjoys a newfound ability and agency noticeably lacking in the former.
Newly empowered, the goddess of love, so knowledgeable in the many ways she can
play her part, rebels.
The revolt in The Revolt ofAphrodite represents more than the revolt of the love-
goddess (the roboticized form of Iolanthe as frighteningly perfect in her function as the
real Iolanthe is in her form); it also signifies Charlock's revolt from the expectations of
the novel. Though he spends much of the book dictating to his dactyls, "writing" the
book itself, he admits that the writing process itself is not to any goal. His narrating
reveals that there is no contained histoire he plans to relate; indeed, the recit seems to
end unresolved, apocalyptically aborted mid-dance.17 Moreover, in the course of the
novel, the natures of both Iolanthes shift from perceiving, simplifying, and reading
to acting, complicating, and writing. Each of Robo-Iolanthe's actions opens a new
world of pogonometric possibility for Abel to decipher and write out upon the elec¬
tronic membrane of her ersatz free will. Equally so, each action of Charlock, Julian,
Jocas, and the firm represents new material on which Zeno's disturbingly accurate
predictions can be based. The characters read their expectations and react to them,
rebelling or complying as the case may be, at the same time writing fuller versions of
"the reality." These versions are eventually discarded too, though—by the loss ofAbel,
the death ofMark, the electronic fault of Robo-Iolanthe in St Peter's Basilica, and in
the fire Charlock starts in Merlin's archive—in favor of the unread and unwritten ver¬
sion of reality that lies "beyond the greatest intellectual understanding," interrupting
the message mid-transmission where it wavers between the two worlds of fiction and
reality. At the end of the novels, the characters find themselves at a curious impasse,
when they cannot know what will happen next. At the end of the Revolt, all that has
been written has been unwritten, too; there is nothing left to read. Charlock has no
choice but to start afresh, creating new fictions to fill the void left by the old belief.
l6"It is deduction based on the pogon (eoyov) a word which does not exist. It is the smallest con¬
ceivable unit ofmeaning in speech; a million pogons make up the millionth part of a phoneme. Give
Abel a sigh or the birthcry of a baby and he can tell you everything." {Tunc 11)
I7In touching on the themes and hopes of the book as well as problems in its creation, the true
ending of the book, the postface, emphasizes the primacy of the open act of narrating over the closed
nature of his histoire.
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hi The Kingdom of the Imagination
Our analysis leads us full circle, to Durrell's The Avignon Quintet, that original tome
that served as an exemplar ofour "prime themes." The recits very structure, five books,
represents the elusive quincunx hunted by many characters in the book—from Felix
Chatto to Adolph Hitler and Egyptian royalty. Arrival at the quincunx marks the end
of the novel and the point at which "reality prime rushed to the aid of fiction and the
totally unpredictable began to take place!" (Quintet 1367). Furthermore, the last book
is called Quinx, signifying five and ostensibly named after "the Ripper" Mnemidis
whose tale it is meant to tell. Mnemidis' accidental murder of Sebastian (in Sebastian)
frees Constance to love Blanford, the happiness of which couple marks Blanford's
arrival at a new kind of fullness—thereby also marking the end of development within
this Kunstlerroman.
Laminated Pages
Nevertheless, the tidiness of this structure veils much that is untidy about the histoire\
in the end, the novel is less about Blanford's relationship to Bruce, Sutcliffe, and Con¬
stance and more about the composition of reality and the creation of a world that Eco
might argue is not logically "possible" (Eco, Role 221—224). lnge Siegumfeldt writes
that the Quintet is "designed to produce a disorientation of the reader in almost all
respects" (Siegumfeldt 117). Blanford's manifesto of "a new discrete image of fiction
[...where] All events are the same event from a different angle" and in which "The
work becomes a palimpsest with a laying out of superposed profiles" (Quintet 1217)
describes a fiction that, in the words of Siegumfeldt, moves "back and forth across all
boundaries conventionally distinguishing one category from another" (Siegumfeldt
118).
To wit, the relation of Blanford to Bruce is one best described via a consideration
of Blanford's relation to Sutcliffe (the relation of author to character) and Sutcliffe's
relation to Bruce (again, the relation of author to character). Sutcliffe represents a
reality written into being by Blanford in the same sense that Bruce is an inhabitant of
the reality written by Sutcliffe; both are projections of the secondary imaginations of
their respective authors, making Bruce a creation of a creation of Blanford. Compli¬
cating things, Blanford recognizes Bloshford, another of Sutcliffe's creations, to be a
caricature of Blanford himself. Bloshford represents a troubling of the separation of
reality from fiction, as he is ultimately a product both of Blanford's primary imagi¬
nation (which simplifies to understand the "reality" he lives in) and of his secondary
imagination (which creates a fiction based partly on the rules of reality). Through
Bloshford, who represents him in his fictive world, Blanford partly exists on the same
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narrative level as Bruce. This already complicated structure is complicated further by
the act of Bruce sorting through the posthumous effects ofSutcliffe and (in an extreme
example) by virtue of his medical intervention that saves the life of Blanford himself,
thereby existing autonomously from at least two of his authors.
It is tempting to consider logical possibilities that might explain how Bruce might
be able to oversee the lives of his nested creators, how we might interpret the world
of the Quintet in a way that would satisfy Eco's requirements for a "possible" world.
One such interpretation is one in which there are multiple characters—very similar
to each other in career and deportment—named Bruce whose plurality we as readers
simply fail to recognize. The notion makes sense considering the rest of the Quintet's
dramatis personae, comprised of Affad and Akkad (who seem, at least, very similar
to each other and to another named Sebastian), Trash and Thrush (who seem, at
least, very similar to each other in their shared southern-American twangs, the shared
exoticism of their dark skin, and their shared lesbianism and promiscuity), Sylvie and
Sylvaine (who seem, at least, strikingly similar to one another in the nature they are
both caught in a love triangle with their brothers and husbands), and Pia and Livia
(who seem, to a lesser degree, oddly peculiar in the similarity of their marriages, the
particularly taboo natures of their extra-marital sexual affairs to Trash and Thrush,
respectively, and their violently premature deaths). But this reading glosses over other
problematic constructions in the novel. Affad and Akkad and Sebastian, for example,
are not merely similar to one another: they really are the same person. Sylvie and
Sylvaine, on the other hand, represent a creation ofBlanford and a figure in a painting,
respectively; even so, Sylvie, the character of the fiction created by Blanford, is also
depicted in a painting and has an affair with Constance, whom Blanford himself loves.
And Sutcliffe, too, presents supreme challenges to the structures of fiction and reality
when he telephones Blanford, sends Freud's couch to Constance, and helps nurse
Blanford back to health—not to mention the journey he takes with everyone to the
festival for the Saints Sarah, where he rekindles his old love affair with Sabine, the
beginning of which had been the content of Blanford's novel of him.
On a macroscopic level, too, the characters seem in part to play types, interchange¬
able with one another. The "three-cornered love" of Bruce, Piers, and Sylvie, for
example, is reflected in the troubled love of Trash, Pia, and Sutcliff, further refracted
through the love of Thrush, Livia, and Blanford, mirrored again in Livia's incestuous
relationship with her brother Hilary, who wanted only to sleep with their other sister,
Constance. Sutcliffe's cuckolding by Trash, is partly undermined by the sexual desire
he feels toward her, in the same manner that Blanford's cuckolding by Thrush is partly
undermined by the true motives ofhis marriage to Livia: to be closer, through her, to
Constance, whom he really desired, a compromise not dissimilar to the one taken by
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Hillary. Like the rest of the novel, it is, as Blanford describes it, "a case of transposed
heads" (Quintet 365), the significance of each sacrificed in favor of the effect of the
whole.
These transposed heads resonate throughout the Quintet, but most notably in the
portraits of Piers, Sylvie, and Bruce hanging in Constance's house: "the three heads!"
(361). These particular heads represent a trio unknown at the time to Constance,
Blanford, and the others, for the analepsis of the summer spent languidly lounging
by the pond happens much earlier than their meeting one another. More than that,
though, this particular trio represents an idea of the other Piers, Sylvie, and Bruce; the
unmistakable antiquity (much older than the Piers, Sylvie, and Bruce who eventually
meet Constance, Blanford, and the others) of the portraits clouds the three in mystery
more puzzling than identification:
three smoky heads printed in the typical ancestor-style of safe academi¬
cians of the last century. And now almost obliterated by corruptions in
the pigment. Ihe names too were hardly readable, though one could make
out the word Piers [...] and the word Sylvie [...] who might well have been
his sister. The third picture had fared worse and it was literally not possible
to tell whether the subject was a man or a woman [...]. All three portraits
were draped with black velvet, which created a singular impression on the
beholder, who could not help wondering why. [...] Who were they? We
were unable to find out. (362)
The mystery of the three captivates Felix Chatto, who "spent a lot of time and energy"
trying to understand the painting. The only clue is an inscription on the back of
one painting: "Chateau de Bravedent" (362). Felix focuses his energy on the possible
meaning of that clue, eventually conceding, "I swear there is no such place in Provence
[...] though of course one day it might surface again as the lost medieval name for a
place" (362). The mystery vexes Blanford, too, who recognizes the three as "obstinate
symbols of something to which the key had been lost," lamenting further, "If only I
believed in the novel as a device I would incorporate their story in a book which had
nothing to do with real life. Bravedent!" (363).
The comparison of the meaning behind the three to a key to something that had
been lost recalls for the reader the account of the key to the Templar treasure (247).
Blanford's consideration of the three as fodder for a novel recalls, too, Sutcliffe's de¬
scription of the impossibility of ever finding such a treasure: "It was all part of the
Provencal image, the story of a land which from ancient times had given itself up to
dreaming, to fabulating, to tale-telling, with the firm belief that stories should have
no ending" (247). The search for the treasure, the possible finding of which ends the
novel, focuses on the search for a quincunx, which one could argue is found in the
completion of the Quintet. In the same sense that Felix's search for answers centers
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around Chateau de Bravedent, the fate of the Templar treasure centers around Ver-
feuille, the Nogaret family home, the ownership of which corresponds with the own¬
ership of the Templar key. Just as characters are comprised of transposed heads which
might stand in for one another freely, so too do their respective homes become mu¬
tually indistinguishable except by establishment of name or inhabitants. The homes
Tu Due (peopled by (Actively real) Constance, Livia, and Hillary), Chateau de Brave-
dent (peopled, perhaps, by the artistic rendering of (Actively Active) Piers, Sylvie, and
Bruce), and Verfeuille (peopled by the "real" (Actively Actively real) Piers, Sylvie, and
Bruce) transpose themselves upon one another, conferring meaning through the over¬
lap of their respective signiAcations. Though Felix spends "a lot of time and energy
trying to And out the meaning of this laconic inscription" (362), we might fare a lit¬
tle better in trying to And the meaning of Verfeuille, another house whose Actional
naming could keep one guessing.
Organically, Verfeuille might mean "green leaf." At the same time, the suffix —
feuille could come from the archaic meaning offeu as "house" or "homestead."18 And
ver- shares at its root the Latin word for "truth," so Verfeuille might mean "true house."
The various houses in TheAvignon Quintet, then, which are all easily confused with one
another, are in a sense shades of Verfeuille, the "true house." But interesting things
come into play upon considering other meanings of the name. Feuille, for example,
also means "sheet (of paper)." Taking into consideration ver, 'worm,' Verfeuille might
mean "bookworm." Or the Latin root ver proposes "true page." The French vers,
'toward,' suggests "toward the page," while verre, 'glass,' lends the meaning "glass page,"
letting the reader see through the book to the characters or the telling of the various
layers of the book.
The combination together hints at the phrase verrefeuillete, 'laminated glass,' fur¬
ther opening, in the English laminated, a possibility ofmeanings. As a verb, "to lam¬
inate" means, variously, to "overlay (a flat surface, esp. paper) with a layer of plastic
or some other protective material," to "manufacture by placing layer on layer," or to
"split into layers or leaves" ("Laminate" ia, ib, ic). A novel that has been "laminated"
is one that is written by layers or one that is read by splitting it into multiple layers. As
a noun, "laminate" means "a laminated structure or material, esp. one made of layers
Axed together to form a hard, flat, or flexible material" (2). In this meaning, Vefeuille,
the de Nogaret family home, suggests the layered structure of the novel, resonating
the novel's peculiar fascination with the creation of Action and the concatenation and
interpolation of truth with transparency. Felix Chatto's (Felix Chateau s?) fascination
with the mystery of Chateau de Bravedent (the 'noble tooth' penetrating everything?)
18French-to-English translations are from Harrap's UnabridgedDictionary Dictionnaire.
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and the ghostly hauntings ofTu Due, with its "dense" anticipation ofmaterialization
{Quintet 360—361), suggest the interchangeability of these family houses whose singu¬
lar identities are displaced by the primacy of their uncanny (unheimlich) compositions.
Immediately we can recognize a departure from the models of reading and writ¬
ing—at least as productive descriptions of activity. The interchangeability of charac¬
ters and chateaus, creators and creations, suggests a stirring movement in general, but
a movement in no specific direction. Hie fictions ofBruce and Sutcliffe and Verfeuille
are written by Blanford (and Sutcliffe), writing these fictions to life and transposing
them into reality by transcribing them into notebooks. At the same time, however,
these fictional "characters" challenge the authority of Blanford by suggesting the fic¬
tional characteristics of his own composition, in turn bringing him back to life (661)
and nursing him back to health (921).
Blanford's authorial hegemony is threatened, too, by the way in which his creations
exercise varying levels of free will. In a letter to Blanford, Constance writes that she
had thought Sutcliffe to be "imaginary, but I find he is all too real. What could you
have meant by that?" (663). Despite Blanford's determination to remain in control of
his creations, they often get the best ofhim. Reacting to Sutcliffe's initial unwillingness
to meet him in Geneva, Blanford complains:
I am annoyed because my power is not absolute over him—he is after all
my creation; but he can sometimes break loose and show traces of free
will. My domination is incomplete, damn him. I told him to come to the
airport. He mutinied. He must be punished! (901)
Blanford's authority is only partial; while Sutcliffe has the ability to decide against
the actions Blanford prescribes for him, he is unable to escape Blanford fully. The
punishment Blanford speaks of comes, in fact, by way of a correct prophecy, that the
woman with whom his wife had an affair, Trash, will visit him, "a dark woman of
unexpected force and glory with whom he will be forced to couple" (901). Trash,
possessing none of Sutcliffe's free will, complies, explaining to him the only truth she
knows: "I jest had to see you Robin, honey" (905).
Sutcliffe's free will displays itself in more ways than just controlling decisions he
makes; he is also able to come to artistic conclusions separately from Blanford, describ¬
ing "the titanic do-it-yourself kit, le roman appareil [...] full of spare parts of other
books, of characters left over from other lives, all circulating in each other's blood¬
streams—[...] fresh, nothing second-hand, twice chewed, twice breathed," command¬
ing at last for the objects of his creation to commingle: "Be ye members of one an¬
other" (692—693). He develops his idea further, describing a book very much like The
Avignon Quintet:
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I dream of such a book, full of not completely discrete characters, of an¬
cestors and descendants all mixed up—could such people walk in and out
of each other's lives without damaging the quiddity of each other? Hum.
And the whole book arranged in diminished fifths from the point of view
of orchestration. A big switchy book, all points and sidings. A Golgotha
of a book. I must talk to Aubrey [Blanford] about it. (293)
He ends this mental monologue with an acknowledgement of the applause of an
"imaginary audience" (293), which distinguishes the boundary of the work of art,
drawing the line separating internal and external with thick strokes that are immedi¬
ately effaced when he does eventually "talk to Aubrey about it."
Talking to Blanford over the phone to complain of Trash raping him "very enjoy-
ably but against my will," Sutcliffe is told again that he is a fiction, possessing only
"contexts, but no future and no past" (910). Sutcliffe disagrees, preferring instead to
think of their relationship as comprised of "versions of one another set upon differ¬
ing time-tracks," continuing to complain that "Reality is very fatiguing" (911). Their
conversation eventually comes to a head when Blanford insists "You must manifest
at last," citing the need to "exchange versions" of the books they have been writing
(911-912).
Contingent Realities
In composing his version of the Quintet, Sutcliffe recognizes the discrepancy between
fiction and reality, claiming that his book "corresponds to the reality" (912), raising yet
another question: which reality? The goal of the Quintet seems to be to problematize
any model that would reference reality by a definite article without qualifying that
singular reality through a particular perspective. Sutcliffe himself recognizes the limits
of using reality as inspiration, writing that "Reality is too old-fashioned nowadays for
the writer's uses. We must count upon art to revive it and bring it up to date" (7).19
Furthermore, his manifesto on the art of fiction challenges the primacy or singularity
of any depiction of reality:
To commingle and intersperse contingent realities—that's the game! After
all, how few are the options open to us—few varieties of human shape,
mental dispositions, scales of behaviour [...]. How many coats of reality
does it take to get a nice clean surface to the apprehension? (693)
The plurality of realities here challenges any finality of "the reality," as such; moreover,
the contingent nature of the realities portrayed in the two versions of the Quintet draws
I9This inescapable primacy of the textual (in favor of something transcendental to the text) is in¬
creasingly common in writing of the late twentieth century. I will further consider this notion of new
kinds ofart for a new kind of reality—especially as it relates to emergent, potentially postmodern styles
in Durrell's own writing, placed within its relevant literary-historical context— in Chapter 5.
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closer the discrepancies among any "realities." Reality as considered here by Sutcliffe is
not the infinitely large abstraction considered by Peirce; instead, it is a subset of that
infinity containing only a selection of available shapes, dispositions, and behavior.
Nevertheless, that reality is still somewhere superior to fiction, the secondary reality
of a recit that is written into being by an author, and Sutcliffe stops short of dispensing
with it altogether, as varying layers of it are necessary for "a nice clean surface."
Sutcliffe's model of reality is somewhere between the abstractions of "fiction" and
"reality"—or, at the same time, somewhere between "histoire" and " recitT In Durrell's
own ontology and Genette's narratology, Sutcliffe's multiple realities coincide with
"imagination" and "narrating," respectively. Sutcliffe's "contingent realities," the in¬
tervening factor filtering the infinite Reality to be accessible to the finite Fiction, are
matters of creation, the liminal moment shared by writing and reading correspond¬
ing, too, to Coleridge's primary and secondary imaginations. Bruce muses on the
intermingled actions in Sutcliffe's writing, wondering "how to splice the real and the
imagined—when I read his book" (7). The real and the imagined, the Real and the Fic¬
tional concatenated through this model of contingent realities, beliefs dependent and
respondent to one another, intermingled internal and external creations and simplifi¬
cations, meet in Sutcliffe's writerly text Monsieur to which we as readers of Blanford's
novel The Dark Prince never gain access.
Peirce understands reality to be something transcendental toward which we can
only direct ourselves for partial comprehension; only an infinite set of data points,
something like omniscience, can bring us to something we can call an understanding
of reality (Peirce, "[on Reality]" 31). Blanford recognizes the limitations of living
in belief, saying to Sutcliffe, "My vision, like yours, is not absolutely panoramic yet.
it's [sic] selective: so there is always the blind spot." And later, in a drug-induced
melancholy, Blanford considers the implications of infinite comprehension: "Suppose
one wrote a book in which all the characters were omniscient, were God? What then?
One would have to compose it in a death-mood, as if dawn would bring with it the
firing-squad. But this is what the artist does\" {Quintet 929).
Sutcliffe offers his perspective to fill in gaps in the recit, recognizing Blanford's blind
spot as "the point where Monsieur intrudes on the cosmic scheme" (922). Overlay¬
ing the transposed heads of Blanford and Sutcliffe, body and soul, to combine their
respective perspectives results in a single omniscient character through which we gain
access to the "absolutely panoramic" view of the Quintet. But more pressing than
either the plurality or contingency of reality or realities or the omniscient perspec¬
tives of particular characters is the question of placement of those characters within
an existing model.
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When Blanford and Sutcliffe finally meet one another in person, they realize they
have had mental images of one another that fail to match up things as they really are:
They both burst out laughing as they eyed each other. "I imagined you as
much fatter," said one, and the other replied, "And I much thinner." Well,
they would have to make do with reality—it was all they had to work on;
it's boring, this question of there being several different versions of a self,
so to speak, no? (921)
The secondary imaginations of each have produced visualizations that contradict real¬
ity, which is "all they had to work on." The divergence of Blanford's appearance from
Sutcliffe's mental image is to be expected, as Blanford, in writing Sutcliffe, never had
need ofdescribing himself (the author) in his recit. The relation ofSutcliffe to Blanford
is one of reading, and the discrepancy between real and imagined appearance represents
a lack of text to read. The divergence of Sutcliffe's appearance from Blanford's mental
image, on the other hand, represents a breakdown in writing, the opening up of the
secondary imagination that reifies the simplified fiction/belief of Blanford's internal
mind into something of external reality—manifest most usually in the physicality of a
book. Moreover, the introduction of a plural third-person voice alongside the playful
tone of the second-person question ending the quotation—asking, in effect, "reality
is boring, isn't it?"—belies a complicity between the reader and the author; the rev¬
elation of second- and third-person perspectives hints at and signifies in its absence
the third part of the trinity, the first-person act of narrating, the authority ofwhich
overlies the entire scene.
This invasion or acknowledgement of the nature of the authorial "I"-as-sender and
reader-as-addressee as unveiled in the textual aside leaves for Sutcliffe, Blanford, and
company the position of "message." This condition is not unusual; what is unique,
however, is the explicit nature in which The Avignon Quintet acknowledges this situa¬
tion ofaudience and author, fiction and reality, histoire and recit, internal and external,
bringing the halves together in a shared third to which they cleave and with which they
interweave: message, imagination, narration, the book. Blanford's writing ofhis book
in the end resembles the act of lamination hinted at in the name ofVerfeuille: he tears
apart his notebook, only to have the pages sold back to him by gipsy children later,
whereupon he collects them back into the form of a book (1319). And at the end
of the novel, the point at which the histoire itself is ultimately finished, reality meets
fiction at the close of the intervening third:
The lovers gave a shiver ofpremonition and Blanford thought that if ever
he wrote the scene he would say: "It was at this precise moment that reality
prime rushed to the aid of fiction and the totally unpredictable began to
take place!" (1367)
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As the fiction of the novel spills into the external world of the reader, reality prime
intervenes, measuring the dosage of the fiction and cutting it offwith the book's back
cover—itself discussing the novel's themes of fiction and reality and opening more
entrances to the text at the same time it closes the text off.
Reading and Writing: The PrimalDuality
In Durrell's model outlined in the Key, the imagination offers a chance to understand
reality, if only in a limited manner. The marriage of fiction and reality found in The
Avignon Quintet corresponds roughly to what Patricia Waugh calls metafiction: "fic¬
tional writing which self-consciously and systematically draws attention to its status
as an artefact in order to pose questions about the relationship between fiction and
reality" (Waugh 2).20 Waugh traces the beginnings of the trend ofmetafiction to the
likes of Woolf's To the Lighthouse and Joyce's Ulysses because they signal the novel's
awareness of its own "fictitiousness" (Waugh 6).21
Robert Scholes sees metafiction as an extension of fabulation: 'Tabulation [...]
means a return to a more verbal kind of fiction. It also means a return to a more
fictional kind" (Scholes, Tabulators 12). For Scholes, certain devices emphasize this
"fictitiousness" of fabulation: the form of a fabulation, for example, is often complex,
lending a certain aesthetic to the work while also emphasizing the authorial role in its
creation (Scholes, Fabulation 2). Such texts, according to Pfeifer, espouse "a sense that
any attempt to represent reality could only produce selective perspectives, fictions,
that is, in an epistemological, not merely in the conventional literary, sense" (Pfeifer
qtd. in Waugh 7), an idea expressed in almost identical terms in the Quartet's "selected
fictions."
The Alexandria Quartet's liberal play with the concepts of reality and fiction leads
Scholes to identify it as a prime example of fabulation. Scholes' "more fictional" fiction
is "a less realistic and more artistic kind of narrative: more shapely, more evocative;
more concerned with ideas and ideals, less concerned with things" (Scholes, Tabulators
12). In such a fiction,
The structure also, by its very shapeliness, asserts the authority of the
shaper, the fabulator behind the fable. [...] The authority of the fabu-
lator over his fable is not only asserted by the ingenuity of the fabulation,
20David Lowenkron numbers Durrell's Quartet among prominent metanovels—what he describes as
a subgenre of metafiction comprised ofmise en abyme: "a work in which an inner fiction, narrated by
an inner persona, is intercalated in an outer one" (Lowenkron 343).
11Waugh recognizes earlier metafictional works, like Tristram Shandy, but draws a distinction be¬
tween anomalous texts and literary trends. Nevertheless, one might trace a tradition of the style back
as far.
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however; this authority is reinforced by the relations among the characters
in the [...] outer tales. (10)
To be precise, the fabulation will often consist of a series of layers, with each inner
layer relating in some way to the outermost layers that encapsulate their creation.
Durrell's Quartet showcases this very shapeliness of structure in its nested texts, the
stories about stories (Arnauti's Moeurs, letters to and from Clea, Pursewarden's note¬
book, Nessim's diary, Balthazar's Interlinear). The inclusion of these multiple layers
indicates an awareness of fictionality often characteristic of metafictional texts. The
reader of such a text must take into consideration the text's awareness of its own fic¬
tional status. In order to read, the reader must also be willing to write, to acknowledge
the possibilities and problems of representing reality in fiction at the same time he or
she recognizes those possibilities and problems of representing fiction in reality.
The metafictional text approaches the writerly in that it requires the reader to ac¬
knowledge its status and to be able to recognize its place in the creative oeuvre of other
novels. In the case of the Quartet, this approach of the writerly is most apparent in the
novel's recognition of outer layers external to its own, referring to its own condition
of creation as the novel ends with Darley writing "Once upon a time" (Quartet 877).
These four words are not the same four words that begin the Quartet-, nevertheless,
they signal the beginning of its writing and the end of Darley's struggle with reality
and fictionality, in which he finally accedes to acknowledge the potential of the latter.
As Scholes writes:
In reading the passage we feel very strongly a kind of duality which per¬
vades Durrell's work: we are pulled toward the primitive by those four
magical words and by the description of the artist as a mere story-teller;
we are pulled toward the sophisticated by the preoccupation of the passage
with the art of story-telling.
This duality corresponds roughly to the duality of readerly and writerly: the readerly
is the kind of fiction which exercises in the reader the primitive, primary imagination's
"repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation"; the (elusive) writerly text
evokes the sophisticated (and intertextual) secondary imagination's essential vitality,
its coeval acts ofcreation and re-creation. The idea of the primitive (/ primary imagina¬
tion / readerly) resonates with the Quartet as "a portrait of the artist, a Kiinstlerroman,
about a character in a book who is writing a book in which he is a character" (Scholes,
Fabidators 18). Scholes' "primitive" is primal only as it stands for the act of reading
and the projected immediacy of the histoire. The idea of the sophisticated (/ secondary
imagination / writerly) resonates in the novel "the shades of Proust and Gide, among
others, [that] hover between our eyes and the page" (18). Scholes' "sophisticated" is
less primitive in that the act of reading is subverted by Genette's narrating, the recit's
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processes which struggle to assert themselves, the recit's preoccupation with "ideas and
ideals." Yet Scholes acknowledges that, alone, these characteristics are not unique to
Durrell: "What is new [...] is his peculiar combination of the two" (18).
The Black Book represents an act of reading, in the direct re-presentation of the
diaries of "Death" Gregory. Lawrence Lucifer, the narrator/author of The Black Book,
includes the extracts with separated text introduced by "Here begins an extract fi-om
Gregory's diary' (Black Book 32), ending them with "Here ends the extractfrom Gregory's
diary' (54). Lucifer presents the extracts as whole truths, not wanting to interpret
them further: "I do not pretend to interpret. It would be too much to expect of
the interrogative ego, the other me, whose function is simply to take a sort of hiero¬
glyphic dictation from space, and annotate it, punctuate, edit" (55). As such, Lucifer's
book asserts itself as an act of the primary imagination, perceiving and simplifying the
whole, choosing extracts from it, parts to represent the sum. It is, as he writes, "tran¬
scription purely" (243). Consequently, the novel ends soon after the finishing of the
diary, Lucifer book-ending the final extract with the intonation "Here ends Gregory'
(213).
The end ofhis diary corresponds to the end ofGregory—nothing exists beyond the
perceived. Lucifer highlights the futility of life in the face of The Black Book's central
theme of "the English death" by explaining that "It is all the same, for this is a piece
out of another book" (236). And while in Durrell's later novels, the putting of words
onto the page, the act of writing a novel is an exercise of the secondary imagination
in which worlds are given detail and ontological significance, for Lucifer in The Black
Book, the act ofwriting is merely an act of transcription, lifting reality in its simplified
form to record a piece of it for posterity:
A little frightening. What am I doing with this noisy machine and these
sheets of linen paper? It is a kind of trap from which I cannot escape, not
even by shooting myself dead with words as Gregory did, or said he did.
When I think this I am too afraid to continue writing. (239)
In presenting the words of Gregory, the words of another's reality, Lucifer is denied
the ability to act.
In the continuum of reading to writing, The Alexandria Quartet begins where The
Black Book left off, with Darley reading the events of his time in Alexandria and trying
to the best of his ability to present them as true to his perception as possible. Eventu¬
ally, though, he recognizes the flaws in his perception—and the constituent inability
to see reality in its finality at all costs—and decides instead to write into being the
reality of his book. The Quartet, then, is a recit whose subject matter encompasses
both reading and writing. Darley's position regarding reality in the novel shifts from
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reading it (reducing it to the level of belief or fiction), to writing it (projecting a real¬
ity from the reduction of fiction). He abandons reading for writing, choosing instead
the opening outward of histoire into recti made possible by the secondary imagina¬
tion. The Revolt ofAphrodite follows after the Quartet as an act ofwriting. Unlike the
product of Darley's writing in the Quartet, however, Charlock's recit lacks the prim¬
itive "magic" of the tradition of storytelling. It is metafictional to a degree, in that
it is "fictional writing" that "draws attention to its status as an artefact in order to
pose questions about the relationship between fiction and reality." The Revolt differs
from the Quartet, though, in denying the authenticity of the text to which the reader
has access. The artefact of Charlock's sessions with his dactyl certainly raises ques¬
tions about the relationship between fiction and reality, but its status as writing that
is fictional is something Charlock himselfmight challenge. His recit, like many of his
creations, rebels against its creator, eventually becoming an act of un-writing, stalling
in imagination and promising no end. If reading is movement away from reality (recit
/ addressee) to fiction (histoire / sender) and if writing is movement away from fic¬
tion (histoire / sender) to reality (recit / addressee), The Avignon Quintet is defined by
neither of these actions, settling instead on a narrow stasis between the fictive and
the real. The histoire is never complete, and therefore the recit is also never complete.
Likewise, the sender is always in two parts and the addressee is never found. Reading
is certainly deprecated before writing, but in the end even the finalization ofwriting
is undone. While The Black Book and The Alexandria Quartet depict what Godshalk
might call (fictionally) real fictions—fiction within the reality of a book—The Revolt
ofAphrodite and The Avignon Quintet portray (fictionally) fictional realities—realities
within the fiction of a book, realities beyond and larger than the book we read. The
Black Book's act of reading is negated in the Quartet to be replaced by writing, which
is itself taken up by the Revolt. By the end of the Revolt, writing, too, is negated. The
Quintet's focus on writing is unlike the writing of the other novels in that nothing is
ever actually produced; instead, the pages of Blanford's notebook blow around France,
following the peregrinations of the characters they describe and referenced obscurely
in chapter titles ("The Falling Leaves, Inklings," Quinx).
While The Black Books ending is resolute in its finitude ("This is how it ends" (244))
and The Alexandria Quartet hints at an optimistic future that at the very least consists
of the finishing of the Quartet itself, The Revolt ofAphrodite and The Avignon Quintet
deliver the reader through the gaps in the recit to the recti's ending in a final gap, in
which the acts of reading (in the case of the Revolt) and writing (in the case of the
Quintet) are no longer tenable options, replaced instead by the wavering "either/or"
(Nunquam 282) and "the totally unpredictable" (Quintet 1367). Where earlier texts
represent a coming-to-terms with aspects of reading or writing as movements to or
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from reality and fiction, the Revolt and the Quintet portray a coming-to-terms with
the insufficiencies of those constructs. The Revolt ofAphrodite subsists in negating the
acts of reading andwriting in favor ofbetwixt uncertainty; TheAvignon Quintet, on the
other hand, fully inhabits Darley's "kingdom" of the imagination, the world between
reality prime and fiction in which Blanford is able, finally, to "inhabit the whole." The
next chapter will consider th& geophysical whole ofDurrell's kingdom: the betwixt and
between Mediterranean.
Chapter 3
The Spirit of Landscapes and Characters
Pluralism, in exorcising the absolute, exorcises the great de-realizer of the only life we are at
home in, and thus redeems the nature ofreality from essential foreignness. Every end, reason,
motive, object ofdesire or aversion, ground ofsorrow or joy that wefeel is in the world offinite
multifariousness, for only in that world does anything really happen, only there do events come
to pass. (Pluralistic Universe 49-50)
The punt which now carried him, thrust by slow thrust across the turbid water, was turning
slowly eastward to take up its position... {Mountolive 11)
The third book of The Alexandria Quartet, Mountolive presents a departure from the
methods ofJustine and Balthazar. Told from an omniscient, third-person perspective,
it presents the same story as the first two books with an added distance, as if looking
down on everything from a great height. The introduction of the third dimension
in the Quartet also introduces with it an enlarged awareness of the three-dimensional
world in which it is set. Following the development of ambassador-to-be Mounto¬
live, it traces his diplomatic career, plotting the changing political climate of the early
twentieth century.
If Justine's treatment of the first dimension represents the relationship between
subject and object and Balthazars of the second signifies that of reality and fiction,
Mountolive's third dimension represents a placement in a specific construction of the
world, a privileging of place over all else in a geopolitical world divided by the imag¬
inary boundaries of the West and the East. In "Landscape and Character," an essay
describing his "spirit of place," a "private notion about the importance of landscape,"
Durrell admits to favoring location over characters—which he calls "functions of a
landscape"—even to the point that his books are about the places in which things hap¬
pen, rather than the people who effect these happenings ("Landscape" 156). The idea
is not unusual to readers of TheAlexandria Quartet, who might recognize the subordi¬
nate relation of characters to landscape in Darley's description of the city that "used us
as its flora—precipitated in us conflicts which were hers and which we mistook for our
own" (Quartet 17). The reader familiar with The Revolt ofAphrodite might relate the
notion to Benedicta's and Julian's childhood, ofwhich Charlock writes, "It was much
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more than the facts which mattered, which had shaped their peculiar destinies; it was
also place" (Nunquam 33). Similarly, a reader of The Avignon Quintet might associate
the idea with the de Nogaret-family home, Verfeuille, which "reclaims" its inhabitants
after every absence and which is inextricably tied up with "the most decisive part of
our lives" (Quintet 13).
But it is in Durrell's books on places that his idea of the spirit of place is most
unapologetically given voice.1 In his essay he describes the spirit of place as an ir¬
refutable tendency for "culture-productions [to] bear the unmistakable signature of
the place" rather than maintaining a fragile susceptibility to a "historic pattern dic¬
tated by the human will." For this reason, he writes that although there "are no original
Greeks left," there remains a "curious constant factor that we discern behind the word
'Greekness'" ("Landscape" 156—157). This Greekness comes out in the shadow play
of Karaghiosis which captures "All Greece" in one scene (Prospero 53), in the "phos¬
phorescent" light of Corfu, the hospitality of Crete, and the beauty of Coan women
{Greek Islands 18, 60, 152), and in the statue of the Marine Venus on Rhodes, through
whom "the whole idea of Greece glows sadly, like some broken capital, like the shat¬
tered pieces of a graceful jar, like the torso of a statue to hope" {Reflections 38). Each
of these places embodies a spirit or essence to which it is reduced in order for Durrell
to speak on a more algebraic level about the concepts contained therein.
Similarly, other locations in his novels—his Avignon, Alexandria, Athens, Istan¬
bul, London—are imbued with the spirits of those places which form inhabitants as
functions of the landscape; they are endowed with the essences of the fixed locations
of France, Egypt, Greece, Turkey, and England. As Durrell believes that culture is a
product of place, then it is necessary also to identify the production of place in Dur-
rell's novels. In the first section of this chapter, I will use Martin Heidegger's idea of
place and theories of spatiality to understand the significance of place and the process
of it coming into being.2 I will identify key places in Durrell's works, and, coupled
with Said's notion of the Orient as a topos, I will map a real and imagined geography of
absolute places in Durrell's world. In the second section of the chapter, I will consider
the areas of the Mediterranean and the Sahara as intervening Heideggerian spatia or
1 It is best to describe his island books not as travel writing, as Durrell rejects the mantle of "travel-
writer" in favor of "residence-writer": "My books are always about living in places, not just rushing
through them" ("Landscape" I 56). Jane Keller even calls the books "anti-travel books" (Keller 230).
2Heidegger's theories of spatiality and place are not without their problems, but then certainty of
meaning when discussing the idea of place is a premium. (See J. E. Malpas' "The Obscurity of Place,"
Place andExperience, for an in-depth analysis of the historical and philosophical problems plaguing the
discussion of place.) The choice of Heidegger is one based primarily 011 the almost-scientific precision
in which he defines the constituent parts of the construction of place, his theories' relative longevity
in the discussion of the topic, and the obvious metaphysical connections his ideas share with those of
Durrell.
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extensii betwixt and between the significant places of Durrell's cities, a betweenness
that is itself more defining of Durrell's oeuvre than the places themselves. In these
neutral zones, characteristics of Durrell's cities and of the imagined topoi of East and
West bleed outward beyond their defined boundaries. In the third section, I will con¬
sider a revised notion of hybrid place in light of the cultural palimpsests of the sea
and the desert. I will then employ this revised spirit of (hybrid) place to analyze in-
between cities—Alexandria, Athens, and Istanbul—and in-between and wandering
peoples—Jews and gipsies.
i Giving Place, Building Dwellings
InwardMotion
Durrell's notion of static landscape defining the culture of a place is slightly differ¬
ent from Heidegger's notions of place formed by constituent parts. As described in
his essay "Building Dwelling Thinking," Heidegger's place, rather than being situated
by the ground, is located by the thing (what he calls das Ding) that brings together
the earth, sky, gods, and mortals (what he collectively calls the fourfold). The event
of these four coming together and gathered up by the thing is called Ereignis, vari¬
ously translated as 'event' or 'appropriation' (Bruns 79, 96). The thing that establishes
a particular place is unlike other things because the place-making thing also "grants
stead" to this fourfold in the form of something like a dwelling, which preserves the
co-mingling of the four aspects in a location: "dwelling occurs as the fourfold preser¬
vation of the fourfold" (Heidegger 151). Just as the Ereignis (event) of the formation
of thing is at times known as the thinging of the thing, the Ereignis or coming into
being ofplace is sometimes known as the worlding of the world (Bruns 79). The place
becomes known by the thing that assembles the fourfold, but it is also known through
the fourfold, to which Vincent Vycinas explains place belongs "organically" (Vycinas
39). The fourfold then become inseparable from place because it defines them as much
as they collaborate to form it. Whereas Durrell's spirit of place shapes its inhabitants
irrespective of whatever character may be pre-existing in those inhabitants, Heideg¬
ger's place is made of equal parts landscape (earth) and inhabitants (mortals)—as well
as respective parts of sky and gods.
Place comes into being for Heidegger on the conception of the thing that grants
dwelling to the fourfold. Heidegger's favorite example of place coming into being is
of a bridge over a river:
The <place> is not already there before the bridge is. [.. .T]he bridge does
not first come to a <place> to stand in it; rather, a <place> comes into
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existence only by virtue of the bridge.3 (Heidegger 1 54)
The bridge geo-physically locates the river: it "gathers the earth as landscape around
the stream" and "holds its flow up to the sky by taking it for a moment under the
vaulted gateway." Moreover, it "escorts the lingering and hastening ways of [...] mor¬
tals, to the other side," leading them on "to the last bridge" where they must "bring
themselves before the haleness of the divinities" (152—153). In this way, the bridge
assembles and grants a site to the earth, sky, mortals, and gods. By assembling the
fourfold in this way, the bridge does not create a mathematical position, but it does
create a reference within experience to that position. In doing so, the bridge intro¬
duces the concepts of spatiality and distance—"The space allowed by the bridge con¬
tains many places variously near or far from the bridge" (15 5)—thereby allowing for
neighborhoods, districts, cities, counties, and other broadly defined locations (what
Heidegger calls extensio), and also allowing for the intervening space between places
(what he calls spatium) (155).
Place, as the encapsulation of humans, gods, earth, and sky, mediates human in¬
teraction with the environment, allowing us to actualize geometrical space in geo¬
graphical terms. By building a bridge or another such structure, the founders of a
city define the terms by which the entirety of the city will be considered; Durrell, too,
introduces a city by the key components that determine the character and geophysi¬
cal relationships of its inhabitants and its environs. In fact, the last books he wrote,
The Avignon Quintet, offer a convenient introduction to a Heideggerian analysis of
Durrell's methods of place-making. In Monsieur, the first book of the (Quintet, Dur¬
rell affords us the earliest glimpse of Avignon when Bruce arrives at the city to the
south by rail and takes a horse-drawn carriage to his hotel. En route, he is moved to
point his driver toward the river, explaining his "sudden desire" as a need to verify
the Avignon-as-place he once knew: "its existence seemed to confirm so many things,
the old river-God of our youth." The impenetrable night allows Bruce only patches
of sight: "trees [arch] overhead" and the grey water is "inky, swollen and curdled with
blocks of ice." Unable to see well in the darkness, Bruce relies upon his sense of hear¬
ing to imagine these blocks of ice "thump[ing] and tinkl[ing] along the banks," but
even his hearing is fallible as the mingling of the sounds of the river and the wind can
3Albert Hofstadter's translation ofHeidegger (the standard translation) uses "location" and "place,"
while most critical material on Heidegger presents the same passages with the English equivalents in op¬
posite positions. To simplify issues, I have chosen the translations ofHeidegger used in these secondary
critical works, substituting "location" with "<place>" whenever I come across it in the Hofstadter. Sim¬
ilarly, I present "place" as "<location>" whenever the former is in this translation.
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be misrecognized as the sound of "cats making love" (Quintet 12).4
In the darkness, features of the city are lost, leading Bruce to tell how "[y]ou might
have thought yourself in central Asia—the cloudy sky in close link like chain-mail
and the fading stabs of moonlight," and he describes a particular landmark of the
city, Pont St. Benezet, simply as "the famous broken bridge" and Chapel St. Nicolas
as "the chapel." The bridge, a "broken and renowned relic of man's belief, pointing
its amputated fingers of masonry westward," compels Bruce to think of Piers (his
brother-in-law and lover), whose funeral has driven him back to the city. Avignon
Bridge and its little chapel—introduced with the direct article both anonymously and
familiarly—represent the city which "had been all Christendom," but once broken
and merely a "relic of man's belief" pointing west as dawn cuts into the eastern sky,
they represent something else. For Bruce, the bridge seems to represent the "collective
image of the past—all the temporal selves which have been present in a serial form
focused together now in an instant ofperfect attention, ofcrystal-clear apprehension."
Through this collective image of the past, he remembers time spent with Piers and
Sylvie, his wife. But the "amputated fingers of masonry [pointing] westward" also
point to the end of this collective image, Akkad's lesson on dying that Piers explains
to Bruce. Not only has the bridge broken and the papal age ofAvignon passed, but
so must the age of Bruce, Piers, and Sylvie also pass (12—13).
The bridge here in Avignon is a helpful cognate to Heidegger's bridge. Vycinas
writes that "[w]hen a bridge is built, the place on the river becomes a place. Previ¬
ously it has not been a place. It merely was one of the many spots along the river
for a possible bridge" (Vycinas 252). The bridge as a thing calls forth the foursome,
appropriating them in an event, Ereignis, and at the same time, it participates in the
worlding of a place by granting the fourfold stead (dwelling, or physical location of
reference). The bridge in Avignon does the same for Bruce. Its masonry rests on the
bank of the earth and thrusts out over the river into the sky, providing a crossroads for
4Durrell may have been making a more explicit reference to the city itself here: Avignon comes
from the Latin name for the city Avenio, which means either "town of violent winds" or "town of the
river." Alternatively, Durrell may have been borrowing from his own "The River Rhone," an article first
published in the magazine Holiday in 1960, in which he approaches the city from the river. He describes
Avignon as "the heart" ofProvence and defined by "machicolated towers" around which a mistral often
blows ("The River Rhone" 331; much of these descriptions are unreferenced from Augustus Hare's
South-Eastern France (1890), page 361). In the article, he emphasizes the importance of the wind by
inserting an ancient verse about the city:
Avenio ventosa [Windy Avignon
Cum vento fastidiosa With wind, annoying,
Sine vente venenosa. (331) Without wind, pest-ridden.]
[Here "vente" seems mis-transcribed from Hare's "vento" (Hare 361).]
From the river, the city is characterized by the wind. Thus, both etymologically and intertextually, the
river and the wind really do couple, "like cats making love," to form the city.
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travelers mortal and divine in the little chapel and as the literal crossroad of mortals
over the imaginative "river-God." The bridge places Avignon—Avenio, the town of
the river—on the Rhone, and yet the fractured expanse made famous in song ("Sur le
pont dAvignon /ony danse, tous en ronde" 'On the Avignon bridge / we dance, everyone
in a circle') represents what is in effect a missing sum.5 The bridge is broken, the circle
of dancers is interrupted, and "the collective image of the past" dies. Pont St. Benezet
represents Avignon, but as a symbol, it also functions as an open invitation to discover
that which it partially conceals: the city itself.
Durrell often characterizes his key cities in this manner, using particular landmarks
to center his literary constructions and even lend qualities to those who people them.
The figure of the Bridge in Avignon, for instance, returns throughout The Avignon
Quintet, sometimes as the Pont St. Benezet and at other times as the Pont du Gard. In
other books, the chosen landmark is not always so easily identified. Darley's opening
description of Alexandria, for example, seems to revel in the city's eclecticism. He
answers the question "what is this city of ours?" with vagueness: "In a flash my mind's
eye shows me a thousand dust-tormented streets. Flies and beggars own it today—and
those who enjoy an intermediate existence between either" (Quartet 17). These dust-
tormented streets, flies, and beggars are more anonymous than "the bridge" and "the
chapel" ofAvignon, for they barely even assemble the foursome, let alone steady it.
Darley also identifies the city through its "[fjive races, five languages, a dozen creeds [,
...] five fleets turning through their greasy reflections behind the harbour bar[, .. .and]
more than five sexes" (17), but this teeming mass of identifiers serves only to confuse
the identity ofAlexandria further. The city is "something subtly androgynous, inverted
upon itself," and it seems Darley can describe it only through its "landscape-tones":
"Long sequences of tempera. Light filtered through the essence of lemons. An air full
ofbrick-dust—sweet-smelling brick dust and the odour ofhot pavements slaked with
water" (18). Then, however, he inches into the history of the city, finding something
slightly more lasting than light and dust in a reference to Cleopatra's Anthony (18).
Like Bruce with Avignon, Darley struggles to pinpoint the defining essence of
Alexandria. Not until twenty pages later does he finally strike a chord of the true
(and literal) assembling point of the city when he writes ofAlexander the Great, "the
soldier-God in his glass coffin, the youthful body lapped in silver" (38). Alexander's
burial plot, misplaced at some point in time, represents a mortal/divine (soldier/God)
celestial/terrestrial (public/intimate coffin) wedlock. The founder of the city, he whose
sFrom its crumbling remains, it is difficult to ascertain that the bridge could never have been the
scene from the song: it is too narrow for a group to dance in a circle. More accurately, the song should
be remembered as "Sur le Pont d'Avignon / Tout le mondey passe" 'Over the Avignon bridge / the whole
world crosses' (Rhone 332; also in Hare 371), equally notable for its failure to deliver a bridge over
which the world might pass.
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body is "returned" upon his death, Alexander does not only represent the assembling
of the foursome; he also idealizes the conception of Alexandria as a place. That the
coffin has been lost is of no matter to Darley, who acknowledges the city's aloofness:
It is as if the preoccupations of this landscape were centred somewhere out
of reach of the average inhabitant—in a region where the flesh, stripped by
over-indulgence of its final reticences, must yield to a preoccupation vastly
more comprehensive: or perish in the kind of exhaustion represented by
the works of the Mouseion [...]. (38)
This out-of-reach-ness ofAlexander's burial site (an actual, physical location in the city
despite its misplacement) lends the city a noticeable lack similar to that given by Pont
St. Benezet to Avignon: Alexander's City is a city he never saw and in which he can
now never be seen—despite his theatrical glass coffin. Still, Darley acknowledges the
Soma, "where the confused young soldier's body lay in its borrowed Godhead," as the
spiritual center of the city (38—39). To this spiritual center, Darley adds the "tempo¬
ral site" of the Brokers' Club where businessmen admire the womanizing exploits of
Capodistria "as people upon a river-bank will watch the progress of a fisherman or an
artist" (39). This temporal district's sexually driven nature emphasizes the very tempo¬
rality of mortality. Combined, these spiritual and temporal centers present a further
overlapping of the city's celestial, terrestrial, divine, and mortal interests. Through
these centers, Justine wanders, "searching with such frightening singleness of mind
for the integrating spark which might lift her into a new perspective of herself" (39)
and through which she might attain something greater than mortality. The centers
of the city entice her to seek something more. Avignon's broken bridge presents the
image of a fuller expanse than was ever there; similarly, Alexandria—betokened both
in name and by the (merely supposed) presence of the soldier's corpse—presents a
larger-than-life image of itself as Alexander's City. The "temporal" red-light district,
with its superficial coupling of the earthy with the spiritual, merely reinforces this
inflation.
Whereas Bruce groped through the dark by the riverside before landing at the
base of the broken bridge and Darley struggled for twenty pages before alighting upon
serviceable centers at the Soma and the Brokers' Club, Felix Charlock opens the second
chapter of Tunc with the bold declaration of the Parthenon to be "the last serviceable
molar in some poor widow's gum" (Tunc 29).6 Moreover, the "monumental intimacy"
of the Acropolis is like a back garden for Felix and Iolanthe, for whom there is "hardly
a corner of it where we didn't make love" and from which one could wave to the
6The comparison of the Parthenon to a molar is similar to the plumber Raoul's description of Pont
St. Benezet in "Laura, a Portrait of Avignon," an article first published in Holiday in 1961: "There
she [Avignon] is. And the famous Pont d'Avignon. It looks silly all broken off like a tooth" (Durrell,
"Laura" 342).
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other "while she walked the Plaka streets below" (Tunc 29). Quite unequivocally, the
Acropolis—more specifically, the Parthenon—serves as the reference point ofAthens
for Charlock.
In Istanbul, Charlock strains to characterize the city, first choosing the "coax¬
ing palms [and] penis-turreted domes," later mentioning "the choicer monuments"
(though not by name) and listing the "honeyed gloom of the covered bazaars [.. .and]
sunbaked mosques." Then he recognizes the graveyards:
The tombs are sown broadcast, not gathered together in formalized squares
and rectangles. [.. ,H]ere death seemed to be broadcast wholesale in quite
arbitrary fashion. A heavy melancholy, a heavy depression seemed to hang
over these beautiful monuments. Turkey takes time to know. (102)
Moved by the frequency of these tombstones dotting Istanbul, Charlock calls the city
"an immense graveyard" (102).7 While the overwhelming number of these gravestones
lends a dizzying anonymity to the lives they commemorate, one tomb in particular
stands out for Charlock. After a day of sightseeing, Charlock's fiancee, Benedicta,
takes him to one "set in a small grilled enclosure of its own" inscribed with her name,
Benedicta Merlin. She turns away wordlessly, remaining silent when Charlock asks
about it (Tunc 1 5 5—1 56).8 Benedicta's grave serves as an interesting relation to that of
Alexander: Alexander's body lies marker-less; Benedicta's marker lies body-less.
It is not difficult to recognize the Heideggerian fourfold in the Parthenon and in
the "immense graveyard" of Istanbul. The Parthenon stands over Athens on the rocky
citadel of the Acropolis, drawing the earth upwards into the sky. It is, further, the
meeting point of gods and mortals, the mutual dwelling ofAthena (who protects and
names the polis) and of her priestesses. The tombs of Istanbul, too, represent the con¬
nection between mortal life and immortal afterlife. They acknowledge the mortals'
crossing over of that "last bridge" before bringing themselves before "the haleness of
the divinities." Just as in life the soul is embodied within its dwelling place, the matter
of the mortal, so too in death is the corpse entombed within the flesh of the earth;
thus the physical body connects the sky with the earth. Parthenon as spiritual tem¬
ple, fleshly tomb, and civilization's womb9; graveyard of Istanbul as acknowledgment
of mortality, appraisal of perpetuity, and inter-penetrability of earth and sky: these
symbols of respective cities suggest a reading of the present through their pasts.
Although Athens is immediately knowable by the toothy Acropolis and Istanbul
7Later in Nunquam, Caradoc says that Turkey has a "heavy death-propelled wavelength" and that
it is influenced by Egypt, "the one country above all which specialised in death" (Nunquam 234).
8Charlock later learns that the grave is that of her mother (Nunquam 32).
'See Caradoc's speech on the Acropolis [Tunc 67—78).
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"takes time to know,"10 they are similar to Alexandria and Avignon in that they are
knowable only through their pasts. These cities are in sharp contrast with London,
described breathlessly by Charlock as "the brave new chrysadiamantine world of [...]
nuptial London," with the city's mysteries and "great achievements" listed next to ex¬
pensive cars and fancy clothing. The house in the city he is to share with Benedicta is
"beautiful" and filled with "sumptuous impersonal furniture" (Tunc 173—174). More¬
over, the clothing he used to wear—the clothing of Athens—is considered the "pre¬
historic [...] uniform of [a] poor sage" (180); it is not the uniform of someone who
has adopted "the condescending wave of an umbrella which somehow goes with city
clothes" (181). The true assembling points of London for Charlock, however, are his
country house and St. Paul's cathedral.
Upon their marriage, Charlock and Benedicta move to their country house, sig¬
nificantly named Cathay, a "preposterous, gloomy" compound composed of "turrets
and fishponds" (187). The house itself serves as a kind of nowhere, an architectural
anthology, reminding Charlock ofmany other places and buildings: "the rococo mu¬
sicians' gallery with its mouldy Burne-Jones flavour" competes with "preposterous
Edwardian rooms leading with an air of ever greater futility into each other," "spectral
Venetian lustres," and "[sjhades of Baden and Pau." Additionally, the total effect of
the house, "copied and recopied, criss-crossed with mirrors set in tarnished mould¬
ings," calls to mind for Charlock yet another place—Istanbul's "rotting palaces in
style pompier'—reminding him how "foreign" Benedicta is (188). Moreover, when
Charlock reads his telegrams of marital congratulations, the empty (save the army of
servants) mansion channels the distant voices of his friends "from the lost world of
Athens and Stamboul." And perhaps most notably, the library, the "huge and beau¬
tifully arranged room with its galleries and moulded squinches, its sea-green dome,
its furnishings of globes, atlases, astrolabes, gazetteers" and its extensive collection of
books—"one would have imagined the room to contain virtually the sum total of
European culture"—presents an exhaustive European encapsulation of the world, not
least obviously in the physical inversion of the globe (earth) upon the ceiling (sky). The
implication, of course, is that European culture, with its gods of philosophy and sci¬
ence—"Descartes, Nietzsche, Leibniz...[sic]"—not only decodes the natural world,
but dominates the mortal world as well. Though these books are in truth fake ("all the
books in it were empty dummies!"), a fact that mocks the earnestness of the display,
the implication remains the same (189).
IOAthens and Istanbul also take on another sort of identification with the consideration ofCharlock's
loves, for as "Io owns Athens," so does "Benedicta's face [appear] superimposed upon" Istanbul in
Charlock's mind (155). Even later, Charlock imagines himself looking upon Turkey's coastline when
he lies with Benedicta (Nunquam 31).
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Unlike Cathay, with its melange of influence, St. Paul's cathedral is clearly delin¬
eated in the text: Charlock buys a guidebook and learns the exact dimensions of the
building (41' x 515' x 300') (.Nunquam 278). Furthermore, as a cathedral it defines
London in the old definition of city: it is the "old petrifact which crowned London
town" (277). Notwithstanding the sincerity of the building's designation and descrip¬
tion, a degree of artifice like that of Cathay taints the scene: the painting of St. Paul
above the Whispering Gallery is a "gamboge cartoon," the house of Paul is transliter¬
ated as Paulhaus (the name of Benedicta's asylum in Geneva), and Charlock's prayer
mocks God and calls for his resignation (278)." Moreover, Iolanthe's flight to the
Whispering Gallery where she prays beneath the pictures of St. Paul, hearkens back
to the flight of her namesake Io who prays to Prometheus. In contrast to Io, Iolanthe
hears no answer for her pleas and commits suicide; whereas Prometheus is able to
dissuade Io, St. Paul is just a cartoon figure (Clawson 159-160).
In St Paul's cathedral, the elements of the fourfold are still apparent, but it should
be obvious that Durrell problematizes any delicate balance they might have among
each other. Although the elements of the earth and the sky are available in the build¬
ing's construction of stone, its physical mass, its towering height in the city, and the
access it provides to the skies via variously leveled galleries, the elements of gods and
mortals are unstable. It is ostensibly an extension of the Catholicism's Roman base of
St. Peter's Basilica, yet it is "not a dream of godhead" but of mathematical and En¬
lightenment principles: in the architectural favoring of the building's mathematical
principles over its importance as a spiritual refuge, it is resultantly "much less aestheti¬
cally beautiful" than any other cathedral (.Nunquam 194). Moreover, in its very earthly
location it has been situated on a spot of (implied pagan) magnetic importance, un¬
dermining the notion ofmere potentiality of pre-cathedral space: the magnetic fields
are independent of the thing of the church and originate in the earth, the landscape.12
The cathedral unites sky with earth and mortals with gods, but it does so in a way that
equates and confuses the values of these variables: the differentiation between sacred
and profane is now merely nominal, and the latter even mocks the former.
"While Charlock says of his wedding that it will be civil ("No church-bells for Charlock" (Tunc
187)) and that the ceremony, which none of his friends attends, in the library is itself "perhaps a trifle
funereal" (188), this depiction contrasts with Jocas' funeral in St. Paul's cathedral, the scene ofwhich
opens with the sound of the bells ringing (Nunquam 277), and which is filled with the bulk ofCharlock's
friends.
"Oddly enough, the Stonehenge-like geo-magnetic fields on which the church is built are concen¬
trated in the very spot where Robo-lolanthe is later killed.
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Outward, Motion
Herein lies the difference between the Durrellian and Heideggerian notions of place:
Heidegger's intimate examinations of the interplay between his fourfold demand that
these four be of like importance, but Durrell's macroscopic isolation of "the germ
of the people which is expressed by their landscape" ("Landscape" 156) institutes a
clear hierarchy among the constituent parts. The two correspond to dual inward and
outward motions, a pair which Roger Porter suggests is inherent in travel writing: the
outward motion of new experiences and gained knowledge is always coupled with a
motion of returning back home, both actual and in the figurative sense of regaining
something lost or claiming an unconscious desire (Porter 51). Durrell acknowledges
these motions, writing that the first, outward motion for the travel writer has as its aim
the discovery of that spirit of place. But this outward discovery is less important than
the one which the traveller makes about him- or herself in the second, inward motion
of travel, all passage being nothing more than "a sort of metaphorical journey—an
outward symbol of an inward march upon reality" (Labyrinth 59). The journey home
is really a journey within, what Stefan Herbrechter calls "an antidote against exile,"
or a re-figuring of the quest for the island, "the disconnected land whole to itself"
(Herbrechter, Ethics 257, 260).
A straightforward Heideggerian analysis of the dwelling places of the Avignon
Bridge, the Soma ofAlexandria, the Parthenon, the tombs of Istanbul, and of Cathay
conforms to this notion of a "land whole to itself": the uniting of the fourfold is the
fulfilling of place. What is more, the metaphorical journey reveals an inner reality of
the interplay between these constituent parts. But Durrell, interested also in the out¬
ward motion of experience, troubles these whole lands and places of balanced parts,
as is most obvious in his portrayal of St. Paul's. In describing these dwelling places
with the inward motion of intimate description, Durrell is also making gestures to the
larger, symbolic, outward motion necessary to recognize the implications of his spirit
of place.
Gregory Dickson writes that location in The Revolt ofAphrodite is polar: from the
mechanical, rational England and Europe in theWest to the holistic, simplistic Turkey
and Asia in the East (Dickson 528).13 Extending Dickson's thread to consider the
13To be sure, he allows for geographical "grey areas" of Greece and Switzerland, but Switzerland is
(perhaps too) easily overlooked as a temporary stopover during the mental illnesses of Charlock and
Benedicta, a quiet asylum set beside a "melancholy lake which mirrors mostly nothingness because the
sky is so low and as toneless as tired fur" (Nunquam 18). Greece is a dwelling of the characters, and
thus it fits within the continuum from West to East. In the Revolt Switzerland is not a dwelling, per
se, but it too fits acceptably along the line drawn from England to Turkey. In the Qitintet, however,
it is a more significant dwelling; nevertheless, the characters reside in Switzerland only in order to sit
out the war, making of it a kind ofwaiting room or the ship in which they make their passage through
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Alexandria of the Quartet and the Avignon of the Quintet does little to distort his
model, and in truth emphasizes another dimension overlooked in his study: that of
time. If London is mechanical and rational, it is also characterized by its novelty, rep¬
resented in the innovation and invention that demarcate Charlock's life there. Con¬
versely, Alexandria and Istanbul are characterized by the absolute remoteness of their
pasts, represented in respective tombs either implied (and inaccessible) or real (and
only slightly more accessible). Between the extremes, Athens is also represented by its
past, albeit a past that that is not only read-able but also relatively write-able: Caradoc
compares the Parthenon to a tomb and a womb in his speech on the Acropolis (Tunc
67—78), signaling a future made possible by works of the past.14 Avignon, too, in
Pont St. Benezet recalls the city's inheritance as the seat of "all Christendom," but the
broken bridge represents a break with the past, and the amputated finger pointing
westward at dawn is more concerned with future than with history.
Alexandria, then, with its imagined gravesite, represents the extreme inaccessibility
of the East in Durrell's world. From Alexandria, the thread curves through Istanbul,
Athens, and Avignon, each city becoming more comprehensible and immediate than
the previous, before ending in London, the city whose immediacy leads to Charlock's
mental illness. Somewhere between Alexandria and London, this thread traverses the
boundary from East to West, from Orient to Occident, but it is difficult to know the
point of transition. Istanbul and Alexandria are certainly Oriental, but Athens and
even Avignon are too problematic to categorize. Edward Said writes, "The Orient is
not only adjacent to Europe; [...] In addition, the Orient has helped to define Europe
(or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience" (Said, Orientalism
1—2). So too, in Durrell's model, is the East defined against the West, with both
inextricably tied to each other. The difficulty in recognizing the boundary between
the two comes from the arbitrary nature of that boundary (Said 54); the only true
way of recognizing the models ofOrient and Occident is in recognizing the relative
distance and direction of change between the two, not in absolutely quantifying that
difference.
JeffMalpas explains Heidegger's notion of spatiality as one principally concerned
with "the notions of 'orientation' or 'directionality' ('Ausrichtung') and 'distance' or
'de-severance' ('Ent-fernung')" (Malpas, "Uncovering" 212—213). The distance and
severance ofHeidegger's Ent-fernung is one that measures and breaks the world down
the trials ofwartime. Little is written of Switzerland, except to name it-—making of it little more than
another "neutral zone."
I4Caradoc's speech is heavily influenced by a story from Vitruvius' De architectura quoted in Otto
Rank's Art andArtist (170—72), which Durrell read.
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into discrete units of relational difference. To follow this model in the space of Dur-
rell's literary world, Athens, with its European and Ottoman pasts, is more Oriental
than London, but more Occidental than Alexandria. Certainly, such a generalization
may be problematic, but it is not unlike the "corrections" Said sees daily imposed
"upon raw reality, changing it from free-floating objects into units of knowledge"
(Said, Orientalism 67). Yet again, in Durrell's novels, any transformation from free-
floating Oriental or Occidental objects into The East or The West happens not just in
units of difference or direction: the dimension of time, previously added to Dickson's
model, also has a place in this ffeideggerian map of the spatiality of Durrell's novels.
As Malpas writes, since
spatiality [...] is tied to activity and since activity is always projective—
presently oriented toward a set of future possibilities on the basis of a past
actuality—so it is temporality that enables the opening up of the spatial
ordering of Dasein's world. (Malpas, "Uncovering" 213)
Likewise, our spatial ordering of Durrell's world, the thread which runs from East to
West, from Alexandria in the Orient (in which "one suddenly confronted unimagin¬
able antiquity [... and] boundless distance" (Said, Orientalism 167)) to London in the
Occident (the "brave new chrysadiamantine world" (Tunc 173)) is temporal, running
from past to present.
Moreover, the idea of Alexandria-as-Alexander's-City, granted stead by the pres¬
ence of his body at the Soma, is like Said's distinction of the Orient as a topos. It is
"less a place" than
a set of references, a congeries of characteristics, that seems to have its
origin in a quotation, or a fragment of a text, or a citation from someone's
work on the Orient, or some bit ofprevious imagining, or an amalgam of
all these. (Said, Orientalism 177)
The actual presence ofAlexander's body at the Soma is less important than the rumor
of its presence. This "fragment of a text" is all that is necessary to give the city its set of
references, its distinction as topos, an Aristotelian term which Malpas defines as "the
limit of the enclosing body, at which it is in contact with that which is enclosed" (Mal¬
pas, "Uncovering" 215). Alexandria, Durrell's "half-imagined (yet wholly real)" city
{Quartet 209), though a place ostensibly given stead by its founder's corpse, is bound
by its "congeries of characteristics," its flies and its beggars, its light and its dust, its
businessmen and professional women. "Half-Imagined" Alexandria is the completed
and confirmed imaginary Orient described by Said (Said, Orientalism 167).15
15Ken Seigneurie writes of the Egypt presented in the Quartet as a symbol pointing toward an ideal¬
ized, sacred sense of the Orient (Seigneurie 93). This consideration draws another dimension, Imagi¬
nation, into the discussion of the path of the thread from Alexandria to London, picking up the thread
left open from the previous chapter.
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So too does the "immense graveyard" of Istanbul illustrated by Durrell represent a
collected expectation ofwhat it is to be Turkish. The "penis-turreted domes," "choicer
monuments," bazaars, and mosques are merely quotations of what the Istanbul experi¬
ence must be like. They are useful to correspond to the idea of the Egyptian/Oriental
death-obsession presented by Caradoc and espoused by Charlock (Nunquam 233).
Similarly, the Parthenon, the "last serviceable molar in some poor widow's gum" (Tunc
29), calls to mind the age and troubled history of that "poor widow" Greece. At the
same time the bright monument embodies the expectation of the Greek "sunny phi¬
losophy," its comparative (to Turkey, at any rate) domestication of death, and its
innocence (.Nunquam 233). These ideals, like "the bright blue and white of Greece"
found on the flag (.Nunquam 234), are Said's bits of "previous imagining," the quota¬
tions and citations of the spirit of Greece, which Durrell asks the reader to recognize
(or, perhaps more accurately, to remember). Any Oriental elements of Greece, those
components that are "ominous or minatory," are to be understood as the influence of
the country's proximity to Turkey and its historical connections to Egypt (Nunquam
233); nonetheless, they are accepted and recognized as part of the country's whole
impure past.
The Bridge ofAvignon, too, represents some elsewhere-referenced idea ofAvignon
and its history. The bridge built by a mocked farm boy in Avignon's zenith is the bridge
on which everyone danced in a circle and which carried the weight of the world. It
connects the town to the Rhone and in turn overlays its own set of references upon
the town. Projected by the bridge's past greatness, the exotic allure of the papacies of
the "Babylonian Captivity" serve to contextualize the scandal of the Templar massacre
and to mystify the legacy of the de Nogaret family. Projected by the bridge's ruined
nature, the city as testament to the earthly make-up of the church delineates a space
for the legitimacy of literary authorial creation. Even the Pont du Gard speaks for
the utilitarian admirability of Provence's Roman heritage. Durrell quotes this set of
characteristics, what amounts to an idea ofAvignon-ness, using it to place and influence
(and even justify) the happenings of his Quintet.
If Alexandria, Istanbul, Athens, and Avignon are easy to essentialize on account
ofwhat Said cites as an effortlessness to "be there" mentally with only little resistance
on the part of the Orient or the Other (Said, Orientalism 7), London proves to be
a different kind of place. Durrell instead appeals to the pride of assumed European
and English superiority: the books in the library of Cathay encapsulate the greatness
ofWestern thought; the navigational paraphernalia therein signify the pre-eminence
of British exploration and colonization (not least of all over the East, to which it is
opposed); and the cathedral in London epitomizes the mathematical rigor of English
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engineers. Even London is interacted with chiefly on the grounds of it being an idea
ofwhat the city is expected to represent—more topos than geophysical location.
Beyond the City
The reduction of these literary places to their respective spirits is not one that strips
them of significant profundity or of their relationships to the other, actual cities.
Rather, the resulting map of imagined geographies in Durrell's corpus enriches the
implication of these real cities by introducing new dimensions of spatiality. While
Alexandria is a former Greek and British colony and a current Egyptian city on the
southern shore of the Mediterranean, and while it is still a city in which Durrell lived
for almost three years, it is further strengthened by the possibilities for symbolism that
Durrell instils within it: when a young British diplomat falls in love with an exotic
Egyptian woman, the parallels to British colonialism are impossible to ignore; when
their relationship sours, so does that of their respective countries.16 Porter's sense of
the duality of travel—outward and inward, learning a place and learning oneself—can
be reconsidered in light of these constructions as well. Tire inward motion (a Hei-
deggerian analysis of the making of place) and the outward motion (Durrellian and
Saidean greater metaphors of place), while different, are not mutually opposed to one
another. Obviously, Durrell's own notions of place were foremost in his mind when
he wrote his novels, but the value of Heidegger's theories extends beyond his bridge.
Particularly, his notions ofspatium and extensio—an interpolated space between places
and a broad extension of place, respectively—will be useful in examining the areas of
the sea and the dessert in the next section of this chapter.
ii The Spirit of Space: Non-Dwelling Places
The spaces through which we go daily areprovidedfor by <places> [...]. Ifwe pay heed to these
relations between <places> and spaces, between spaces and space, we get a clue to help us in
thinking ofthe relation ofman and space. ("Building Dwelling Thinking" 156)
Heidegger introduces the idea of space as one that is dependent upon place. By gath¬
ering the fourfold, place introduces the space in which these four collect. At the same
time, place also establishes the greater idea of spatiality, with which the notions of
distance or nearness and abstract three-dimensionality are bound. The locations "var¬
iously near or far from the bridge" are able to come into being because of these con¬
cepts of distance and extension, what Heidegger terms spatium and extensio. Spatium
l6Anne Zahlan suggests that Durrell even uses the relationship of Leila and Mountolive to ridicule
the British myth of empire, rather than merely showing its deterioration (Zahlan, "Rhodes" 229).
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is a kind of space stripped of significance. It exists as the space between two locations:
"In a space that is represented purely as spatium, the bridge now appears as a mere
something at some position, which can be occupied at any time by something else or
replaced by a mere marker." Extensio, on rhe other hand, exists as pure significance,
though that significance resides in the place from which the space radiates: extensio is
the space implied by extension of place (Heidegger 155).
This notion of space as one tied to the experience ofplace is quite similar to Michel
de Certeau's definition of space as "practicedplaceP He takes his idea ofpracticed place
from the expectation he has of space to incorporate "direction, velocities, and time"
(de Certeau 117). Thus, to some degree, the space produced by the place of a bridge is
accessible only to those who experience rhe space en route to or from the bridge. In this
manner, the space ofAlexandria, the city jointly defined by the places of the Soma and
the Brokers' Club, is established by Justine's wanderings through these "two centres of
gravity" (Quartet 38—39). Similarly, throughout Durrell's novels, other spaces, like the
Mediterranean and the Sahara, are experienced only in practicing the transition from
one place to another. In these spaces, varying characteristics of nearby places—with
which these spaces interact both as spatium and as extensio—overlay upon and shuffle
with each other, the notion of prime influence of place being overtaken by a more
decentralized amalgam.17
The Sea
The Mediterranean is obviously important to Durrell, a self-professed exile and expa¬
triate who spent much of his life moving from one country to another. But despite
his claim to the expatriate's ability to "feel at ease anywhere, given a minimum of sun¬
shine," to carry his country within him (Alyn 24—25), the Mediterranean pulled him
back, enticing him with more than the promise ofsunlight: it was also "the capital, the
heart, the sex organ of Europe," and "the central point, the pivot" (38). In his books,
too, the Mediterranean is perhaps central to everything. Greek 'Sea in the Middle of
the Earth,' Arabic 'MiddleWhite Sea,' it also features as central, cartographically at any
rate, to almost all of his works. At the very least, it offers a colourful backdrop or the
opportunity of fresh air for his characters, who often stroll along Alexandria's "Grand
Corniche" (Pursewarden, Mountolive), swim recreationally (Balthazar, Darley, Clea),
or even venture out in a little fishing boat to gaze back upon the city (Pombal, Sveva).
But this recreational interaction is not of the same import as other kinds of interac¬
tion with the spaces outside of the city. The centrality of the Mediterranean is perhaps
I7Tiziana Carlino writes that "The Levant is a space inbetween, only temporary hosted by the sea,
non-national, neither nostalgic" (Carlino 1).
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most notable when characters are drawn to the sea in the same manner Durrell him¬
self was. For example, in Quinx, the last book of The Avignon Quintet, a busload of
characters ventures out of Avignon through the space (extensio) of the surrounding
countryside to the Mediterranean shore, traveling through Provence to Camargue to
take part in the yearly gipsy feting of Saint Sara. This tradition, in which the stat¬
ues of Saint Sara and the two Saints Mary sacred to gipsies are carried in procession
into the Mediterranean, began in the 16th century and is associated with the trio's
welcome arrival in France. In both of these movements, from Provence to Camargue
(for Blanford, Sutcliffe, et al) and from Saintes-Maries-de-la-Mer to Mediterranean
(for the statues of the Saints and their gardiens), individuals interact with the space
between and around places, but the interaction is a contentious one, at best.
Blanford and company's journey from Avignon to Saintes-Maries-de-la-Mer and
through the stadion of the Provencal and Camargue countryside is a quick one in the
text, taking a few pages, but spoken of directly in only two sentences. When Blanford
and his companions depart is not clear; in fact it is almost as if they are swept along
with the gipsies' migration "to honour their patron saint [...in] the little Church of
the Saintes Maries de la Mer, the famous village on the sea to which all their steps
were now bending" (Quintet 1233). They encounter the gipsies when "first they [the
gipsies] filled up Avignon" on the way to the Camargue (1233), but it eventually be¬
comes apparent that Blanford's group is also bending their own steps in that direction.
Mostly, Durrell references the trip remotely, using the conditional or past perfect tense
to indicate a distance of time or actuality: "they would look almost as strange [as the
gypsies...] for they had hired a large red motor bus for the excursion [. ...] A van such
as this would free them from the responsibilities of the road" (1235; emphases mine).
These sentences hint at the possibility or even the inevitability of travel (and req¬
uisite interaction with the spaces beyond the city), but they do not signal its start.
At other times, the use of the past progressive, as in "After all, they had a purpose,
they were travellingWith the intention of invoking Saint Sara" (1235; emphases mine),
seems to signify that they are in fact traveling in their red bus, though it might also
just signify a motive for an intention to travel. The next few sentences are only slightly
less ambiguous, once again referencing the journey only in relation to something else.
In this case, Sutcliffe's thoughts of Sabine leads him on a mental journey whose de¬
scription is entangled with the first glimpses of a passing and changing landscape: "the
flowering meads of high Provence [...] soon gave place to the sadder, flatter plains of
the Camargue—country of marsh and rivulet and lake" (1235). Finally, in the para¬
graph's concluding sentence, the end of the journey is in sight: depictions of landscape
and other passing features are equated with the end of the journey. The "straggling
column" of pilgrims is described as winding itself "dustily through his [the gardiens}
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land to the sea," and horses are described as white as "foam flowing over the land
like waves on the blue sea which lay ahead, the crown of their journey, the church of
Saint Sara" (1235-1236). And yet, after recognizing the whole of the journey, after
describing the passage from Provence to Camargue and recognizing the sea as the fi¬
nal destination, Durrell never directly signals the journey until two paragraphs later,
when he begins the sentence "So they voyaged," and again, two more paragraphs later,
with the sentence beginning "So the little bus struggled on" (1236, 1237).
But far more contentious than the road from Avignon to Saintes-Maries-de-la-
Mer is the unpracticed space of the named Mediterranean, at once part of the town
(de-la-Mer) and not a part of it, unknowable except as an element of extensio (or even,
more oddly, as the town is 'of the sea,' the unknown place from which the known
element of the town extends). In the Quintet, the saints' yearly baptism, the culmi¬
nation of the festival and reason for the journeys of the gipsies and of Blanford and
his friends, is described as obliquely as the journey from Avignon, hinting at the sub¬
tly shifting progress out of the town, onto the beach, and into the Mediterranean.
When the ceremony to bring the statues to the sea is described in relation to the fair,
Durrell recognizes that event as central to everything happening: the "great fair was
growing up around the event which would end with [...] the transport of the three
Maries down to the sea," he writes (1237). The colourful and detailed description of
the future ceremony ("the event [with] which [the fair] would end") builds until it
loses its position in time, described at one point in the past tense—"the whole party
[...] plunging through the shallows until the sea was breast-high, and the whole caval¬
cade seemed to float"—and at another signaling a more immediate shift—"[the whole
party] encircled now by all the fisher boats of the little seaport" (1237; all emphasis
mine). Despite the apparent significance of the central moment of the statues' proces¬
sion, all of this description offuture happening is employed to describe the textually
current action of the red bus coming into view of the beach. Seven pages later, at the
time when the saints actually are carried into the water, the only sketch Durrell affords
the statues is a cursory mention ("the saints were being carried down to sea on their
wooden trestle—part of the traditional service" (Quintet 1244)) buried in a sentence
telling of Sutcliffe's non-participation in that day's festivities; presumably, however,
the other characters take part in the ceremony into the sea.
Novelists Darley and Blanford also interact with the Mediterranean when they
each traverse it en route to Egypt in respective novels. When Darley returns to the
city in Clea, he crosses the sea from his Greek island. His journey is a pleasant one.
"The night was superlatively warm and fine," he writes. "A dolphin broke once, twice
at the bow. A course was set" (<Quartet 666). The journey begins when the boat "slip[s]
out slantwise from the bay" and "shuttle[s] for a while along the ink-shadowed line of
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cliffs" before the crew ventures "outwards upon the main deep," trailing a phospho¬
rescent wake like a comet across the night sky (666—667). Darley writes of nearing
Alexandria, comparing the journey to traveling backwards in time across "the familiar
pathways of the Greek sea" (667). As the journey progresses, he feels a stronger "tug
of memory's heavy plumb-line" until the boat is just outside the harbour (667).
Like that ofDarley, Blanford's Mediterranean is an outlet to immortality, a space of
"perfect peace" and epic calm: the skies are cloudless and the sea is without "Homeric
curl" {Quintet 618). During his passage to Alexandria in Constance, he takes advantage
of the time and freedom to begin Arabic lessons from the Prince and to write poetry,
which steadily improves.18 Distance is marked by the sliding influence of the world
around them: first by news of the war and then by specific places as they near them.
The yacht carries them "into Egypt and safety," but they still trouble (albeit feebly)
over the threat of torpedoes, and they feel they are surrounded by the unseen navies
ofwarring countries, France, England, and Italy (Quintet 618—620). They travel "to¬
wards the white cliffs ofCrete and then Evnostos, the harbour-home of the Alexandria
basin," sliding from place to place as they near Alexandria (620).
On the Mediterranean, Blanford and Darley gradually slide along spheres of in¬
fluence, beginning with reluctant departures from respective origins, "shuttl[ing] for
awhile along the ink-shadowed line of cliffs." They slide through the waters, map¬
ping coordinates by where they are not. For Darley, the "Greek sea" itself is familiar
through its mytho-historical importance.19 It is also a plumb line of personal mem¬
ory, along which—as the boat nears Alexandria—he must pull himself. The journey
is temporal and conjures a catalogue of ghostly recollections: religious conversations,
passionate kisses, gestures, images of flying birds (667). For Blanford, crossing the
Mediterranean represents a journey to the future, rather than the past. "My mother is
dead, my friends dispersed, my future uncertain," he writes, considering the trip to be
his long-awaited turn of good fortune {Quintet 619). He describes the Mediterranean
as all consumed by warring fleets, forming "some great hurricane" whose eye is the
yacht on which he and the Prince travel (620). Through this hurricane, they progress,
first towards Crete and then to Alexandria.
Both Blanford and Darley arrive at the city in darkness, confident they are just
l8This linguistic freedom is not unlike that found in The Revolt ofAphrodite when Sacrapant takes
Charlock across the Bosporus to the Asian side of Istanbul and is struck dumb in the pre-linguistic
limitlessness of the transition: "Sacrapant waved his arm at it and gave a small incoherent cry of plea¬
sure—as if he had momentarily forgotten the text of the caption which should go with such a picture"
{Tunc 110).
I9Indeed, in Balthazar, Darley admits that the Mediterranean's size is too easily inflated when one
considers "the length and greatness of its history" {Quartet 213).
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outside Alexandria but unable to see proof. In both instances, the visual confirma¬
tion is instant and dramatic, with Blanford's "utter darkness" replaced by spectacular
brightness as "somewhere a switch was thrown and a sort ofcombination ofTaj Mahal
and Eiffel Tower blared out upon the night" (621) and with Darley's "all-obliterating
darkness" exchanged for explosive brightness as the
harbour suddenly outlined itselfwith complete clarity upon the dark pan¬
els ofheaven, while long white fingers ofpowder-white light began to stalk
about the sky in ungainly fashion [.. .and] a dense stream ofcoloured rock¬
ets [...] emptying on the sky their brilliant clusters of stars and diamonds
and smashed pearl snuff-boxes [...]. {Quartet 668)
In both instances, the Mediterranean is filtered through extremes of location, first
recognized by proximity to origins, and then as the destination is neared, the sea is
located with respect to Alexandria. Interestingly, their passage across its surface also
represents the passage of time.
Likewise, between Avignon and the Mediterranean is temporal chaos marked by
verb tenses vacillating between an "ocean of futurity" and an antiquity called to mind
by "palaeolithic steeds" {Quintet 1235—36). The procession of the saints, too, is a
future event (the "great fair [...] would end with [...] the transport of the three Maries
down to the sea" (1237; emphasis mine)) until it is actually happening, at which
point Durrell references it only as "part of the traditional service" having happened
for centuries (1244; emphasis mine). This shift from future to past to present marks
the difficulty of establishing spatio-temporal stability outside of established place: the
Mediterranean is first an extensio of the point ofdeparture before it is the open spatium
of the journey (interrupted intermittently by the extensii of nearby places extending
into the sea) and finally the extensio of the final port. Thus, while Blanford and Darley
feel they are just at the harbour to Alexandria, they have no means of establishing an
actual position until the city ultimately shocks them with its presence
The Desert
One came upon it, came to the edge ofthe carpet ofhuman plantation and there it was likegreat
theatrical personage, waiting serenely. [...] The desert was a metaphorfor everything huge and
dangerous, yet without so seeming. (TheAvignon Quintet 650)
Contrasting with the bleeding edge of the city's space into the sea, Alexandria also
bleeds into the desert at its southern edges. The desert is not as romantic a notion as
the Mediterranean in Durrell's personal life; neither is it "the sex organ of Europe."
Durrell considers the desert to be depressing and devitalising to all of Egypt (Alyn
64), and while found in the Quartet and the Quintet, it does not figure in any of his
II. The Spirit ofSpace: Non-Dwelling Places 92
other travel writing or novels. Still, the unruly space of the Sahara is analogous to the
un-knowable space of the Mediterranean.
In The Alexandria Quartet, Nessim takes a journey similar to that of the Avignon
party, but instead of traveling fromAvignon to Saintes-Maries-de-la-Mer on the Medi¬
terranean, he travels from Alexandria on the Mediterranean to Karm Abu Girg, his
family home on the edge of the desert. For Nessim, the space between Alexandria
and Karm Abu Girg is as obscured as that of the other trip. As he drives through "the
barren network of faults and dried-out lake-beds," dust soon covers his tires and clouds
the air in his car, "coating everything in a fine-grained pollen" until the windscreen
is so "snowed-up" he resorts to using wipers (Quartet 251). He soon arrives at a ferry
crossing, where he meets his brother Narouz, who accompanies him the rest of the
way home. Later in the Quartet, but years earlier, the young diplomat-in-training
Mountolive makes this same journey to the rural home of the Hosnanis, but he finds
that the road outside of Alexandria simply stops (405). Nessim's difficulty—he can
hardly see the road—is not too far removed from that of Mountolive, who has no
prescribed trail to follow. In both cases, leavingAlexandria signifies leaving the known
city and entering into an unknown space. The road outside ofAlexandria ends when
it can no longer serve the city, when the residents of the city no longer practice the
city so far out. When the dust from the unpaved road impedes Nessim's sight and
when the complete lack of road hinders Mountolive's forward progress, they cease to
be within the practicable space of the city and are moving outward from it into the
un-practiced desert.
The day after Nessim arrives home, the two brothers venture into the desert so
Narouz can purchase and break in a new horse. They travel alone, because their ser¬
vants find the desert "such torture," believing it "to be an emptiness populated entirely
by the spirits of demons" (264). The desert itself is a wild place of "pure draughts of
desert air" marked by
the nakedness of space, pure as a theorem, stretching away into the sky
drenched in all its own silence and majesty, untenanted except by such
figures as the imagination ofman has invented to people landscapes which
are inimical to his passions and whose purity flays the mind. (266)
Even the horses feel the boundlessness and respond with "their tearing plunging gallop
across the dunes, manes and tassels tossing" (266). Once the brothers familiarize
themselves with the sense of freedom, they set to task to familiarize themselves with
their geographical position. Though Narouz carries "the whole land in his mind like
the most detailed map by a master cartographer [...] knowing [...] the drift of sand
to an inch" (264), they dip into their surroundings cautiously, taking a "slow tacking
path, questing about" for a hint as to their location. Eventually, they find the pathway,
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an "ancient caravan route," leading to the Quasur el Atash, where they are to meet the
horse sellers. They find the trail and soon recognize Quasur el Atash in the distance;
at this point, the freedom and limitlessness of the desert is lost as they are no longer
in an unmarked space but are instead "nearly there." The Sheik's four waiting escorts
become a clear destination: "To them they rode—into the embrace of arms like dry
sticks" (267).
In the. Avignon Quintet, too, the characters venture into the desert from Alexandria.
Bruce, Piers, Sylvie, and Toby set off on horseback with an Arab guide from Alexan¬
dria, "heading for an oasis called Macabru which lay some way to the east" (Quintet
91). At this point in time, Alexandria has no suburbs and the desert begins right at the
gates to Alexandria, thrusting the four immediately into "the damp enervating heat
which soaked and bathed one, until one could feel the sweat trickling through one's
clothes into one's very saddle" (92). Here in the desert, "breathing was laboured" and
everywhere are small villages, which, because of the numerous mirages, give "the illu¬
sion of being fictions" (92). But within this shifting landscape of illusion, Alexandria
is firmly located, as Piers is happy to tell, at "310 13' 5" north latitude and 270 35'
30" longitude, near Lake Mareotis, on an isthmus which connects with terra firma
the peninsula that forms the two ports" (94). Here in the desert, distanced from the
city, the four ruminate on its past wonders, which reach fifteen miles into the desert
in the form of artifacts, fallen monuments, "shattered archways, smashed causeways
and musing lintels" (94). Piers recognizes within these earthquake-savaged ruins a
direct connection with this past life—"And yet," he says, "the outer furnishings of his
world are still here—palms, water-wheels, dervishes, desert horses. Always!" Never¬
theless, Toby dismisses these very real relics as mirages, mere symptoms of the mutable
environs (95).
They advance into the desert "and into darkness," recognizing and indeed seeing
little around them for the night: "there was nothing to be seen save the desolate dunes
stretching away on every side—and now visibility was foreshortened by the absolute
dark" (98). The four travelers become unsure of their guide's sense of direction and
begin to worry they are heading aimlessly into the desert, but they soon see an air¬
plane—Akkad's—land somewhere ahead of them at the oasis. Tire plane orders the
desert by establishing a place in the sea of sand. At this point, the travelers quicken
to hurry their arrival to the "point of fixity in the midst of desolation" which is yet
little more than "a shadow which dawn's light would break down into objects and
planes," indistinguishable except for a certainty that it is "not part of the desert" (99).
The oasis, distinguishable by its position within and yet against the desert, becomes
immediate to the place of the travelers.
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For these pilgrims traveling to Macabru, the desert establishes positional uncer¬
tainty equivalent to that of Darley and Blanford in the Mediterranean. The desert
is "uneven" and equated with darkness (98) and an environment "in which the sand
drifts were in some places blown up into heaps and in others spread out into vast
mattresses, where our animals sank a foot deep, and in others again, water-covered
and reduced to black mud" (97). While Alexandria is situated precisely at 31° 13' 5"
north and 270 3 5' 30" east, the four are imprecisely located in the desert, somewhere
to Alexandria's east. Even their guide, who seems to be on some sort of course across
the desert (98) gives the impression of being lost in the "croak of relieved triumph"
he lets escape when they are within sight of the oasis (99).
Correspondingly, Narouz, who is meant to be as knowledgeable of the desert as a
"master cartographer," carrying within him a "battle-plan" of "the drift of sand to an
inch" (Quartet 264), establishes his and Nessim's position only with time, trial, and
error. For Narouz, much of the desert represents an unknown that is to be tamed, "for
he had already mentally planted this waste with carobs and green shrubs—conquered
it" (266). Nessim has been fighting such a battle at Abousir, where Justine's Winter
Palace is carved out of the sand drifts "which, after a winter of wind, would move
forward and cover the stones of the courtyard in six inches of sand" (133). Ihis con¬
quering of the wild is not unlike Narouz's breaking-in of the colt he has chosen, who
gives "a low whistling cry of fear" at the "panic which always greets such a collision
of human and animal worlds" before bucking and wildly galloping, "aimed like a
shooting-star to pierce the very sky, and whirled away across the dunes" (269).
The desert as an unconquered, unknown entity is an object of desire to be learned
and explored through the inward motion oftravel, but the shifting sands and un-place-
ability within that space make it unknowable. Like the Mediterranean, the desert can
only be experienced by the subtly sliding places whose influences permeate the space.
Thus, Nessim and Narouz are disoriented until they find the road that leads to Quasur
el Atash, and the four pilgrims experience Alexandria fifteen miles into the desert and
are unsettled until they recognize the oasis, at which point their "spirits rose [...] with
the confirmation that our course was a true one" (Quintet 99).
Out ofPlace
These areas of the desert and the sea are what Eric Dardel calls geographical space,
"unique [for] it has its own name—Paris, Champagne, the Sahara, the Mediterranean"
(qtd. in Relph 16). For Dardel, the naming of space establishes its relationship to the
subject who names it, much in the same sense that for Heidegger a space is effected
by the place that gives it signification. But despite having names, they are not truly
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claimed for man in the manner Edward Relph writes of named spaces being claimed:
"Where there are no names, the environment is chaotic, lacking in orientation, even
fearful, for it has no humanised and familiar points of reference" (16-17).20 Known,
named, geographical spaces for Relph are cultural, reflecting "the significant space of a
particular culture that is humanised by the naming of places" (16). The phenomenon
of indigenous peoples populating their environment with mythologies of landscape-
formation is such a construction of geographical space, as it is through these stories
of the land that they come to know it, to "humanise the wilderness" (17). In this
manner, the mythologies of named geographical spaces give place to the various rock
formations or valleys that they name. The problem with "untenanted" named geo¬
graphical spaces like the Mediterranean and the Sahara, however, is that they are not
knowable in this manner; they are not humanisable because they are not dwellings.
If space is truly claimed for man by naming it, then the Mediterranean's lack of rec¬
ognizable characteristics, its deficiency of recognizable dips or mountains or valleys
in its surface to which humans might attribute a story, its dearth of orientations or
spatiality independent ofoutside places, its scarcity of "humanised and familiar points
of reference," nullifies the cultural signification of that space, as the Mediterranean is
never able to provide substantial signification for itself. Additionally, if an unnamed
environment is "chaotic [and] lacking in orientation," then the Sahara's steadily shift¬
ing sands, where "the wind blew out one's footsteps like candle-flames" (Quartet 278),
where "one could not just walk into it for a stroll, for its shapes were always changing;
at the least wind all contours changed, and one's tracks were expunged at a breath"
(Quintet 650), represents another un-knowable space. This lack of characteristics by
which one might orient oneself introduces an absence of difference, the further lack
of what Paul Carter calls "irriguous uncertainties of the ground that introduce us to
the adventure [...] of engaging with in-between spaces" (Carter, Lie 5). Carter's en¬
gagement with "in-between spaces" is travel. The deficiency of details found in the
Mediterranean and the Sahara allow us to engage with these spaces only en route to
other places ofmore "irriguous uncertainty" and knowable qualities.21
20It is important at this point to recognize a derivation from the terminology of Heidegger: Relph
and Dardel are both speaking of space with the expectation that it represent itself in the manner Hei¬
degger expects place to represent itself. For Heidegger, the introduction of place also unidirectionally
allows for spatiality. Relph and Dardel establish place as a component of spatiality.
2IYaacov Shavit writes of this Mediterranean instability, calling the sea "a singular instance ofmul¬
tiplicity and diversity [...] maintaining, over thousands of years, reciprocal relations, integration and
acculturation, without either themultiplicity being impaired" (qtd. in Carlino 3). The instability Shavit
writes of undoubtedly lends to the "uncertainty" common to in-between spaces, allowing for travel.
Gil Hochberg suggests that the notion of travel is familiar in—and perhaps even native to—writing
from the Levant: it "has always been transnational and has emphasized mobility. In contemporary Lev¬
antine literature, one immediately recognizes the emphasis put on transition and mobility" (Hochberg
237)-
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The Mediterranean and the Sahara are spaces that give way to other places—from
Europe across the Mediterranean to Egypt, from Alexandria across the desert to Cairo
and the rest of the Middle East, from West to East. Arnold van Gennep identifies
territories like the sea and the desert as "neutral zones," writing that whoever crosses
such a zone "finds himself physically and magico-religiously in a special situation for
a certain length of time: he wavers between two worlds" (van Gennep 18). Crossing
the sea or the desert represents an unknowable transition, an Othering made anxious,
challenged by an unknown and encroaching limit between. Not only is the sea or
the desert neither here nor there, but the way in which the desert's drifts challenge
the sovereignty of the city's edges, the way in which sands erode the carved edges of
monuments, the way in which the sea is the means by which Alexandria is attacked
in the war—all of these feats establish the sea and the desert as defiant of the fixity
of knowable limits. At these points where cities come into contact with the shifting
edges of the desert or the sea, they challenge the corporeality of those cities: the illu¬
sorily whole topos of the city is threatened at its point of definition, at "the limit of the
enclosing body, at which it is in contact with that which is enclosed" (Malpas, "Un¬
covering" 215). James Gifford writes that challenged binaries (East/West, Self/Other,
etc.) in Durrell's novels represent a crisis of epistemology permeating these works
(Gifford, "Reading" 1). When Durrell introduces such epistemological scepticism,
he also challenges the absoluteness of established place. This enforced out-of-place-
ness in turn establishes a discomfort with these open, unnameable spaces. Carter
calls this discomfort agoraphobia, a loaded term signifying fear of space that is both
"democratic [.. .and] twinned with the wilderness" (Carter, Repressed9). The Mediter¬
ranean and the Sahara are just such spaces: democratic because they are experienced
from the vantage of the civilized places that space them in, and wild because they are
unnameable. Thus, the desert is "inimical to [human] passion," so pure it "flays the
mind" (Quartet 266), and the sea is a "magic" frontier (Greek Islands 14) catalyst to
immortality (Quintet 618).
The appellation of democratic wilderness is appropriate because the sea and the
desert are both named (and hence peopled) but unknowable (wild) except by their
ends, by the places from or to which travel commences, the places that "space them
in" as spatii or extensii. The act of crossing over these spaces from one place to an¬
other is really the wholesale assumption of the properties of that other place. For this
reason, Stefan Herbrechter writes that travel in relation to Durrell's works "can only
be experienced apres coup" (Herbrechter, Ethics 25 6). This determination to know
a space by its ends is why the "flowering meads of high Provence [...] gave place to
the sadder, flatter plains of Camargue" and the "metalled road [of Alexandria] gave
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place to the brown earth tracks" of the rural fringe of the desert (Quintet 123 5, Quar¬
tet 251; emphases mine). The wealth of descriptions at the edge of spaces signals a
desire to recognize the difference between designations; however, these borders are
tellingly not spaces themselves. They are, instead, points at which one space "gives
place" to another in sudden movements rather than through gradual displacement. If
these frontiers are magical, it is because they introduce an immediacy of access to an
Other separate from the self. Simply by entering into the democratic wildernesses of
the Mediterranean or the Sahara, one opens oneself up to the interplay of competing
extensii, the spaces of nearby places. Like the revealing of Alexandria for Darley and
for Blanford, these places might at any time disclose themselves (the world might be
worlded) in an explosive event (Ereignis), into which
everything disappears: everything (the work of art, world and thing, lan¬
guage, even, if we let go of our usual sense or command of things, our¬
selves)—everything withdraws orwithholds itself, shows its reserve or self-
standing (its lack of logical support). Everything is released from our con¬
trol; nothing is as it was, everything (even Being) is otherwise, no longer
speakable (cannot be put into statements). (Bruns 3)
Sacrapant comprehending the whole of Istanbul while crossing the Bosphorus is just
such an event which language cannot articulate: witness his "incoherent cry of plea¬
sure" (Tunc 109). Similarly in Monsieur, the guide's "croak of relieved triumph" is in
response to the sudden instigation of place brought about by the arrival of Akkad's
aircraft, which orders the wilderness of the desert (Quintet 99). Darley's and Blan-
ford's journeys to Alexandria, too, end in darkness just outside the city, which they
expect rather than recognize until the explosive moments of brightness, a brightness
that subsumes everything else and in which the city makes its presence unignorable.
There remains a problem with this model of Heideggerian space, however, lire
cultural make-up of cities, especially those cities like Alexandria and Athens, is rarely
a singular thing. While anxiety of the wildness and "nakedness of space" may be miti¬
gated by conceptualising these geographical spaces as made ofvarying degrees of influ¬
ences of the places on the rim, we still must ask the question of the border: to whom
does it belong? De Certeau writes that the "river, wall or tree makes a frontier [.. .but]
does not have the character of a nowhere that cartographical representation ultimately
presupposes" (de Certeau 127). Rather, the borderland should become a subject in
itself, articulating the likenesses of two lands, and becoming "a third element," an
"in-between," a "space between" (127), what Edward Soja calls Thirdspace (Soja 2).
As it stands, though traversable through the stepping-stones of cultural influences,
the Mediterranean is still "a vast empty ante-room, a hollow bubble of blackness"
(1Quartet 667) about which little can be said. Moreover, the act of travel is not al¬
ways one of transition of place if, as Durrell writes, the exile carries his country within
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him (Alyn 25). Tlie next section of the chapter will consider the active transition and
communication of culture and identity in these hybrid places and peoples.
hi Thirdplace: Extending the Frontiers
So much has been revealed to me by all this that Ifeel myselfto be, as it were, standing upon the
threshold ofa new [...]Alexandria. [. ,.I]n the light ofall these new treasures [...] what shoidd
I do? Extend thefrontiers oforiginal truth, filling in with the rubble ofthis new knowledge the
foundations upon which to build a newAlexandria? (Quartet 338-39)
The above quote, from Balthazar, is Darley's reaction to the knowledge that Jus¬
tine had never loved him. The information throws new light upon the events in his
manuscript to Justine, setting off a chain reaction in which he reconsiders all he once
thought he knew about his acquaintances and friends and the experiences he had in
Alexandria. This reconsideration, in which the novelist does extend the "frontier of
original truth," provides form to the tetralogy, which quickly overgrows the meagre
size of its constituent four books to become something akin to Balthazar's "crabs in a
basket" that crawl over one another, struggling for the top (Quartet 298). Balthazar,
the revision ofJustine, does not supersede the earlier book but instead exists along¬
side of it, subtly altering its contents in the same way that Mountolive amends and
refigures the happenings of Balthazar. In the whole of The Alexandria Quartet, many
conflicting revelations are never resolved; the result is a delicate simultaneity built
upon the averages, interstices, interplay, and overlays of the contradictory versions.
Michel de Certeau writes of a similar example of "exchanges and encounters," that it
offers up a sort of "Middle place composed of interactions and inter-views" function¬
ing as a "third element" (de Certeau 127). The interaction of the constituent parts
of the Quartet is like this third element—or rather, for the Quartet, a fifth element.
The inter-views afforded by the overlaying ofperspectives look upon this Middle place,
what Edward Soja calls Thirdspace. Theories of a third space/place/element, the whole
of which being worth more than the sum of its differential parts, are practical to use
when considering the hybrid places and peoples of Durrell's works.
Thirdspace
Soja establishes a hierarchy of perspective made of Firstspace, in which the "real" ma¬
terial world is the focus of study, Secondspace, in which the material world is filtered
"through 'imagined' representations of spatiality," and Thirdspace, which builds upon
and combines the other two spaces (Soja 6). This Thirdspace describes a collection of
"real-and-imagined" places (6) that for Soja at once embody
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subjectivity and objectivity, the abstract and the concrete, the real and
the imagined, the knowable and the unimaginable, the repetitive and the
differential, structure and agency, mind and body, consciousness and the
unconscious, the disciplined and the transdisciplinary, everyday life and
unending history. (56—57)
He takes the term from Homi Bhabha, who, regarding cultural hybridity, talks of a
"third space" that "displaces the histories that constitute it, and sets up new structures
of authority, new political initiatives, which are inadequately understood through re¬
ceived wisdom" (Bhabha, "Third" 211). The "third space'VThirdspace, then, consti¬
tutes a situation that alters an understanding of those constituent parts. The process
"gives rise to something different, something new and unrecognisable, a new area of
negotiation ofmeaning and representation" (211). Elsewhere, he writes that the third
space is a "space of translation: a place of hybridity, figuratively speaking, where the
construction of a political object that is new, neither the one nor the other, properly
alienates our political expectations" (Bhabha, Location 25).
The idea ofThirdspace is theoretically rich, but it is not merely abstract. Jonathan
Rutherford offers the example of identity being comprised of an interplay of class
and gender, writing that it "is not reducible to the single logic of class" and that class
must instead be considered (not merely) along with (but also in a mutually-influenced
relationship to) gender, among other things: "our class subjectivities do not simply
co-exist alongside our gender. Rather our class is gendered and our gender is classed"
(Rutherford 19). This same example is used by Bhabha, who writes that in moving
beyond these simple, singular identifications of class and gender, an "awareness of
the subject positions—of race, gender, generation, institutional location, geopolitical
locale, sexual orientation—that inhabit any claim to identity in the modern world" is
opened up. This awareness, however, is not enough; rather, he calls upon us "to think
beyond narratives oforiginary and initial subjectivities and to focus on those moments
or processes that are produced in the articulation of cultural differences" (Bhabha,
Location 1). The practice of combining two terms into a third ("gendered class" and
"classed gender" being different than "gender and/or class") Bhabha and Rutherford
both call articulation, identifying the term as one originating in the work of Ernesto
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Laclau and Mouffe further define articulation as "any
practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as
a result of the articulatory practice" (Laclau and Mouffe 105), and Bhabha identifies
difference (possessive of "a cutting edge, a limit" and "a position of liminality [.. .and]
the spirit of alterity") as "the all-important articulating world" (Bhabha, "Third" 209,
213).
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The all-importance of difference signals its necessity in a relationship of articula¬
tion. The balanced difference among the stories ofJustine, Balthazar, Mountolive, and
Clea allows the four to articulate the Quartet, in which none is predominant. The
tetralogy is, in a sense, composed of a Balthazar-td Justine (a refiguring ofJustine in
light of Balthazar), a Justine-A Balthazar (a Balthazar interpreted in light ofJustine),
and so forth. Culture, too, in the books is composed of overlapping meanings and
identifications.
Cities and Citizens
Bhabhawrites that "all forms ofculture are continually in a process ofhybridity" (211).
The culture ofAlexandria and its inhabitants is no exception; on the contrary, it would
appear that Alexandria's hybridity is especially foregrounded in Durrell's works. It is
much more than the city centerd by the Soma and the Brokers' Club: it is made of
"a thousand dust-tormented streets"; it is peopled with "[fjlies and beggars [...] and
those who enjoy an intermediate existence between either"; culturally, its inhabitants
are of "[f]ive races, five languages, a dozen creeds [...] and more than five sexes"
(Quartet 17). Durrell offers a list of some of these races and languages later in the
Quartet-.
Fragments ofevery language—Armenian, Greek, Amharic, Moroccan Ara¬
bic; Jews from Asia Minor, Pontus, Georgia: mothers born in Greek set¬
tlements on the Black Sea; communities cut down like the branches of
trees, lacking a parent body, dreaming of Eden. (56-57)
But there does seem to be some parent body to the constituent cultures ofAlexan¬
dria: the city's eclecticism is due in large part to its position on the rim of the Mediter¬
ranean, the long-historical crossroads of various societies. Durrell writes of the sea at
Alexandria in a letter to Henry Miller in which he automatically juxtaposes its de¬
scription with a listing of its cultural influences: "A sea flat dirty brown and waveless
rubbing the port. Arabic, Coptic, Greek, Levant French" (Durrell-Miller 168). His¬
torically Greek but geographically Egyptian, Alexandria alternates between the "free
Hellenic world" and the Orient (Quartet 18), among other worlds. Elsewhere in the
Quartet, Durrell writes of
the reality ofAlexandria, a city at once sacred and profane; between The¬
ocritus, Plotinus, and the Septuagint one moves on intermediate levels,
which are those of race as much as anything—like saying Copt, Greek
and Jew or Moslem, Turk and Armenian. ...Am I wrong? These are the
slow accretions of time itself on place. (338)
Alexandria is a kind ofcultural free-town. Its association with the sea—an amalgam of
influences—works against any attempts to essentialize fully or to work the place into
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a too-simplified regional metaphor of the Orient or of antiquity. The intermediate
levels of race or religion (with inhabitants at once "Copt, Greek and Jew" or at once
"Moslem, Turk and Armenian") permeate the citizens as much as the city. Justine,
for example, is an Arab Jew married to a Copt; moreover, she is modelled in part
upon Durrell's second wife, Yve "Gipsy" Cohen, who is a faithful Alexandrine: "As
a barefoot child of Tunisian Jewish parents, mother Greek from Smyrna, father Jew
from Carthage, she has seen the inside of Egypt to the last rotten dung-blown flap
of obscenity" (Durrell-Miller 169—170). Inheriting such a legacy from her real-life
counterpart, Justine is a "true child ofAlexandria; which is neither Greek, Syrian nor
Egyptian, but a hybrid: a joint" (Quartet 28).
As such, she exudes that hybridity identified by Bhabha as "a difference 'within',
a subject that inhabits the rim of an 'in-between' reality" (Bhabha, Location 13). This
"difference within" is native to all citizens of in-between Alexandria—in-between not
merely because it is at the edge of the Oriental world, at the boundary from which
Heidegger might say the Orient"begins itspresenting" (Heidegger 154), and not merely
because it is a city with two "centres of gravity—the true and magnetic north of its
personality: and between them the temperament of its inhabitants sparked harshly
like a leaky electric charge" (Quartet 38), but in-between also because of that sparking
character made up of its multitude of interacting (and articulating) identities.
Indeed, this difference within is native (though perhaps not as noticeable) to all
citizens of Durrell's in-between Mediterranean, which is both etymologically and se-
mantically approximate to de Certeau's "middle place."22 In The Revolt ofAphrodite,
for example, Baum fears a business proposal he is to make to Turkish leaders in Is¬
tanbul, citing what he supposes to be extreme alterity ("The Turks are Moslems and
deeply religious—suppose we start a holy war without meaning to, eh? [...] How, for
example, will all this stuff translate into Turkish, eh? One doesn't know."), but when
the meeting goes well, he credits the growing Westernisation of the country: "After
all Turkey abolished the fez out of a desire to make itself a modern state, and then
the Latin alphabet replacing the Arabic..." (Nunquam 221—222, 240). Additionally,
Jocas' Bible is covered in layers of multi-coloured wax (symbolising the accumula¬
tion of multiple influences), and he solicits prophecies from Zeno, a Greek mystic
(232). Greece, too, is allowed its Oriental influence (233). None of these places is left
untouched by the influence of nearby cultures.
"The Sahara, though a "middle place" and a cultural thoroughfare is not so significant from a Eu¬
rocentric viewpoint; lined with trails "which had been used for centuries by the caravans which plied
between Algiers and Mecca," the desert is mostly the meeting point of various cultures that, relative to
Durrell's oeuvre, figure merely as Oriental or African (266—267). For more on the figure of the desert
in Durrell's writing, see Ahmed Hussein's The Representation ofthe Arab World, 90-152.
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A Private Country
In Avignon, on the other hand, any difference within is manifest mostly as the pene¬
tration of gipsies into the city, a fundamentally physical representation of a political
matter. Felix Chatto, wandering through Avignon one night, comes across an en¬
campment of gipsies situated in
a fitting place for the enactment of mischief, a corner made for throat-
slitting, settling ofaccounts and active whoring. The gipsies had not been
slow to find it and to settle on it—in defiance of the law which from time
to time ordered them to leave. In vain. (Quintet 381)
Later, the procession of gipsies streaming through Provence is described in a man¬
ner that presents the exhaustive multiplicity of their origins: they arrive in "swarthy
columns of 'Greek' and 'Egyptian' and 'Romanian' and 'Bulgarian' gipsies, each tribe
with its characteristic music and avocation—basketwork for the 'French', pots and
pans for the 'Greek' farriers" (1236). They arrive in carriages reminiscent of places
like Sicily and England (1236), bring goods like "coloured napkins from Turkey or
Yugoslavia" (13 51), and the parade of the gardiens is the "Orient answering the Occi¬
dent, East mingling with West" (1250).
In these examples, the gipsies are presented as having no national identity in them¬
selves and as being at the edge of the identities with which they do engage: the inverted
commas around the nationalities—"'Greek' and 'Egyptian' and 'Romanian' and 'Bul¬
garian'"—indicate some necessity of ironic qualification. Moreover, they live in the
undesirable areas of the city and internalize an immediate and unavoidable external¬
ity. For this reason, they are mistrusted. Indeed, Blanford, recounting their history,
tells how they faced widespread mistreatment and were "enslaved, tortured, often put
to death: their lives were worth nothing" (1236—1237). In the context of the end of
World War II, such violence resonates also with that faced by the Jews. Sabine, the
Quintet's Oxford-educated Jew-turned-gipsy, recognizes the shared untouchability of
the two races and contemplates the inter-identification available to the two races: "I
was spellbound by the self-evident fact that I was a gipsy—the whole of European
culture slid from my shoulders like a cloak." Continuing in her consideration of the
untouchable, she talks of India, Spain, Central Europe, and the horrors of sickness
and economic instability before asking, "But where does it come from, the ethnic
puzzle? Even Freud did not know, I found" (1240).
Sabine's ethnic puzzle requires one to recognize and hold all of its pieces to under¬
stand how they fit into one another. The Prince provides us with just one piece of the
puzzle:
in Egypt they [the gipsies] are a sly and slippery folk—and their name
is apparently derived from gypt, which is "us". If they are, as you say,
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unchangeable it is because they are change. They are like water and will
take any shape, but always stay the same. (1234)
The "sly and slippery" nature of the gipsies is especially disconcerting when they are
considered to be an "us" of the cultures into which they introduce their change.
Though not by definition truly "Greek," "Romanian," "Sicilian," or "French," there is
something of the gipsies from those regions—there is something of the "curious con¬
stant factor that we discern behind the word 'Greekness'" ("Landscape" 156)—that
causes Durrell to differentiate them as such, if only to a degree. Moreover, if they do
originate in Egypt, as the Prince seems to imply, the difference between gipsy culture
and Provencal culture describes a trans-Mediterranean movement contrary to that of
Blanford. To the residents ofAvignon and Saintes-Maries-de-la-Mer in south-eastern
France, the gipsies problematize the Mediterranean-as-border by providing example
of its permeability. Even the Prince's wording to describe the protean nature of the
gipsies—"like water"—recalls that nearby Greek sea, and the catalogue of places with
which the gipsies identify all share a relative proximity to its shores.
Sabine herself provides another piece of the puzzle when she refers to Freud. In
Moses andMonotheism, Freud presents his theory on the origination of Judaism, ar¬
guing that Moses, despite Judaic tradition's claims otherwise, was Egyptian by birth:
"Moses is an Egyptian—probably of noble origin—whom the myth undertakes to
transform into a Jew" (Freud, Moses 22). Moreover, Freud argues that the religion
Moses imparts upon the Jewish people is Egyptian as well (31). And yet, having identi¬
fied Judaism as Egyptian, he also puts Jews under the larger umbrella ofMediterranean
culture, with the same gesture finding similarity with the identity of Europe and Eu-
ropeanism to which they are opposed. By tying the fate of the Mediterranean world
so inextricably with that of the European tradition, Freud recognizes the influence
the sea has had in the formation of the continent. Likewise, by referencing Freud's
theories on ethnicity, Sabine calls out the shared non-European nature of gipsies and
Jews. Edward Said recognizes in Freud's writing an idea ofan "irremediably diasporic,
unhoused character" that "in our age of vast population transfers, of refugees, exiles,
expatriates and immigrants, [...] can also be identified in the diasporic, wandering,
unresolved, cosmopolitan consciousness of someone who is both inside and outside
his or her community" (Said, Freud 53). The characters of the Jew and the gipsy both
trouble the European for this unresolved consciousness. They signify the topos of the
European nature, the point of contact, the limit between that which is European and
that which is non-European.
In an interview with Marc Alyn, Durrell identifies himself as an exile and an ex¬
patriate, defining the latter as one who "carries his country with him, inside him:
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everywhere belongs to him, because he belongs nowhere" (Alyn 25). As exiles or ex¬
patriates of sorts, the Jew and the gipsy present a unique case when considering Mal-
pas' definition of topos\ while the European is enclosed within the idea ofEurope, the
Jew or gipsy inverts this containment by respectively embodying the ideas ofJudaism
or gipsy-ness. Heidegger, too, recalls the importance of the boundary in defining a
space:
A space is something that has been made room for, something that is
cleared and free, namely within a boundary, Greek peras. A boundary
is not that at which something stops but, as the Greeks recognized, the
boundary is that from which something begins its presencing. (Heidegger
154)
By carrying their own private countries within them, these exiles' sense of travel is
one of representing difference, rather than merely encountering it. In the Quintet
especially, the gipsy projects this otherworldly difference upon Avignon or Saintes-
Maries-de-Ia-Mer or even, by the Prince's own testimony, Egypt. They are portrayed
as a frontier of culture—as a beginning of the presencing of change—at which the
difference of these identities is recognizable.
Darley, upon recognizing the discrepancies in his manuscript ofJustine, decides to
extend "the frontiers of original truth" to build a new Alexandria upon the founda¬
tions of the old. So too must the frontier of Europe be extended upon recognizing
that frontier within the Jew and the gipsy. The Mediterranean or the Sahara, while
limits to the cultures which edge them, influence as much as they are influenced. The
extensio of the Mediterranean can exert its own influence, its own extensii, through
an amalgam of Mediterranean qualities articulated by heterogeneous cultures (such
as that of the Jew or the gipsy) upon the neighbouring shores. The frontier extends
into the enclosed body. As such, the Jew and the gipsy represent the very heart of the
crisis in epistemology Gifford finds in Durrell's novels. The East mingling with the
West in the parade of the gardiens is a challenge to old notions of European identity;
at the same time, this mingling presents new possibilities, new interactions, and new
territory for communication. They fashion a third space, the possibility of there being
a "neither the one nor the other" within the One, by introducing the all-important ar¬
ticulating world of difference. As Said writes, "identity cannot be thought or worked
through itself alone." Rather, it needs that "radical originary break or flaw" of differ¬
ence to stand as a whole unit (Said, Freud 54). The "third space" fashioned as such is
unique for its ability to stand on its own as a whole unit, and not as a space fashioned
by a particular place.
In the historical context of the novels set in the shadow ofWWII, these hybrid
peoples, exiles and expatriates in the strictest sense, and the cities they populate serve as
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an antidote to the bleak narcissism of self-discovery's inward motion. They broadcast
difference, giving place to relationships ofarticulation; they are change. In colonizing
the Middle Ground or Thirdspace these hybrid peoples and places extend the frontiers
to being more than boundaries of enclosure or beginning. These limits, situated as
they are in the domestic wilderness of the Mediterranean Sea, the Sea in the Middle of
Durrell's World, are not just the beginnings of presencing; they are also the location
of the interface of difference and articulation, but in an influencing, self-sufficient
way. Bhabha's Third Space becomes, in a manner, a Heideggerian Third Place of
the Durrellian Mediterranean, a place whose extensii enclose the various locales of
Alexandria, Avignon, Istanbul, Athens, and Rhodes. The Spirit of the Landscape
of the Mediterranean functions to infect and comment upon the "curious constant
factor" of the Places for which the cities, events, and peoples are merely fauna. The
next chapter will project this sense of landscape, the three-dimensional construction
of the Mediterranean, into a depiction of the fourth dimension of time.
Chapter 4
The Viscera ofTime
We. ..date things publicly, as it were, and by each other. The notion ofone objective and "evenly
flowing" time, cut into numbered instants, applies itselfas a common measure to all the steps and
phases, no matter how many, into which we cut the processes ofnature. They are now definitely
contemporary, or later or earlier one than another, and we can handle them mathematically, as
we say, andfar better, practically as well as theoretically, for having thus correlated them one to
one with each other on the common schematic or conceptual time-scale.
(A Pluralistic Universe 232—233)
All the writing which I had borrowedfrom the living and the dead, until I myselfhad become
a sort ofpostscript to a letter which was never ended, never posted... (Clea 11)
In Clea, Durrell finally frees the hand of time, returning Darley to Alexandria after a
span of years to interact, once more, with the city and her citizens rather than inhabit¬
ing the capital ofmemory only mentally. This final book of the Quartet stretches the
first three dimensions forward into the fourth, coming to terms—at least by the book's
end—with the effects of time, and learning to inhabit and enact the happening rather
than the happened. Durrell affects The Alexandria Quartet to be a romance built upon
a literary representation of his understanding ofAlbert Einstein's theories of time and
relativity, finding in the theory of space-time "the greatest Boy meets Girl story of
the age" {(Quartet 306). Though The Alexandria Quartet purports to laud this "Space
and Time marriage" (306), the challenging representations of time in those novels
nevertheless intimates a rocky home life rather than wedded bliss; indeed, Durrell's
negotiations and renegotiations with chronological ordering, cyclical historicity, and
temporal potentiality in all of his later novels deserve critical consideration.
A vital element of each of the settings he chooses for these novels, for example, is
the historic importance and the antiquity of each site. Alexandria, far from merely
an amalgam of culture on Egypt's Mediterranean coast, is also the modern thresh¬
old of extreme antiquity, the doorway through which Durrell—and Darley, Bruce,
et al.—accesses the timeless Spirit of Place shared by Cleopatra and Clea alike. The
Parthenon, too, lends its extreme age to every scene in Durrell's Athens in the same
way that Istanbul's cemeteries and Avignon's bridge and papal complex inform their
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respective cities, imposing respective times past upon respective practiced place.' In
reading Durrell's construction of a literary world, one might be forgiven in confusing
time and space, a distinction which even the residents of such a world often confuse.2
Apart from the historical significance of these settings, the novels of Durrell's
"opus" all problematize time—that which Tarquin claims goes through us and that
which we "are running through [...] without realizing" (Black Book 203), what Balt¬
hazar identifies as the medium in which truth most contradicts itself (Quartet 216),
the ever-distant flux that Charlock seeks to master (Tunc 13), the authority ofwhich
Blanford casts off, and that which Durrell calls in his Key to Modern Poetry "the mea¬
sure ofour death-consciousness" {Key 23). To approach an understanding ofDurrell's
differential views of this fourth dimension, this chapter will first look at the critical
influences he cites in his Key before, in its body, considering three approaches to the
later three series.
A Key to Time
As part of the literary scope of his essay Key to Modern Poetry, Durrell examines mod¬
ern shifts in the understanding of time in the popular consciousness. The Victorians,
he writes, believed that the earth "had been created about 4,000 B.C. by God, and
was more or less as we see it today." The rise of geology challenged those beliefs, and
Darwin's theory of evolution upset the hierarchy of time even further, allowing for
man to be as old as 100,000 years (15—16). Archaeology, too, uncovered reality hid¬
den beneath Classical literature. Subsequently, "the civilization of Europe [...] began
to look remote and tiny set against the historical perspectives opened up," and "the
history of man on earth [...] began to appear of negligible importance" (16). These
vast shifts in understanding changed even further with the introduction of Einstein's
theory ofRelativity. After Einstein, Durrell writes, the subject-object hierarchy is lost,
and science can no longer claim to seek objective truth, as truth is no longer considered
objective;3 the world as we think we know it becomes something impenetrable. Sci¬
entific absolutism, newly blossomed in the Victorian age, begins to wither on the stem
(21). Moreover, after Einstein, time is a dimension of, rather than an afterthought to,
'London, too, is identified by its lack ofsuch ties to the past: it is the "brave new chrysadiamantine
world" (Tunc 173). This extreme modern element of that city might, in part, lead to what Kaczvinsky
finds to be a preponderance of schizophrenia ("the loss of the sense of history on the individual and
cultural level") in the Revolt (Kaczvinsky, "Postmodern Society" 65).
2 In Prospero's Cell, Durrell claims that Corfiots determine distance by a measure of (albeit spatialized)
time: "Ask a peasant how far a village is and he will reply, nine times out of ten, that it is a matter of
so many cigarettes" (Prospero 27).
3 It is likely Durrell is confusing Einstein's theory of Relativity with Heisenberg's Uncertainty Prin¬
ciple.
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space, in the same way that space is a dimension of time—or rather, they are both di¬
mensions ofspace-time. As Durrell writes, "This completely revolutionized our whole
attitude to the universe" (23).
As proofofhis thesis of time being a measure ofdeath-consciousness, Durrell high¬
lights notable cases of literary foregrounding of death-obsession in Joyce, Woolf, and
Eliot, saying that as modern philosophies of time have changed, so do these changes
affect our modern notion of death—and life: "Time is one of the great clues to the
modern outlook" (23). Darwinian evolution, archaeological discoveries, and Ein-
steinian relativity may have shaped the modern outlook to be conspicuously different
from that of the past, profoundly altering the ways we think about religion, history
and geology, and perspective, bur scientific progress is not the only thing altering our
views of time (and, by association, life). Industrialized expectations of time manage¬
ment and clock-time oblige us to break time into discrete units where before it had
been a flowing medium: as Durrell quotes H. V. Routh, "modern man is tempted,
almost compelled, to regulate this idea (Time) by the face of a clock and the pages of
a calendar" (Routh qtd. in 24). This industrialized expectation of universal regulation
of time by clock and calendar is an unfulfilling one for "modern man," who cannot
reconcile the rigidity of such systems with
what passes in his own head. [This system] suggests or confirms the fiction
that life is a sequence of continuous yet distinct moments, a perpetual
birth of instantaneous impressions, whereas all artistic and imaginative
experience insists that life as we perceive it is duration. (Routh qtd. in 24)
Life as we perceive it—the qualifying phrase "as we perceive it" is as important as
"life" itself—is an exploration common to all of Durrell's novels. That time somehow
factors into Durrell's poetic equations is not surprising; however, the manner in which
it factors into everyday living, evolving from book to book, can be remarkable.
Time and Western Man
At the end of his "Preface" to his Key, Durrell names Wyndham Lewis's Time and
Western Man as an "admirable survey" that he has used "to formulate some ofmy own
vague ideas" about time (xi—xii), recommending the book for anyone newly come to
the subject. Lewis himself excuses his work from its beginning, calling it a work of
belief. At the same time he says that it is as far as one can go to write a work on
reality: "For the understanding of'reality,' and to get at the meaning of the problem
suggested by the term 'reality,' there is no term so important as 'belief.' Reality is in
fact simply belief" (Lewis, Time and Western Man 3 5 x).4 The purpose of his book,
4 For more on this relationship of belief and reality, see also Peirce, "Of Reality," or the discussion
thereof in Chapter 2.
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then, is to examine beliefs of reality, despite the potentially paradoxical position of
reality being "simply a way of describing our capacity for belief, and the things in
which we believe" (351). Lewis's book presents a philosophy of time and civilization
by examining and commenting on the beliefs of reality (and reality of beliefs) held by
various thinkers and writers. The section of the book on time focuses primarily on
three persons: Albert Einstein, Oswald Spengler, and Henri Bergson.
According to Lewis, one of Einstein's particular fortunes was in founding a the¬
oretical principle whose rudiments were easily adopted by inexpert audiences. The
common, unspecialized person knows more about Einstein's relativity theory, Lewis
writes, "than any layman has ever known about the Newtonian cosmology, either
during Newton's lifetime or since" (137). It has entered the popular consciousness
and shaped it more than can be measured.5 Spengler, on the other hand, is seen by
Lewis as one who champions history disproportionately over all else: "The Theory of
Quanta, the Evolutionary theory ofDarwin, the music ofWagner and Weber, a Dres¬
den Shepherdess, El Greco and Einstein-—[...] At bottom there is really no physics, no
art, no philosophy, only politics and history" (Lewis, Time and Western Man 129—130).
In Lewis's opinion, for Spengler the historical context of any event ultimately over¬
shadows the immediate implications of that event. He is "of the widely-held belief
that everything whatever—as much a scientific theory as the hat you wear—is a phe¬
nomenon of fashion, a Time-phenomenon—a 'history,' and not a 'truth,' whatever its
pretensions to be the latter" (258). He is "very exactly the philosopher of Zeitgeist,"
finding the context of historical period crucial to the understanding and even cre¬
ation of everything (258), disallowing, to the dismay of Lewis, for true creativity. In
his examination of Bergson, Lewis returns from history to a metaphysics of time. Like
Einstein, Bergson enjoyed popular recognition, even to the point of (though a philoso¬
pher) most likely having been read by Einstein himself: "That Einstein [...] had not
at least read the work of Bergson, and formed some opinion upon it, favourable or
otherwise, is unlikely, to say the least" (139). Lewis is decidedly less approving of
Bergson than he is ofEinstein, though. "Bergson discovered nothing," he writes; "he
interpreted science; and he gave it an extremely biassed opinion" (153). Lewis echoes
(and quotes) the sentiments of Bertrand Russell, who writes that in Bergson's system,
"The beliefs of today may count as true today, if they carry us along the stream; but
tomorrow they will be false, and must be replaced by new beliefs to meet the new
sAlan J. Friedman and Carol C. Donley write of Einstein's intense lecture tour of the US, England,
and France, suggesting that Einstein's image and carriage as much as his theoretical rigor were respon¬
sible for the mounting popularity of the scientist (and popularization of his theories): "Einstein did
much to popularize the new physics [...] His shaggy and rumpled Chaplinesque appearance endeared
him to photographers and cartoonists while his natural openness won his listeners" (Friedman and
Donley 17—18).
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situation" (Russell qtd. in 190). For Lewis, whose beliefs create the kind of reality to
which they are native, such an irresolute system is not desirable.
Inasmuch as Durrell cites Lewis's Time and Western Man as a good introduction to
ideas of time and Lewis cites the work of these three intellectuals as worthy of (vary¬
ing degrees of) study, this chapter will consider these philosophers of time alongside
Durrell's books in which their influence is most obviously shown. In doing so, we
can develop an idea of the meaning of time in Durrell's novels, pointing out discrep¬
ancies and new overlaps to arrive at a more complete theory ofwhat time means—or
does—in the body of his work. The first section will consider Durrell's The Alexan¬
dria Quartet with the theories of Einstein, the second section will look at The Revolt
ofAphrodite with the notions of Spengler, and the third will focus upon The Avignon
Quintet along with the ideas ofBergson. Each section will also highlight the means by
which Durrell's texts interpret respective approaches of time to be transitory or unsta¬
ble: Einstein's continuum in the Quartet problematizing a construction ofpast/future,
the Revolt breaking free of its Spenglerian destiny by casting offmemory and achiev¬
ing the pure present of the Classical culture, and the Quintet emphasizing Bergson's
present being one formed by an inextricable connection to the past. Finally, the chap¬
ter will speculate on the consequence ofBergsonian action in all of the works, arguing
that each claims for itself a purity of the present, celebrating the indeterminacy be¬
tween past and future.
i AWord Continuum
The fourth novel ofDurrell's Quartet opens with a note further outlining the full struc¬
ture of Durrell's Alexandrian tetralogy, previously explained in Balthazar-. "Together
the novels constitute 'The Alexandria Quartet'; a suitable descriptive subtitle would
be a 'word continuum'" (Clea 5). In this continuum, the aspect of time mixes freely
with those of space. This section will first examine the temporal free-association in
the Quartet before considering Durrell's ostensible source for his model of the con¬
tinuum, the work ofAlbert Einstein, to qualify the level of success he has in such an
undertaking.
The Alexandria Quartet
Darley begins the Quartet on an island away from the city, chronologically later
than the events of the story he writes. He describes approaching the writing of his
manuscript as if he were mentally revisiting Alexandria: "I return link by link along
the iron chains ofmemory to the city which we inhabited" (Quartet 17). Moreover,
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his temporal distance from Alexandrian life is mirrored by his physical distance from
the city, both of which are necessary to encapsulate fully the entirety of his story: "I
have had to come so far away from it in order to understand it all!" and "I had to
come here in order completely to rebuild this city in my brain" (17, 18).
These first scenes of island life are written along a temporal line separate from
the time of the rest of the book. Gerard Genette (citing Gunther Miiller) calls this
original time Erzahlzeit, or narrative time. It is the time of the teller of the story, and
as it represents itself as the time of the author—that is, a time outside the histoire,
though it is in fact a part of the time of the book, a "false time standing in for a true
time"—he classes it a pseudo-time (Genette 33—34). It is also the first narrative, the
temporal level from which we gain our footing and from which we can follow later
temporal acrobatics (48).
Darley is careful to represent this time with certainty by describing things in the
present tense ("The sea is high again today"), designating the succession of seasons ("In
the midst ofwinter you can feel the inventions of Spring"), and repeatedly distancing
himself from the past ("I have escaped," "such a remote place," "I have had to come
so far away from it") (Quartet 17). Once he establishes Erzahlzeit, however, he uses it
as the port from which to launch his manuscript and its corresponding erzahlte Zeit,
the temporal line of the story he tells (Genette 33). Easing into more poetic prose,
he introduces notes to himself that might help him with writing, establishing a gentle
break from the time of the island. Tire notes expand into analepsis, or flashback (40),
taking focus from the narrative as temporally non-localizable (and non-tensed) details
of the landscape slowly give way to more specific descriptions of discrete moments: "a
whore walks in a dark street at night," people begin to search each other out in cafes,
and backgammon-playing boys "stir uneasily" (Quartet 18).
By this point in the text, the temporal assurance of Darley's island haven is out of
reach: he has momentarily surrendered the present tense of island life to the present
tense of living memory. The tenseless list of landscape tones—breathless fragments
of description—"inflames" his memory (or so the text would suggest) so that "the
flesh comes alive, trying the bars of its prison." The city, no longer complacent in its
secondary existence, infiltrates the first narrative, and (in recognizing particular cafes
as ones "where Balthazar went so often with the old poet of the city") even introduces
further derivative temporality (18).
The text shimmers between Erzahlzeit and erzahlteZeit before settling for the latter
in the rest of the book, interrupted only by occasional present-tense references to the
time of the manuscript's creation, the time of the narrating: "I am thinking back to
the time when [...]" (21); "I record this [...]" (25); and
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These are the moments which possess the writer [...] and which live on
perpetually. One can return to them time and time again in memory, or
use them as a fund upon which to build the part of one's life which is
writing. (27)
These and other narratorial comments aside, the greater form of the text is analeptic,
focusing on events that take place in a past that supersedes the present of island life,
before returning to Erzdhlzeit in the end. Just as, in the beginning of the book, the
firings ofmemory lead Darley into his manuscript and the tense of a former time, at
the end of the book "memories are already refunding themselves slowly into forgetful-
ness," leading Darley into the tense of the present and future: "soon it will be evening
and the clear night sky will be dusted" with stars (195). Again, the passage of island-
time is an attempt to actualize the pseudo-time of the narrator: while Darley begins
writing in late winter, he ends Justine in the summer. Even though the beginning and
end of the analeptic manuscript dovetail almost seamlessly with the first narrative, the
secondary status of that erzdhlte Zeit is never in doubt. For the bulk of the book, it
might take on the role of first narrative in introducing or leading into derivative tem¬
poralities, but time still passes (in the present tense) for Darley, the author-narrator,
writing on his remote island.
In Balthazar and Clea, Darley further memorializes the ancient city, characterizing
it in one as something that begins and ends in "us, roots lodged in our memory" (209),
and in the other as "the capital ofmemory!" (657). As he does inJustine, Darley begins
Balthazar from a distance. Writing about his friends—"[dispersed now by time and
circumstance"—is an attempt to "reinstate them in memory, allot to each his and
her position in my time" (210). Darley admits that the act ofwriting about another
time becomes a subjective assertion ofhis own time, but he also recognizes the truth in
Pursewarden's lesson: "We live [...] lives based on selected fictions. Our view of reality
is conditioned by our position in space and time [...]. Thus every interpretation of
reality is based upon a unique position" (210). After Balthazar's Interlinear, the only
value to the manuscript ofJustine can be as a means for Darley to come to terms with
his own perspective, his own unique position in space and time—a position which is
definitively opposed to the one he once had in Alexandria.
Justine and Balthazar, then, are texts that define Darley's position. Alexandria is
physically and temporally distant, accessible only through Darley's admittedly limited
recollections ofwhat his perspective had been. In both texts, analepses ofAlexandrian
life comprise the bulk ofwhat we would traditionally say the novels are about (their
histoire),6 but these analepses are increasingly problematized—initially by the accen-
6Citing Roland Barthes, Marta Dahlgren notes the equivalence of reading to the "successful decod¬
ing of a message" (Dahlgren 74).
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tuated distance between first and second narratives and then by the mounting en¬
croachment of the Erzahlzeit's narratorial doubt upon the domain of the erzdhlte Zeit.
Eventually, Darley abandons the task of a truthful representation of reality for a plau¬
sible representation of a possible series of circumstances. The ostensible objectivity of
his own perception is replaced by Balthazar's reporting for much of Balthazar—"So
much have I reconstructed from the labyrinth of notes which Balthazar has left me"
(Quartet 275)—and by his own invention in other parts: "Shall I reconstruct it—the
scene I see so clearly, and which his few crabbed words in green ink have detonated
in my imagination?" (314). By being texts that define Darley's position, they are also
texts that define the limits of that position. Balthazar seems to suggest that for a text
to be as accurate as it can be, it must recognize these limits, though full accuracy is
never possible.
Mountolive introduces a new model to challenge that of the first two novels' lim¬
ited authorial perspective. Written from an omniscient third-person perspective, this
third book disregards any earlier troubles of questionable accuracy. Moreover, though
the Erzdhlzeit seems to be similar to that of Darley's first two books as it uses the past
tense, little can be said about the writer's "position in space and time." Certainly, as
the narrator ofMountolive is non-localizable, his position within the field of relativity
is also unknown; we can only assume that this writer's version has as many limitations
in it as do the others. Nevertheless, in presenting a seemingly complete version of
memorialized Alexandria, a version lacking the level of irony and purposeful inven¬
tion found in Balthazar, the text playfully ignores the lessons of that earlier book. As
one of the psychologist Balthazar's more famous truisms states, "Truth is what most
contradicts itself in time" (216). The passing of time, a component of every perspec¬
tive, represents a passing of every corresponding perspective; the perceived truth of
these perspectives, Balthazar seems to be saying, will also pass. Aware of this paradox
ofwriting in Balthazar, Darley amends his text to be less an encapsulation of the past
and more an invention and artifact of the present. As Balthazar's Interlinear, "cross-
hatched, crabbed, starred with questions and answers in different-coloured inks, in
typescript," seems to vibrate with change, it is to Darley "somehow symbolic of the
very reality" ofAlexandria (21 5). Mountolive, unquestioning, like Darley's manuscript
to Justine, is another singular perspective that will pass.
Clea is the passing of that perspective. In his note to the fourth novel, Durrell
writes that it is a sequel to the previous three novels, the only one in which time will
be allowed to have passed in Alexandria since Darley left it before Justine. Early in the
novel, Darley writes that he "had been forced to admit defeat on paper" regarding his
original aspirations to "re-work reality." In this admission, he has gained what he calls
an "increase" in his character, a new understanding of the nature of time and change
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(657—658). Alexandria is still an "ancient city" and "the pith of memory" (657) it
always has been in the Quartet, but in Clea the passing of time leads to another kind
of change. In the fourth book, Darley writes entirely in the past tense, and he ends
the novel with the revelation of one day having "found myself writing down [...]
the old story of an artist coming of age" (877). This story of an artist coming of
age is presumably the same story—the failed manuscript written in Justine, corrected
throughout Balthazar, presented in Mountolive, and revisited in Clea—of the Quartet,
the experiencing ofwhich transforms Darley into the artist come of age: "the act of
writing had in itself brought me [.. .a] way to begin living" (658)7
Interestingly, in this course of Darley's transition into his art, he also increasingly
distances himself from the story he tells. In Justine, Darley is on an island, writing
confidently in the present tense about writing. From the first sentence, beginning
"The sea is high again today" (17), he places himself resolutely between the story and
his telling of it. There is a Darley who has experienced Alexandria, he seems to say,
and I am that Darley writing you this book. The beginning of Balthazar, however, is
more likeJustine s unstable first transition into analepsis: in Justine, we find "Notes for
landscape-tones Long sequences of tempera" followed by a list of verbless descrip¬
tions (18), while in Balthazar we are immediately introduced to "Landscape-tones:
brown to bronze, steep skyline, low cloud" followed by another list of verbless de¬
scriptions (2.09). The temporal form found in Justine is projected onto the Quartet at
large. Just as in Justine the text uses the device of tenseless, descriptive lists to elide the
transition from present into past tense, Balthazar begins the transition in the Quartet
from present to past, shifting fromJustine's obvious temporality in the present ofDar¬
ley's island to the past tense of Mountolive. Mountolive, absent of Darley's narrative
voice (and any corresponding narratorial present tense) but presumably written from
the same temporal vantage, eventually gives way to Clea, in which the narrator is able
to speak of the text's future: in Clea he is a narrator from a later temporality than we
ever see in the text.
While Clea presents a fully transitioned past tense and the narrative voice of a
come-of-age Darley, that first sentence ofJustine marks the beginning of the transition
to be carried throughout the Quartet. Typical of a transition, there is the betwixt-and-
between ofTurner, the combined neither-nor and both-and of unsettled matters. For
example, in Justine, Darley substitutes what might be either iterative analepses for
scenes of specificity or scenes of specificity for synechdochic example—or both:
Six o'clock. The shuffling of white-robed figures from the station yards.
The shops filling and emptying like lungs in the Rue des Soeurs. The
7Here, again, we can recognize in Darley's statement the affirmation of his artistic subjectivity,
discussed in Chapter 1.
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pale lengthening rays of the afternoon sun smear the long curves of the
Esplanade, and the dazzled pigeons, like rings of scattered paper, climb
above the minarets to take the last rays of the waning light on their wings.
[...] This is the hour least easy to bear, when from my balcony I catch
an unexpected glimpse of her walking idly towards the town in her white
sandals, still half asleep. {Justine 19)8
It is difficult to determine whether the "Six o'clock" of this scene describes a specific
morning or a typical one. Present participles and tense suggest the timelessness of
generality, but details like the timing of "Now tired men throw back the shutters of
their balconies" yet allow room for specificity (22).
This particular scene comes soon after Darley mentions the beginning of his love
affair with Melissa, describing how he had seen her "daily for many months on end"
(21), but the scene does not name Melissa explicitly. The next scene seems a contin¬
uation, but it is not unambiguously so:
I have had many such glimpses of her at different times, and of course
I knew her well by sight long before we met: our city does not permit
anonymity to any with incomes of over two hundred pounds a year. I
see her sitting alone [...] in the vestibule of the Cecil Hotel, among the
dusty palms, dressed in a sheath of silver drops, holding her magnificent
fur at her back as a peasant holds his coat. [...] Under the palms, in a
deep alcove, sit a couple of old men playing chess. Justine has stopped to
watch them. {Justine 20)9
In this scene, which starts innocently as a continuation from the one before it, the
woman Darley is watching is undeniably Justine. Justine's wealth and social status far
removes her from being possibly confused for Melissa, and while the "sad yet quick
smile" (22) of the woman on the street fits more with his image of the impoverished
prostitute, the earlier scene could just as easily be describing Justine. In these scene(s)
in which he transitions into the capital of his memory, Darley conflates separate loves
as easily as separate moments.
Durrell uses this technique often in the Quartet, taking all advantage of vagueness
and juxtaposition to imply situations he never writes as alternatives or additions to
those he does write. In the Quartet's form, in which a memory of the past overtakes
the details of the present eventually to run the present into its future, the technique
is unsettling, but it also places the reader in a situation similar to that of Darley, who
must reconcile his memory with the Interlinear of Balthazar. What really happened
in the past? Darley scrambles to understand, and the reader scrambles alongside him,
bringing forward new pieces of understanding in an effort to form a full chronology of
8The omnibus edition follows this passage with the exhaltation "Justine!" {Quartet 22), removing
much of the (seemingly purposeful) ambiguity inherent in these early passages ofJustine.
9The omnibus edition of the Quartet removes much of the ambiguity of this passage, beginning "I
have had many such glimpses ofJustine at different times" (Quartet 22).
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the events ofAlexandria. While Donald Kaczvinsky has constructed a rough timeline
of events in the Quartet,IQ any specific ordering of events in the Quartet would be
a Sisyphean task. Syllepsis, rather than chronology, is Darley's rule of progression;
too much of the work is comprised of achrony, "an event we must ultimately take
to be dateless and ageless" (Genette 84) for any sense of temporal sequence to be
recognized—tall order for a work designed to be a literary representation of time.11
Lists of description filled with present participles and gerunds ("shuffling [...] fill¬
ing [...] emptying [...] lengthening") are timeless while at once alluding to a state of
action requiring a passing of time. Memory of the past becomes lived in the present; it
is even re-lived to the point that details are changeable. Events are told out of the order
they happen; they are told instead in the order most suitable to Darley: "What I most
need to do is to record experiences, not in the order in which they took place—for
that is history—but in the order in which they first became significant for me" (Quar¬
tet 97). In these ways, Durrell talks of time in the first novels of the Quartet without
letting it progress. The reader shares Balthazar's anxiety in searching for the key to
wind his watch: "Without the key it was useless to open the delicate golden leaf and
expose the palpitating viscera of time itself stirring" (81). Until Clea, time does stop
in Alexandria. It is all the reader can do to search for the key that will unlock "the
doll's house" of Darley's city ofmemory (210), the key that Darley is "trying to turn"
(217), the key necessary to synchronize the delicately disordered story he tells.
Einstein and, Relativity
With the 1958 publication of Balthazar, fans ofJustine were first made aware of the
Quartet's form (and Justines place within it). The author's note at the beginning of
that second novel claimed to be following "the soup-mix recipe of a continuum,"
differing from "Proustian or Joycean method" in favor of something altogether differ¬
ent: Einsteinian "Space-Time" (Balthazar J).11- Accordingly, much criticism on the
'"Mentioned during the "Round Table" at the On Miracle Ground XIV conference in Victoria, 26
June 2006.
"Randall Stevenson suggests that the Quartet's chronological digressions signify a broadening of
modernist technique into postmodernist practice (Stevenson, "Greenwich" 133).
"In this regard, Durrell seems to contest Alan Warren Friedman's assertion that "The modern artist
[...] does not consciously become a student and exponent of, say, Einstein or Freud" (Friedman, "A
'Key'" 32); Durrell overtly claimed to be a student and exponent of both. Theodore Steinberg con¬
tends that Durrell's understanding of Einstein surpasses that of most artists of the twentieth century
(Steinberg, "Postmodern Epic" 65), but popular science writer Richard Morris writes that Durrell "suc¬
ceeded only in demonstrating that he hadn't the slightest idea of what modern physics was all about"
(Morris 206). Alan J. Friedman and Carol C. Donley, too, write that Durrell's "free interchange of
the terms of relativity theory and quantum theory [...] indicates his confusion of these two different
revolutions in physics" (87). Further confusing the issue, in an interview Durrell himself confesses
to having "confused Bergsonian time with Einsteinian time" in his Key (Young 45). While Friedman
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Quartet follows this path: despite Pauline Beard's deprecation of the preponderance
of "mental grannies" who choose to focus on the theme of free love, thereby ignoring
the novel's structure (Beard 93), Goran Palm writes in i960 that, to get the effect, the
reader of the Quartet must read all four novels at once and at the speed of light (Palm
qtd. in Dahlgren 76).13 Lee Lemon writes too, in 1963, of the Quartet's "relativism,"
seeming to confuse it with relativity (Lemon, "Form and Fiction" 329); Willis Mc-
Nelly finds, in the joining of body and soul of The Revolt ofAphrodite, Durrell's urge
to connect subject and object as a faithful step in his project to make literature from
Einstein's theories (McNelly 68); and Carol Peirce sees in the "historic present" tense
of the Quartet "a literary parallel of Einsteinian space-time" (Peirce, "Wrinkled" 485,
497)-
Nevertheless, despite the attention drawn to Durrell's claim of having modeled his
book on Einstein's theories of relativity, few scholars have considered Durrell in light
of Einstein himself.14 In his book Relativity, Einstein acknowledges a sense of unease
common to lay persons when approaching the idea of four dimensions (Einstein 56).
Nevertheless, he also acknowledges that time as a fourth dimension is nothing new
(151); in truth, the significant novelty implicit in Einstein's theory of relativity is that
time itself is a part of the (previously thought to be) spatial continuum, rather than a
linear construction added to the continuum of space:
That we have not been accustomed to regard the world in this sense as
a four-dimensional continuum is due to the fact that in physics, before
the advent of the theory of relativity, time played a different and more
independent role, as compared with the space co-ordinates. It is for this
reason that we have been in the habit of treating time as [...] independent.
(56-57)
Physics after the advent of the theory of relativity, however, presents a continuum
"no longer resolvable objectively into sections." As such, "'now' loses for the spatially
extended world its objective meaning [...and] space and time must be regarded as
[...] objectively unresolvable" (151). In such an understanding
the concepts of happening and becoming are indeed not completely sus¬
pended, but yet complicated. It appears therefore more natural to think
and Donley offer that Durrell's insistence on an "ultimate relativism of truth"—an ultimate relativism
"distinctly colored by [every] character's prejudices and previous knowledge" (thus drawing the Quartet
once again to Bergson)—is "in conflict with both the spirit and letter of Einstein's theory," they also
suggest that "the novels actually reflect Einstein's work better than Durrell's stated intentions" (Fried¬
man and Donley 88). Whether Durrell's understanding is truly of Einstein or rather of a misnamed
personal philosophy, it is an understanding that informs much of his writing and, as such, cannot be
ignored.
13Durrell concedes this point, lamenting that the reader lacks "four-dimensional spectacles" and as
such must rely on imagination to recognize the Quartet as "a four-dimensional dance, a relativity poem"
(qtd. in Mitchell and Andrewski 57).
I4One article which does consider Einstein directly is John Peters' "The Incense of Homage."
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of physical reality as a four-dimensional existence, instead of, as hitherto,
the evolution of a three-dimensional existence. (152)
The four-dimensional existence ofphysical reality is one that presents time as accessible
as any of the other dimensions of the continuum.
Thus—perhaps "seized by a mysterious shuddering when [one] hears of 'four-
dimensional' things" (Einstein 56)—Pauline Beard quotes Gary Zukav writing of rec¬
ognizing "that everything that now seems to unfold before us with the passing of time,
already exists in toto, painted, as it were, on the fabric of space-time" (Zukav qtd. in
Beard 81), and Durrell himself quotes James Jeans writing that everything, "from its
beginning to the end of eternity, is spread before us in the picture" (Jeans qtd. in Key
29). In light of these understandings, too, Beard writes of Durrell presenting "a shift¬
ing reality" (Beard 78) and Nancy Lewis describes characters "jolted into discovering
the flux of continuous change" much at odds with a "false conception of experience
as discrete, fixed events rather than the continuous interaction of a changing past and
a changing present" (Lewis, "Einsteinian" 5).
In the Quartet, Darley's narratorial shift into the analeptic erzdhlte Zeit is just one
example of a post-Einsteinian temporal mutability, fdere, Durrell challenges the lin¬
guistic traditions of a change in tense being used to indicate a change in temporal
frame: Darley's past is not a past of was and were but one of is and the present par¬
ticipial suffix -ing. In the novel, this linguistic presenting of the past is not just a literary
technique; for Darley, the past, that which has already happened, still lives. His mem¬
ories "stir uneasily" until "the flesh"—that is, the memory of reality which retains the
reality of its being, its flesh—"comes alive, trying the bars of its prison," disputing its
past-ness. In this way, the past is accessible in the present; it is of the present and
is interchangeable with it.15 Moreover, in Darley's story, the sequence of events is
negotiable: what matters to Darley is not the order of events as they happen, but the
order of events as they become significant to him. In this sense, time's role as orga¬
nizer of events along a unidimensional line is abandoned in favor of another method
of organization. While Dahlgren writes that Durrell's continuum "is not successful
simply because language is subject to sequential control" (Dahlgren 78), in Durrell's
,sNahla Swedan finds that Darley's tendency to constantly shift focus from the present moment in
Greece to the past in Alexandria is an achievement ofwhat Pursewarden calls the "n-dimensional novel"
(Swedan 78—79), thus embodying a book in which "Things do not all lead forward to other things:
some lead backwards to things which have passed. A marriage of past and present with the flying
multiplicity of the future racing towards one" (Quartet 198). We might recognize in this construction
of the "marriage ofpast and present with the flyingmultiplicity of the future" a sense ofTurner's liminal
("neither one thing nor another; or may be both; or neither here nor there; or may even be nowhere
(in terms of any recognized cultural topography), and are at the very least 'betwixt and between' all
the recognized fixed points in space-time of structural classification" (Turner, "Betwixt" 97)) or van
Gennep's neutral zone ("physically and magico-religiously in a special situation for a certain length of
time: he wavers between two worlds" (van Gennep 18)).
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construction past, present, and future give up their inviolable partitions in favor of
mutually interpenetrative and interchangeable perspectives.
In such an infinite universe—now infinite in four dimensions, rather than three—it
is impossible to say that one thing comes before another, or that one thing follows
from another. Thus, as Durrell points out, the relativity theory "sidetracks causality"
{Key 29). As Bertrand Russell explains ofEinstein's theory, "The language of cause and
effect [.. .is] merely a convenient shorthand for certain purposes; it does not represent
anything that is genuinely to be found in the physical world" (Russell, ABC 140).
Nevertheless, the unenlightened Darley in Balthazar admits to a desire to understand
connections between all the elements of his story: "I must know everything" {Quartet
216). He works to find order in all the details of happenstance, tracing a chain of
effects, hoping to find one stable cause: "How had all this come about? To under¬
stand it is necessary to work backwards, through the great Interlinear which Balthazar
has constructed around my manuscript, towards that point in time" (238). But he
finds that tracing causality through human actions is not a straightforward affair—"It
is hard to isolate a moral quality in the free act" (244)—and Balthazar commiserates
with Darley's difficulty: "One assumes that they [people's actions] have grown out of
their feelings as leaves grow out of a branch. But can one work backwards, deducing
the one form from the other?" (275).
In such an understanding of time and space, if causality, the mainstay of scientific
observation, cannot be proven logically sound, then intuition gains newly sure footing
and "everything is perpetually brand new, everything is, if you care to think of it like
that, a miracle" {Key 30). In a situation in which observation must be distrusted,
then it follows too that any certainty of understanding the natural world must be
discredited: "This is because we and the outer world (subject and object) constitute
a whole. If we are part of a unity we can no longer objectivize it successfully" (30).
Balthazar answers his own question about working backwards, offering the poetic
imagination as a stepping stone to understanding:
Perhaps a writer could if he were sufficiently brave to cement these ap¬
parent gaps in our actions with interpretations of his own to bind them
together? What was going on in Nessim's mind? This is really a question
for you to put to yourself. {Quartet 275)
Balthazar encourages Darley to intuit that which he cannot know, writing "To imagine
is not necessarily to invent" (275); Pursewarden agrees: "If things were always what
they seemed, how impoverished would be the imagination ofman!" (216). The world
in which limitations of perspective are also limitations of understanding is a world
in which intuition, over objective observation, is the best means of comprehension.
Intuition is used to fill the gaps, to connect that which we conveniently call cause with
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that which we conveniently call effect.16 Darley understands "that the key I am trying
to turn is in myself" (Quartet 217), so he moves to "reconstruct it—the scene I see
so clearly [...] detonated in my imagination" (314). The city about which he writes
transforms from a city of the past, to a city of the present: "The city, inhabited by
these memories of mine, moves not only backwards into our history, [...] but also
back and forth in the living present, so to speak" (314). Imagination and intuition
reinvigorate the city in the present, and Darley dismisses objective observation as a
viable means of coping with the world.
This loss of the human throne of subjectivity seems to be the most freeing of all
symptoms of relativity to Durrell, who seems excited about the possibility ofaccepting
"two contradictory ideas as simultaneously true" (Key 31). It is in the spirit of this cre¬
ative ability of imagination that Balthazar tells Darley, "There are only as many realities
as you care to imagine" (Quartet 315). Armed with this maxim, Darley in Balthazar
imagines into being another reality, at odds with the other reality he has imagined in
Justine. As Balthazar predicts, the truth does contradict itself in time. The Quartet
takes the shape of "a palimpsest upon which each" imagined reality leaves its "indi¬
vidual traces, layer by layer" (215), each layer persisting throughout the revision and
existing simultaneously. Darley, as a part of the whole of the world he studies, cannot
retain any unique subjectivity without examining less than the whole set of facts; his
only recourse is to accept all contradictory ideas not as possible but as true. In doing
so, he cannot favor one reality over another, but must "crowd" as much time as pos¬
sible into one moment, endeavoring, as Durrell writes in his Key, "to render a sort of
immediacy of impact" (Key 36).17 Durrell's tenseless lists, merging past with present
and conflating the two on the linguistic level, and his palimpsest ofperspectives, inter¬
leaved and interlocked in meaning, is his way of rendering this immediacy of impact,
presenting all truths, which through time will be intra-contradictory, simultaneously.
Despite the impossibility of Durrell's Quartet actually representing Einstein's con¬
tinuum—a failing caused in part by the readers' lack of four-dimensional specta¬
cles—it certainly does present an idea of "this fascinating theory of indeterminacy"
(Durrell qtd. in Mitchell and Andrewski 58). The sense ofmultiple perspectives in the
Quartet presents a reproduction of individual doubt ofperception, a doubt which on a
singular level is combatted by negotiations and renegotiations we make every day. As
l6Bergson, too, discusses intuition, writing that it is "instinct"—sympathy incapable ofextending its
object and of reflecting upon itself—"that has become disinterested, selfconscious, capable of reflect¬
ing upon its object and of enlarging it indefinitely" (Bergson, Creative 176). Of Bergsons intuition,
Bertrand Russell explains that it "does not divide the world into separate things, as the intellect does"
(Russell, "Bergson" 10). Bergson will be considered in greater detail from page 131.
I7For more 011 this notion of crowding time into the present moment, see the discussion of Bergso-
nian action on page 13 5 of this chapter.
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Einstein writes, this "conceptual ordering principle for recollected experiences" may
in fact help to construct a "subjective concept of time, i.e. that concept of time which
refers to the arrangement of the experiences of the individual" (Einstein 142-143).
The third section of this chapter considers this subjective concept of time further; be¬
fore that, however, the next section of the chapter surveys another model—that of
time as lived history.
11 The Watermark ofTime
Wyndham Lewis's complaint of Spengler that he reduces everything to history, wor¬
rying that the reduction thereof negates any understanding of truth (Lewis, Time and
Western Man 238), underestimates the full impact of that notion ofhistory. E. E. Sperry,
in 1927 writing a review of Spengler's recently released work, explains of Spenglerian
history that it "deals with things-becoming, with human life and development; with
living nature in contrast to dead nature, with the world-as-organism in contrast to
the world-as-mechanism" (Sperry 827—828). Spengler's sense of history is one that
encompasses a sense of truth in that history is the making of it and the perpetual (and
perpetuating) living of it.
Nevertheless, Howard Becker concedes that Spengler seems to have missed his
target of the academic reader, writing that the Decline "has received little acclaim in
university circles," making up for it with popularity (Becker 458)—undoubtedly how
Durrell himselfmust have discovered Spengler. Still, despite Gregory Dickson noting
the influence ofSpengler on the setting of the Revolt (Dickson 5 33)—and despite the
postface in that work explicitly naming Spengler as the raw source of consideration
(Nunquam 28 5)18 —too few have written on the impact ofSpengler in Durrell's writ¬
ing. In this section of the chapter I will consider this impact, reading it alongside his
The Revolt ofAphrodite, which numbers Spengler most immediately as its influences.
The Decline ofHistory
In his treatise, arguing the case for historically cyclical periodicity, Spengler asks, "Is
it possible to find in life itself [...] a series of stages which must be traversed, and
traversed moreover in an ordered and obligatory sequence?" (Spengler, Decline 3).
l8In a letter to Henry Miller in 1938, Durrell writes that "Spengler is wrong, you know; terribly
wrong; but the journey was worth it, he scores terrific truths" (Durrell-Miller 104). His notes in the
postface to Nunquam, however, suggest a reconciliation with Spengler's ideas: the line "He's [Spengler
is] not a pessimist at all. He is a realist, that is all" (Nunquam 285) mirrors the conversation between
Constance and Schwarz in the Quintet (noted in the footnote on page 40), suggesting further, perhaps,
Durrell's perceived connections between pragmatism and Spengler's view of history.
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He finds these life sequences in any examination of world history and past cultures,
which, when looked on from our vantage ofprogressed time, seem to rise and fall, ebb
and flow, with a sense of regularity—or predictability. Spengler's aim in The Decline
ofthe West is to examine this predictable regularity of history and to determine if it is
perhaps formed on a model ofwhat he calls "biographic archetypes" (3)—determining
factors that play a role in the patterning of our lives specifically and those of culture
generally.
Spengler calls those characteristics, in which we are able to recognize the form of a
culture, physiognomic, a name reflecting the sense of history as a biological construc¬
tion (Spengler, Decline—abridged 88). Spengler believes that physiognomic methods
represent the zenith of potential for the scientific method and predicts that within a
hundred years, an application of his physiognomic principle will be standard within
the sciences (88). Physiognomy recognizes the life of a culture as dependent upon the
life of its constituent parts: "The notion of the life duration ofa man [...] comprises a
specific time value [...]. Thus every culture [...] has its determinedphases." From the du¬
ration of human life, including the form relative to it, its "springtime" and "rise and
fall," a reflexive notion of lifespan and form can be extracted to be placed upon that
more general idea of cultural lifespan or cultural shape: "it ispossible [...] to reconstruct
the organic characteristics ofwhole periods ofhistory, and even to pre-determine thefeatures
ofthe still unaccomplishedfeatures ofour western history' (91—92).
One consequence ofsuch biological modeling is an inevitable form to each culture;
rather than a steadily improving string of cultures, each giving way to a subsequent
culture, better and somehow more suited to survive (almost in an evolutionary im¬
provement), Spengler's model proposes limits on the life of any culture, predicting a
certain rise and fall before inescapable final demise (88). Like the Spirit of Place for
Durrell, for Spengler a Culture is dependent upon the space in which it is formed,
maintaining—similar to the relationship of plant-to-soil—a relationship of Culture-
to-space, "in which and through which it strives to actualize itself" (90). This forward
motion, towards actualization, is a defining precept ofCulture for Spengler, who char¬
acterizes it as "a picture of life[...] not as things-become, but as things-becoming"
(Spengler, Decline 6). But such forward motion inevitably drives it toward an actu¬
alization of potential, towards a situation of things-become, at which point a Culture
hardens and stagnates into "Civilization, the thing which we feel and understand in
the words Egypticism, Byzantinism, Mandarinism" (Spengler, Decline—abridged 90).
From this hardening we can recognize a culture's decline.
Despite Hankins' commendation of Spengler's "historic striving," he claims for
the Decline a place in "that dreamland which borders poetry and philosophy on the
one hand and the field of scientific imagination on the other. It is a combination
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of myth-making and historical synthesis" (Hankins 298—299). Interestingly, in his
review ofSpengler's history, he notes one of the key differences in mood or expectation
between his generation and that of later postmodernists (perhaps, even, signaling the
true prescience of Spengler's poetic/philosophic treatise):
he does not note that ours is the first civilization in which the conscious
pursuit of knowledge by well-attested methods of scientific research be¬
came the absorbing pursuit of a galaxy of the best minds. Moreover, sci¬
ence is still in its infancy; in that lies the hope of our salvation. [...] We
seem to be approaching an era of world peace and organization, an era
of the manhood of humanity as a whole. We may, perhaps, have less
romance but more common sense, less mysticism but more scientific pre¬
vision. In any case, we might as well, even on Spengler's postulates of an
inscrutable destiny, be optimistic about it. (300)
Where Hankins' belief in the assurance ofmodern scientific improvements reveals his
tantamount trust in the world overcoming the trials of its past, Spengler's writing on
the inevitable decline of the culture of the West paints a bleak portrait, intimating,
even, that these very points Hankins seems to have found absent in Spengler's overview
(an obsession with knowledge, a compulsion to compare modern European culture
with its darker past) comprise the bulk of the identity of the West ("We men of the
Western Culture are, with our historical sense, an exception and not a rule. World-
history is our world picture and not all mankind's" (Spengler, Decline 1 5)), and thus
lead it even further to its destiny of decline.19
The Revolt ofthe West
Spengler's identification of the West as definitively focused on the mastery of knowl¬
edge and an encapsulation of the past ("What, then, is world-history? Certainly, an
ordered presentation of the past, an inner postulate, the expression of a capacity for
feeling form" (Spengler, Decline 15)) finds purchase, too, in Charlock's fascination
with the workings of memory (which Spengler identifies as the "organ of history"
(9)): "The development of memory! [...] It absorbed me utterly and led me to do
weird things" {Tunc 22).
While in his recording of the books Charlock exhibits this fascination with mem¬
ory Spengler sees in the Western culture, compared to the Quartet, The Revolt of
Aphrodite is a straightforward work. Comprised of two books, Tunc and Nunquam,
''"Classical" man, on the other hand, lacks this historical sense and lives instead in the "pure present,"
which "predicates the negation oftime" (9). This sense of the pure present in which segmentation of
time is abrogated shares much with Bergson's views of pure duration, "pure heterogeneity" (Bergson,
Time 104). For more on Bergson's duration, see the discussion on page 131 of this chapter.
II. The Watermark ofTime 124
titles derived from a line by Petronius, whom Durrell quotes as an epigraph to the sec¬
ond book—"Aut Tunc, autNunquam, 'It was then or never..—the books are largely
free ofanachrony: the events of the first book consist of a single external analepsis (one
"whose entire extent remains external to the extent of the first narrative" (Genette
49)), and those events told in the narrating of the second are entirely chronologi¬
cal. Nevertheless, both begin with a sense of temporal uncertainty. In Tunc, the text
varies seemingly arbitrarily between tenses, sometimes describing things in a past tense
("said Nash") and at other times describing them in the present ("says Nash") {Tunc
12). And Nunquam opens illustrating Charlock waking in an asylum, as uncertain in
his physical surroundings as he is in his temporal ones:
There is a small green diary by the bed [...] But the book seems very much
out of date—surely the Coronation was years ago? [...] moreover in the
middle a whole span ofmonths is missing, has been torn out. Gone! Van¬
ished months, vanished days—perhaps these are the very days he is living
through now? A man with no shadow, a clock with no face. {Nunquam
11—12)
Just as, in Tunc the first section gives way in later ones to relative "normalcy," in Nun¬
quam, too, Charlock regains his mental capacities and becomes capable of recognizing
his positioning in time.
Furthermore, in the Revolt, Julian recognizes equivalents to Spengler's "Egypti-
cism, Byzantinism, Mandarinism," the remote forms of Civilization that are stag¬
nated and accessible only as a type. The cultural artifacts he lists are iterations of
a pattern that is "only repeating itself": The Parthenon, Taj Mahal, Buddha's Tree,
the Holy Sepulchre, Herculaneum, and Pompeii represent respective pinnacles of cul¬
tural achievement, actualizations of respective Cultures. So too is the United Nations
of "great value as a relic of the future, like the Rosetta Stone" (87), as it is an artifact
through which the pinnacle of the Culture of the West might be read.
The firm Merlin's, though, "can't help reflecting the corpus of what, for want of
a better word, we must call our civilisation," for "its very size (like a blown-up pho¬
tograph) enables us to see that it is the reflection of something, the copy of some¬
thing" (87). As a reflection of Civilization, the stagnation and end of the Culture
of the West, Merlins' marks the end of an epoch; however, Spengler's world is not
an inert "world-as-nature" to be studied under ideal conditions and understood ab¬
solutely, but a "world-as-history," constantly varying its shape (Spengler, Decline 6).
Even the dead Culture, the Civilization—the thing-become, as opposed to the thing-
becoming—gives rise to the next Culture. "How do cultures come about, how do
they vanish?" Julian asks in the novel:
We would give anything to know. Can the firm and its structure perhaps
inform us a little—that's the point? Well, to break a chain you must hit a
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link I suppose—the fragile link upon which the whole structure depends.
One such link in man's culture is the fragile link ofassociation of one with
another, articles of faith, contracts, marriages, vows and so on. Snap the
link and the primordial darkness leaks in, the culture disintegrates, and
man becomes the coolie he really is when there is no frame of culture to
ennoble him, to interpret himself to himself. (Nunquam 89—90)
In Spengler's model, this primordial darkness always merely predates the rise of the
next culture to take its own place in a cyclical history.
In this rise and fall, too, the form(s) of the novels mirror one another. Not only do
both begin with a shiftiness and temporal instability, but both end, too, with an act of
drastic violence. In Tunc, the accidental shooting of Charlock's child by his invention
Abel (the very agent of memory in the Revolt) signals the final end of an ideal of
family life that, throughout Tunc, had been in decline. At the end ofNunquam, too,
Charlock decides to hit the "link" upon which the structure depends, to challenge
the construction of the firm—which is not only a model for the Culture of the age,
but is also tentacularly enmeshed within it: he sets fire to the firm's archive (283).
Whether the destruction of the firm's contracts lets in the primordial darkness or not,
is unresolved:
The only one who has shown alarm is Baum who said "Either everything
will disintegrate, the Firmwill begin to dissolve; or else nothing, Mr. Felix,
absolutely nothing. People will be afraid to take advantage of the fact that
they have no contractual written obligations. They might stay put from
funk or " So it will be either/or once again; it will be now or never.
(283)
In any event, the move leaves Culture newly at a crossroads. The doubt at the end
of the novel—"Either everything will disintegrate [...] or else nothing," "either/or,"
"now or never"—introduces a new state of things-becoming where before had only
been things-become. As Charlock lacks the necessary narrative perspective to hint
about the future, the reader is left unsure whether the revised state of things-becoming
is a disavowal of past stagnation and a return to a viable culture of the West or an
introduction of a fresh Cultural soul, awakening "out of the proto-spirituality of ever-
childish humanity" to bloom in the soil fertilized by the remains of Merlin's and an
old Civilization (Spengler, Decline—abridged 90).
The "watermark" of time that Charlock seeks to understand throughout the Revolt
(Tunc 23) represents, in part, the unnaturally inert world-as-nature of a fallen civi¬
lization. The conflagration of the archive at the novel's end opens the door to the
motion and change possible when such inert symbols are cast aside.20 The next sec¬
tion will return to presentation of time faithful to this shifting change, as presented
2°See the note and discussion on Marinetti on page 136.
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Charlock's notion of time as a watermark and Spengler's notion ofhistory as composed
of cycles present an external sort of ordering to time, not necessarily at ease with the
way we experience it. Temporality (and even sequence) in Durrell's Quintet resists such
an external comparison, which must present stable states. Instead, the (Quintet presents
time as continually shifting—not just forwards, but bleeding, also, into the past. The
bidirectional nature of Blanford's writing suggests an affinity to Henri Bergson's sense
ofa personal notion of time not beholden to these extremities. William James, writing
on Bergson, explains that we should try "to see into the intervals," a failing in many
mathematical theories (James, Pluralistic 237). Nonetheless, Bergson's own theories
are not without critics. Bertrand Russell complains that Bergson's model should be
"regarded as a poetic effort" and that it "is in the main not capable of either proof or
disproof" (Russell, "Bergson" 24), and Durrell himself dismisses Bergsonian duration
as outdated by "Space-Time" {Balthazar 9). Nevertheless, as Mary Ann Gillies argues
(Gillies 5), Bergson's influence on British literature of the early- to mid-twentieth
century is indisputable. Moreover, despite Durrell's protests, Bergson's philosophy is
not incompatible with Einstein's quantum physics. In this section I will first consider
temporal troubles in Durrell's Quintet before I address Bergson and, finally, apply a
reading of Bergsonian attributes to the entirety of Durrell's opus. In doing so, I hope
to show the sense therein of pure duration and a privileging of the present moment
arrived at through action.
TheAvignon Quintet
In his final multi-part work, The Avignon Quintet, Durrell returns to the narrative
intricacy of his (Quartet, opening with one of the main characters recognizing the full
loss of memory of the past: "The southbound train from Paris was the one we had
always taken from time immemorial" {Quintet 5, my emphasis). Immediately, Durrell's
later text contrasts with Darley's drive throughout the Quartet "to be matter-of-fact"
regarding past events {Quartet 210). Bruce's ambition in the beginning of the Quintet
is not to recapture the past and understand it, but to understand the making of the
present:
How well I remembered, how well he remembered! The Bruce that I was,
and the Bruce I become as I jot down these words, a few every day. A
train subject to unexpected halts, unexplained delays; it could fall asleep
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anywhere, even in the open country, and remain there, lost in thought for
hours. [...] It has never been, will never be, on time our train. (Quintet
5)
Bruce's intimately half first- / half third-person, multiply present- / past- (and even
future-) tense narrative navigates the troubles inherent within "the swirls and eddies
of" time and memory (5).21 Just as a train might "fall asleep" anywhere, regardless
of Tightness or appropriateness of it doing so, memory might muddy certain recol¬
lections, swirling them into one another so that they become indistinct. Time, as
we think we access it through memory, might be immemorial—beyond the scope
of memory—and a train of thought might never be on time, bending to associated
rules and expectations. At Monsieur's beginning, Bruce is aware of, and even draws
attention to, these problems.
Bruce travels to Avignon for the funeral of his friend / lover / brother-in-law Piers,
who has committed suicide before the first narrative of the novel. His death shocks
Bruce into a forced understanding of a kind of time that is neither so forgiving nor
so capricious: "Dying," he writes, "one becomes out of date" (7). Unlike the train,
which after unexpectedly halting in the open countryside will eventually resume, the
kind of time which forces itself upon Piers, effecting his outdatedness, will not reverse
itself—at least from Bruce's perspective of space and time.
Bruce later reawakens Piers by remembering how they had traveled with Bruce's
wife and Piers' sister Sylvie to Macabru, a Gnostic shrine situated in an oasis outside
of Alexandria. He explores his recollections, beginning his journey from as distant
a perspective as that of the author ofMountolive: "The four riders, one of them a
woman, who set off that noon from the Canopic Gate were as young as their met¬
tlesome longlegged horses." He continues his description, employing a third-person
analeptic style—"The party was," "They were" (91)—presenting one of these almost-
stable vignettes in the style of classical realism; though he is at the time a rider, he
assumes for the moment the perspective of a writer, of one looking on to the scene
from afar. It is as if the heavily romanticized image of the four horsemen, "one of them
a women" (perhaps the idealistic manner in which they are silhouetted by the sun ren¬
ders their sexes otherwise indistinguishable), setting off from the anciently grandiose
"Canopic Gate" of an anciently mysterious city to ride into the desert in late after¬
noon—led, ofcourse, only by a one-eyed Arab mounted upon an as-picturesque white
11Moreover, they deny the reader the stability of a first narrative as found in the Quartet. Instead,
the Quintet presents multiple narrative levels, competing and overlapping Erzdhlzeits, narrating times,
in a series of almost-stable vignettes.
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camel—cannot be one he remembers from the perspective he lived, and must be re¬
membered from the externalized recollection.22 This externalizability of the situation
allows him to portray Piers not as he was, but as a character, treating the memory of
Macabru not as analepsis but as a manifestation of the narrating present.
As the four explorers, four horses, camel, and one-eyed guide leave Alexandria to
permeate the desert beyond its gates, they lose sense of perspective, unable to trust
their sense of sight, which deceives them with mirages, introducing the unstable in
this memory by juxtaposing anachronisms. They permeate the past lives of the city,
stumbling across its real, half-buried "extensive remains ofancient buildings, shattered
archways, smashed causeways and musing lintels" (94). They become, in a sense, time
travelers, "modern scavengers of history" who are able to take up the perspective, to
some degree, of those who had lived the time: "we had some truthful inkling of the
original dream-city of the boy Alexander" (94). This perspective is not without qual¬
ifications, though. The scene was one "which had, it seems, long since exhausted
all its historical potentialities": "repeated historical earthquakes have [...] engulfed
the place time and time again" (94). These earthquakes, historical in the sense that
they happened in the past, also seem to be disruptions in history itself, engulfing the
city and its surrounding desert in time after time, era after era. Thus, the modern
scavengers of history are able to find artifacts of its existence—the signatures of time
and history graffitied on sunken archways and half-buried treasures—at any level of
the desert. Moreover, the dry heat preserves the structures from the time of Pliny,
through "the time of the French invasion," and into the contemporaneous architec¬
tural style of French Riviera (94), all of which remain on one level or another. The
past has "quite gone, and much had vanished with it," but much remains: Piers even
recognizes the "outer furnishings" of Alexander's world—though whether this is a
statement on the timelessness of his choice of symbols ofAlexander's world ("palms,
water-wheels, dervishes, desert horses. Always!") or on the instability of historic per¬
spective ("'Mirages,' groaned Toby, 'and oases'") is not clear (95).
Time becomes a destructive element, ravaging the "dream-city" ofAlexandria, the
sanity of both the old man in the desert ("he was alive but mad [...] the blissful
amnesia that all excessive suffering brings. [...Tjime passed [...] and the criminal
went slowly mad" (93)) and of Sylvie (her lapses of reason are moments in which
she has "slipped, so to speak, off the time-track" (88)), and the life of Piers. The
romance of four horsemen and the Canopic Gate becomes the only way to approach
22He interrupts this authoritative voice soon enough, conceding, "we were all four somewhat new to
the place, and as yet very much under the spell of its skies and its vistas ofmany-coloured desert" (91).
This recollection, then, though told in all the conventions of classical realism, might not be entirely
unlike the experience ofwide-eyed tourism he may have had.
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the history surrounding Alexandria's periphery—and indeed any history at all. "Can't
you see how marvelous history is?" Piers asks his sister: "The presence ofother people
whose actions and thoughts seem to still hang about in the air?" (95). The standoffish
perspective of one looking back onto a "marvelous history" is the only one that offers
enough solidity to comment upon that history while escaping the detrimental effects
of the intervening time.
These ostensibly stable memories are further undermined by the larger structures
of temporal presentation in The Avignon Quintet. As is the case in The Alexandria
Quartet, in Durrell's Quintet one perspective will always be undermined by another.
The Quartet addresses the issue on a small scale by showing multiple perspectives of
one scene in a sort of cubist still life. The Quintet, on the other hand, is a more cin¬
ematic version of cubism, a variation in which each frame is shot from a different
angle, though time itself is allowed to continue on. Careful consideration of truth
and variation among perspectives in the Quartet gives way to the (Quintet, in which
differentiation among perspectives is merely accepted—or not acknowledged at all.
We learn in the end ofMonsieur, for example, that the conversation about Monsieur
that Blanford has been having with the Duchess Tu, Constance, over dinner has been
entirely one of his imagination, as she has been dead "for some time" (293). Never¬
theless, in the second book of the series, Livia, Blanford learns of her death upon its
happening after his dinner with her; when he receives the phone call informing him
of her death, he thinks back on the dinner they had shared and the manuscript she
had enjoyed:
She would miss reading (the selfishness of writers!) all the new material
he had added to his book. [...] He reached out and touched the earlier
manuscript of his book Monsieur. He had given it to Tu and she had had
it bound. (299-302)
The text disrupts the flow of time again when Sutcliffe, a character who dies in Blan-
ford's manuscript Monsieur, telephones his author to commiserate on Constance's
death. Blanford is not pleased: '"You are dead, Robin,' said Blanford. 'Remember
the end of Monsieur?'" Sutcliffe, challenging the finality of that text, rejoins "Bring
me back then, [...] and we shall see" (304).
This posthumous reintroduction of Sutcliffe as author places him at a comparable
level of authority to Blanford. We learn that while Blanford is responsible for the
manuscript ofMonsieur, Sutcliffe has composed its twin, The Prince ofDarkness (306),
the text of Bruce, Piers, and Sylvie. The combined effort challenges all expectations
of sequence and causality; the text that purports to be a joint "quincunx of novels
set out in a good classical order" (309) is anything but that. Instead, we are faced
with a reproduction of Charlock's theory of composition, explained in The Revolt of
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Aphrodite-.
While I am writing one book, [...] I write another about it, then a third
about it, and so on. [...] Like those monkeys in the Indian frescoes [...]
who can dance only with their index fingers up each other's behinds. This
would be my way of doing things.23 {Nunquam 16)
Multiple perspectives ofeach scene, past and present, overlay upon one another simul¬
taneously as action proceeds, developing an interleaved, interpenetrating catalogue of
differences that play out over time. Not until the third book, Constance, do we ever
learn of the "tremendous burst" (Quintet 666) that cripples Blanford, giving him the
"swayback" gait ofMonsieur (278), which is explained away as "a spine full of shrap¬
nel," necessitating daily massages from his manservant (284)—and not until Constance
do we learn that Bruce Drexel, Monsieur's, first narrator on the train to Avignon, is the
doctor who treats him. Further, it is not until the fifth book, Quinx, that we learn
that Constance helps Blanford overcome his physical handicap by way of a regimen of
massage, physical therapy, and (eventually) sexual intercourse (1313—1321), though
in Monsieur, after her death, he has never been cured at all.
In the model of time followed in the Quartet, the Revolt's Pangarides could only
have had sex with the boy or the girl, though in each novel the situation ofwhat actu¬
ally had been the case could change; in the Spenglerian sense of history and destiny of
the Revolt, he has them both at once, as he has been expected to do since his birth; in
the Quintet, on the other hand, every possibility is taken into consideration, and Pan¬
garides can have had the boy, the girl, both, none, and even all of the above—though
only simultaneously in retrospect,24 The cubist perspective change between cinematic
frames allows us to look back upon previously unexplored perspectives to see them
all at once, holding them all simultaneously in our memory. Rather than consider
these perspectives he cannot show us, Durrell allows for any one of them to follow
on, however shockingly, from any other; only in recognizing the absolute differences
among all the assumed perspectives of the Quintet as they play out through time can
we recognize the network of perspectives in the text.
23This, of course, is reminiscent of the indiscretions of Pangarides, who (Banubula tells us) is a
connoisseur and advocate of a particular sexual act, the "chariot": "A sort of en brochette effect. [...] It's
having a small boy while the small boy himself is having a girl" (Tunc 108).
24It is a natural limitation of text that in order to maintain comprehension, one sentence will project
only one world. A paragraph of sentences, on the other hand, can project a cosmos of understanding,
the entirety of which is comprehensible only upon having read each constituent sentence. Again,




Bergson defines his idea of duree, or duration, explicitly against the notion of a mea¬
sured, analyzable time: "Pure duration is the form which the succession of our con¬
scious states assumes when our ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating its
present state from its former states" (Bergson, Time 100). The state of being in which
we find ourselves measuring out time, differentiating moments ofmemory is one in
which we are in a sense constrained by the past. Instead, Bergson explains, "life is a
movement, materiality is the inverse movement, and each of these two movements is
simple, the matter which forms [...] an undivided flux" (Bergson, Creative 249), in¬
corporating past and present states into "an organic whole, [...] melting, so to speak,
into one another" (Bergson, Time 100). Ihese commingling states cannot be placed
in any particular order without distinguishing among the moments, disrupting the
incorporated melange. In attempting such a thing, writes Bergson, we convert what
had been successive moments into a different kind of simultaneity, placing them be¬
side one another and projecting them into space (102). Pure duration, on the other
hand, consists of "qualitative changes" that "permeate one another, without precise
outlines, without any tendency to externalize themselves in relation to one another,
without any affiliation with number"; pure duration, he writes, "would be pure het¬
erogeneity" (104).
This pure heterogeneity ofpure duration, the internal working of the human mind,
still meets up at some pointwith the external. The two, (external) space and (internal)
duration, are synchronized in action: "each moment [in duration...] can be brought
into relation with a state of the external world which is contemporaneous with it,
and can be separated from the other moments in consequence of this very process"
(110). In other words, our sense of internal duration comes into contact with actions
of external space, and although moments might "melt" into one another, they "retain
something of the mutual externality which belongs to their objective causes" (125).
For every moment in memory, there is an actuality. Though our memory might
take the form of an indistinct mass, we can still separate that mass by recognizing the
respective actions of the external. It is only in this mutual association of external and
internal that elements of the external can persist (108). Our recognition ofBergsonian
duree is really the result of the endurance ofourselves through successive states: though
the world around us changes, making up the elements of our memories and past,
that world has no memory of the change to qualify it; it is only in our capability of
qualification, through the enduring ofour memory of the past, that the past continues
to live within us (108). However, Bergson warns against mistakenly equating duration
and space:
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To put duration in space is really to contradict oneself and place succes¬
sion within simultaneity. Hence we must not say that external things
endure, but rather that there is in them some inexpressible reason in virtue
ofwhich we cannot examine them at successive moments of our own du¬
ration without observing that they have changed. (227)
The duality of space and duree becomes a defining precept of Bergson's philosophy. It
is an imbalance between elements of this same duality that Durrell, quoting Routh,
warns us of, an unfavorable encroaching of space (manifest in the external and mea¬
sured sense ofTime) upon our inner lives—a disparity that "cannot ever satisfy man's
consciousness" (Key 24).
Out of Time
It is not difficult to recognize Bergsonian elements of duration in the Quintet. Most
obviously, the Bergsonian pure heterogeneity of duree is apparent in the stream-of-
confusion of the Quintet, whose encapsulation of utter difference reveals the past to
be a knotted skein not easily disentangled. Blanford's memory consists of intermin¬
gled moments, a spatialization of which would necessarily be destructive to certain
elements. For example, though Blanford's dinner with Quartila in Monsieur seems
unproblematic until its end, the factor of her death refigures the entire conversation.
To consider her death, that later detail, as true in a spatialized understanding ofTime
strikes out an honest consideration of the dinner conversation. Similarly, through¬
out the Quintet, other interwoven elements of the past resist the strict expectations
of externalized spatialization, in which any two elements must not contradict with
each other, must not "permeate one another," must not be "without precise outlines"
(Bergson, Time 104). In many other situations, the Quintet shows a Bergsonian con¬
sideration toward the past and memory.
These constructions are not limited merely to TheAvignon Quintet, though. In fact,
Bergson's understanding ofmemory and duration is perhaps more suited as a govern¬
ing model for Durrell's other novels than those models which they purport to follow;
even The Alexandria Quartet, which claims to differ from the "Proustian or Joycean
method [...] for they illustrate Bergsonian 'Duration'" {Balthazar 9), depends upon
a consideration of narrative subjectivity not strictly compatible with Einstein's space-
time. In The Revolt ofAphrodite, too, though Durrell models his notions of history
and destiny on Spengler's philosophies of a science of history, Charlock's preference
for a personal inner time {Tunc 22) and the means in which he relates to his past argue
for a Bergsonian understanding of personal comprehension. While the themes and
forms of the novels might differ from one to the next, the shared model ofmemory
and time is best understood in relation to Bergsonian duration.
III. Time Immemorial 133
In all ofDurrell's later novels, he challenges prescribed forms of linearity, preferring
instead the problematic disorder ofstylized telling, in which the narrator relates events
in the order of their importance to him. In The Black Book, even, in Lawrence Lucifer's
selective reading of Gregory's diaries—his memories—the latter are presented as-is,
with no recourse to understanding what must have been the linear cause-and-effect of
their actualization, a homogeneous form of external time. In The Alexandria Quartet,
too, the ordering of Darley's world is based not on external action, but on internal
significance. The Revolt ofAphrodite is no different, every recollection being relayed
via dactyl, the personal memory device of Charlock, which depends upon the relay
of spoken histories—not as they happen, but as they are recalled. And in TheAvignon
Quintet we face a radically internalized story, non-externalizable insofar as the process
of externalization would necessitate a preferment of certain versions of the story over
others.25
Each of these novels presents a problem of reading, the solution to which at first
seems to be merely a reordering of events into a comprehensible sequence, a synchro¬
nizing of the internal with an external. Like Balthazar, the reader lacks the key neces¬
sary to expose "the palpitating viscera of time itself stirring" and so has no recourse to
reorder—or reconsider the order of—events in the novels. In truth, such a reordering
is undesirable. Though in Bergson's philosophy for every inner moment there exists
a corresponding outer happening with which it is simultaneous, the synchronization
of the two depends upon the recording mind:
we gather up the multiplicity ofatoms in a single perception: get rid of the
mind which carries out this synthesis and youwill at once do awaywith the
qualities, that is to say, the aspect under which the synthesis ofelementary
parts is presented to our consciousness. [...] For their co-existence to give
rise to space, there must be an act of the mind which takes them in all at
the same time and sets them in juxtaposition. (Bergson, Time 94)
In the novels, this act of the mind "gathering up" the multiple positions and setting
them in juxtaposition, corresponds to Genette's narrating-, "the producing narrative
action and, by extension, the whole of the real or fictional situation in which that
action takes place" (Genette 27). The act of creating a text, the very act of ordering
events in a fiction, depends on a narrating mind. As Bergson writes, "We [...] solidify
our impressions [...] to express them in language. Hence we confuse the feeling itself,
which is in a perpetual state of becoming, with its permanent external object, and
especially with the word which expresses this object" (Bergson, Time 130).26 Not only
25In this respect, the multiple versions of "truth" in the Quartet are nevertheless externalizable, as
all variations depend solely on a difference in externalized perspective. The significance of Darley's
ordering of those events, however, is not.
2fiDurrell resists even this solidification by—in later books of his various series—reconfiguring, re¬
visiting, and recanting readings found in earlier books.
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would any readerly reordering be inaccurate, but it would also introduce spatiality into
the concept of time:
we could not introduce order among terms without first distinguishing
them and then comparing the places which they occupy; [...] in a word,
we set them side by side, and ifwe introduce an order in what is successive,
the reason is that succession is converted into simultaneity and is projected
into space. (102)
Any attempt at reordering the succession of events in the story—indeed, any attempt
at finding an already existing order or any questions regarding cogency of a presented
order—falsely recognizes space in the novels, which are, for their respective narrators,
merely compendia ofmemory.
Throughout the novels, the construction ofmemory along the lines of something
similar to Bergsonian duration has a few other ramifications as well. Describing the
force of duration on the individual, Bergson portrays a familiar image:
A violent love or a deep melancholy takes possession of our soul: here
we feel a thousand different elements which dissolve into and permeate
one another without any precise ourlines, without the least tendency to
externalize themselves in relation to one another. (132)
Elements of Darley's memory in TheAlexandria Quartet, too, have no tendency to ex¬
ternalize in relation to one another: they are heterogeneous, each moment of the past
inseparable from others to which it is related by theme, rather than external order. He
conflates the scene of a woman (Melissa?) wandering the early morning streets with
another ofJustine wandering the vestibule of the Cecil; memories of songs are grafted
upon memories ofperfumes; hospital visits roll into one. Moments are so intermeshed
that each subsequent memory leads to another; this seemingly random vehicle drives
the narrative forward. And in The Revolt ofAphrodite, the model of cultural history
is an element of the present; while Spengler advocates extracting an understanding
of the transcendental to be applied systematically to individual cultures, in the Re¬
volt, any move to understand the transcendental shape of the history of Culture is
overshadowed by Charlock's ability to act. History becomes less a structure imposed
upon the present and more a personal understanding of the past through the present.
As Bergson writes, "external things change, but their moments do not succeed one
another, if we retain the ordinary meaning of the word, except for a consciousness
which keeps them in mind" (226—227). Historical succession, as we understand it, is
applied retroactively.27
27This tendency of consciousness seems to be most at play when considering the temporal setting of
the opus, especially the Quartet and the Quintet, both of which overlap World War II. As "I endure,"
the "I" that endures as embodied in Durrelfs narrators keeps this consciousness in mind.
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On a larger level, the novels' (and narrators') shared obsession with memory gives
place to focus on the present. At first, Lawrence Lucifer revisits the journals of long-
gone Gregory, Darley constantly reworks the past in hopes of arriving at a greater
understanding of it, Charlock admits to obsessing over memory, and Blanford lives
for part of the Quintet in the past of Constance's life. Their lives unfold "in space
rather than in time"; they "live for the external world rather than for [them]selves";
they "speak rather than think"; they "'are acted' rather than act [themjselves" (231).
This living for the external world is most apparent in Darley's assertion that the city of
Alexandria "used us as its flora" (Quartet 17), in Charlock's pogonometric predictors,
and in Blanford's creation of a text fixated upon the past he once shared with his dead
friends (Livia, Constance, Sebastian),
In each of these cases, "deep introspection [...] leads us to grasp our inner states
as living things, constantly becoming' (Bergson, Time 231). In recognizing the inner
state of life as a living thing in itself, in recognizing life as a process of becoming, Dur-
rell's narrators open to themselves a world of freedom; they "act freely [...] to recover
possession of oneself." In this liberating action, they are able "to get back into pure
duration" (231—232), "the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes
when our ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating its present state from its
former states" (100). In the Quartet, Darley's acting-Alexandria is acted upon in the
fourth book, which witnesses the effects of World War II on the city. In the Revolt,
Charlock's predictors become less predictors than actualizers of the future they fore¬
tell. In the Quintet, too, the train of reminiscence ridden by Bruce in the beginning is
somehow derailed or diverted in the course of the writing of the novel, which, though
purportedly a novel about the deaths of friends in the past, neglects to match that past
with the present of the first book, ending instead in an alternative present, in which
Constance lives and Sutcliffe is real (and alive).
This rejection of the past in favor of a created and interpreted present is effected
partly through the therapeutic introspective aspects of the creation of respective novels
for their narrators, but it is also due partly to an action, which brings the present
recognizably into the control of the narrator. Bergson writes that "life is an evolution
[...] in reality the body is changing form at every moment [...] form is only a snapshot
view ofa transition' (Bergson, Creative 302), but that we seldom recognize this truth:
We must, by a strong recoil of our personality on itself, gather up our past
which is slipping away, in order to thrust it, compact and undivided, into
a present which it will create by entering. Rare indeed are the moments
when we are self-possessed to this extent: it is then that our actions are
truly free. (200)
This same call to action is mirrored in Filippo Marinetti's "Founding and Manifesto of
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Futurism," in which he deprecates the tendency "to waste all your best powers in this
eternal and futile worship of the past" (Marinetti 252)—a tendency found in all of
Durrell's narrators—advocating instead the decision to "give ourselves utterly to the
Unknown" (250). These unique moments, serious decisions which might never be re¬
peated, mark the denouement of each of Durrell's texts: in the Quartet, the action of
Darley saving Clea from drowning by cutting off her hand;28 in the Revolt, the torch¬
ing of the firm's contracts;29 in the Quintet, the action of Blanford defying his hand¬
icap to save Constance from drowning.30 In the Quartet and the Quintet, two true
Kiinstlerromane, further action toward the end of those texts marks additional deci¬
sive moments: in Clea, Darley writes "with trembling fingers" the story of the Quartet
(Quartet 877); and in Quinx, shivering in anticipation, Blanford—along with Con¬
stance, a troop of gypsies, and the whole town of Saintes-Mairies-de-la-Mer—enters
the booby-trapped cave which is, at once, an old storehouse ofWorld War II arms, a
gypsy shrine, and the hidden location of the Templar treasure (Quintet 1366—1367).
At the end of each ofDurrell's novels, the text gives place of precedence to an extreme
becoming, an enlarged present of liberated consciousness, what The Black Book calls
"the enormous Now" (Black Book 244), the Quartet calls the Heraldic Universe (which
"nudges" Darley (Quartet 877)), the Revolt recognizes in the disaffected dancing of
Charlock and Benedicta (Nunquam 283), and the Quintet calls "reality prime" (Quin¬
tet 1367). Each of these constructions intimates a timelessness ofaction of the present:
Darley's authorship of the Quartet is "quite unpremeditated, quite unannounced," but
it is also the action of "every story-teller since the world began" (Quartet 877); in the
Revolt, characters can no longer rely on a prediction of the future modeled upon a
scientific understanding of the past to place themselves in the present; in the Quin¬
tet, reality prime is the "totally unpredictable" (Quintet 1367). Additionally, in all
of the novels, this final action marks the end of the past and the beginning of the
unpredictable future, beyond the bounds of the novels' edges.
28Dahlgren sees the severance ofClea's hand as the point at which Darley changes from observer to
actor (Dahlgren 82).
2yCharlock's destruction of the firm's archives is a true Marinettian action: "We will destroy the
museums, libraries, academies of every kind [...] Come on! set fire to the library shelves!" (Marinetti
252—252). This past that Marinetti advocates abolishing is one composed ofmutually external states,
an externalization hindering any affiliation with the "pure heterogeneity" of Bergson's pure duration
(Bergson, Time 104): "Museums: cemeteries! ... Identical, surely, in the sinister promiscuity of so
many bodies unknown to one another" (Marinetti 252).
3°Only The Black Book, mitigated by the failure of Lawrence Lucifer's project, might suggest an in¬
ability to enter into the present through action; nonetheless, that failure itself represents an abandon¬
ment of the past (and the externalized journal entries of Herbert Gregory) in favor of the celebration
of present tense at the end of that text: "There is Bach playing [...] There is you dancing [...] There is
the cadenza of flesh here naked [...] It is [...] For this is [...] There is [...] It is [...] It is [...] There is
[...] This is how it ends" (Black Book 243—244).
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These actions evince states that "cannot be adequately expressed in words or ar¬
tificially reconstructed by a juxtaposition of simpler states" because these states are
"phases of our real and concrete duration, a heterogeneous duration and a living one"
(Bergson, Time 239). In the Quartet, Darley tells us that "everything depend[s] on our
interpretation of the silence around us," explaining in an endnote to find an explana¬
tion on the next page, which turns out to be blank (Quartet 195, note on page 203).
In the Quintet, the reality prime that "rushed to the aid of fiction" also rushes in to aid
in the camouflaging of that novel's edge {Quintet 1367). In each of Durrell's novels,
this Bergsonian duration realizes a Present composed of the carrying of all Past states
into the Future, an inclination for becoming (of self, of text, of place, and of time)
rather than become. In Durrell, as in Einstein, Spengler, and Bergson, this present
is the moment from which all opportunities are available. After each work's relative
Tunc and Nunquam—after Then and No Time—can come only Nunc, the enormous,
living Now, free from the constraints of the past and living in the "pure present."
Chapter 5
A System ofQuestion Marks
Pluralistic empiricism knows that everything is in an environment, a surrounding worldofother
things, and that ifyou leave it to work there it will inevitably meet withfriction and opposition
from its neighbors. (Pluralistic Universe 90)
You see, I've done these things that read a bit like detective stories. But ofcourse they're more
than that, because I've built a whole system ofquestion marks into them. This is what bothers
the critics with theirpassion for categorizing. They don't know what to call the books.
(Durrell, Conversations 91)
If the first four dimensions correspond to Durrell's understanding of Einstein's four-
dimensional continuum, then any attempt at understanding a fifth dimension must
complement those earlier ones. As the second dimension extends the first by pre¬
senting a plane on which a plurality of (first-dimensional) lines might interact, so too
does the third dimension present the depth that allows interaction of a plurality of
planes, and the fourth dimension offers time as a means of interaction for multiple
three-dimensional states. Continuing this thread, a plurality of times suggests a peri-
odization quite similar to that employed by Spengler: by recognizing similar aspects
among periods or eras, we compare them, presenting them the field in which they
interact with one another.
Such a comparison elicits a familiar question with regard to Durrell's writing: what
to call the books? In a 1968 interview, Durrell playfully acknowledges the problems
of categorization his readers face with regard to his works. These problems are un¬
derstandable: his four serious works are actually twelve, published between 1938 and
1985, and which (as early as 1937) were styled as one. His writing, too, shifts consid¬
erably from The Black Book, with its stark pessimism and obvious influences ofHenry
Miller, to the playful Quinx: or The Ripper's Tale, the ending of which promises in¬
calculable cultural renewal through the lost treasures of a mystic order—or the death
of a multitude of people and the simultaneous loss of thousands of years of culture,
hinging on the precipices of the fallout ofWorld War II, a theme which haunts his
work from the Quartet onward.
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What to call the books? Reed Way Dasenbrock makes the argument that critics of
Durrell ought to work to place him in a theoretical context that affords him continuing
relevance (Dasenbrock, "Centrifugality" 91). The sentiment mirrors the quote by
Wordsworth featured as the epigraph to the Quintet's last volume: a work "must itself
create the taste by which it is to be judged" (Wordsworth qtd. in Quintet 1176). While
some critics might take alongside any study ofDurrell the concomitant task ofplacing
him in a manner that he might be well "received,"1 Stefan Herbrechter on the other
hand disagrees:
The concern over the survival of literary reputation implies at least two
things: first, that Durrell's work has either not yet been, is not being, or
has stopped being received; and second, that there is a certain necessity to
encourage, extend or revive a reading or re-reading of Durrell's texts [...].
(Herbrechter, Ethics 9)2
And Donald Kaczvinsky writes that Durrell's "status in British literature remains un¬
certain" (Kaczvinsky, "Review" 183). Critics have questioned Durrell's literary sur¬
vivability ever since the publication of Tunc, widely expected to be the successor to
the Quartet but widely and wildly unpopular among the Quartet's advocates. In
"Lawrence Durrell and the Modes ofModernism," Dasenbrock argues that this un¬
popularity and shift in style is perhaps a result of his development as an author: the
many people who enjoyed the Quartet did so because of its inherent modernism; the
same many who dislike the Revolt do so because of its inability to fit into those modes
of modernism (Dasenbrock, "Modes" 516). While Dasenbrock was not the first to
categorize the eddy of change in Durrell's oeuvre as part of a larger current in the
twentieth century, there is little agreement as to when or where any such change can
be recognized.
Continuing a trend that began in the 1970s and that steadily grew in force in
the 1980s, Durrell scholarship in the 1990s and into the 21st century has increas¬
ingly hinged on his placement as a modernist or postmodernist writer. Early con¬
siderations are usually conservative in their methods, eager to connect Durrell with
the already-lauded names of modernist literature: James, Conrad, Moore, Wilde,
Shaw, Pound, Eliot, Lewis, H. D., Lowell, Joyce, Woolf, Aldington, Huxley, Read,
Lawrence, Graves, Campbell, and Auden (Dasenbrock, "Centrifugality" 200—201).3
This trend reverses as the concept of postmodernism filters through literary studies,
providing an alternative cachet in the form of a new and respectable literature—and
a trendy new theoretical stance. While early proponents of Durrell's postmodernist
placement may depend upon homespun definitions of a particular sort of non-
'See Keith Brown, "Letter from Norway."
2For more on Herbrechter's view of receiving Durrell, see also (Herbrechter, "Canon" 329).
3MacNiven adds to this list others, such as Proust, Ford, and Greene (MacNiven, "Quincunx" 23 5).
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modernism, later analyses tend to employ established theories of postmodernism, less
dependent upon a particular (and sometimes peculiar) personal interpretation ofmod¬
ernism.
This chapter will consider as a field of comparison these periods, suggesting a dif¬
ferentiation in Durrell's works from his understandings of modernism (as evidenced
in the Key, delivered as lectures in 1947—1948) to his practice in his opus. In making
such a suggestion, I will first justify Durrell's understanding of modernist literature
(an understanding that is itself seldom studied as an understanding, rather than the
mouthpiece of an author) to those of others more highly considered. I will then
trace—in the fondness for literary forms that disrupt, echoed variously throughout
his opus—an expectation for the opus to enact a kind of change, a disruption from a
modernist tradition. In the second section of the chapter, I will show, too, that to call
his books postmodernist for their unwillingness to fit into modernist expectations, is
equally problematic. Finally, in the last section I will return Durrell's opus to the flux,
the liminality ofTurner and plurality ofJames, arguing that it is both more beneficial
and more accurate to consider the motion of the opus as something continuing and
continual. In the planning of Durrell's opus we can see a separation from modernism,
and in the practice of that opus we can recognize the bewildering betwixt and between
of the liminal, but we never get a sense of aggregation of competing forces, a coming
to the fore of new order in light of all the indeterminacy of passage. The inability
to place Durrell's oeuvre, an inability to "know what to call the books," arises from
Durrell's keen desire to implant a "system of question marks" into them, resisting
categorization and reductionist readings.4
i Separation - Modernism?
Other than through letters he wrote on the subject to Miller and Eliot, Durrell's un¬
derstanding of early twentieth-century literature is best approached through his Key
to Modern Poetry, published from a collection of lectures he gave in Argentina, where
4John Frow has argued that the continuing success of postmodernism as a concept depends greatly
upon considerations ofwhat the word itself might mean; any debate of a definition is always "a move
within the genre of the postmodern" as "any publicity is good publicity" (Frow 22). Nevertheless, as I
am entering into a dialogue already begun (and still continuing) the luxury of refraining from offering
free press eludes me. Still, in this chapter I hope to show the placement of Durrell's opus in a twentieth-
century continuum of change, thus avoiding as much as possible the problematic nature of the term
as "a trap [...] lacking any historical reference" (22). At the same time, I hope to overcome the danger
Frow recognizes in the term's plurality of meaning (21). I argue instead that Durrell's decisive move
against a modernist tradition in his opus (see the discussion from page 147) begins the transition toward
something that might be called a postmodernist tradition; the works of the opus represent milestones
of progress rather than any realization of a final outcome.
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he served the British Council. The title itself hints at Durrell's approach to modernist
poetry as if to a puzzle needing a key to be understood:
the common reader [...] knows that the twentieth century is a battlefield,
but he does not know what the battle is about [...]. The allusions to books
he has not read, to authors he has only heard of, irritate him and make him
feel that perhaps he is the victim of an intellectual leg-pull. (Key 144—145)
Nevertheless, writes, Ian MacNiven, "the book is a 'Key to Lawrence Durrell', al¬
though not intended" (MacNiven, Biography 351). As such, it serves as an appropri¬
ate entry into Durrell's understanding of modernism, putting him in the context of
other early twentieth-century literature. Having done so, I will then compare Dur-
rell's understanding with those of critics writing later in the twentieth century who
enjoy the advantage of time and a privileged hindsight. Finally, I will consider the
opus as a response to this state of "modern" literature, ultimately recognizing it to be
a reaction against the modern novel, a bid to reanimate what Durrell thought to be a
genre grown woefully out of touch.
A Key to Durrell's Modern Poetics
Durrell begins his Key with an apology and an explanation: printed from his British
Council lectures, the book's primary purpose is to "supply a satisfactory key to the
complexities of contemporary practice in poetry" (Key ix). He warns his reader that
he may be "guilty of oversimplifying ideas," blaming the limitations of the lectures
for the shape of the essays (ix). If he begins his book with an apology, he readily
extends that apology on behalf of modern poetry itself, openly sympathizing that
"The unspoken question at the back of the common reader's mind today is always:
'Why doesn't the poet say what he means more clearly?"' (ix). The Key itself takes as
its premise the idea of modern poetry as some locked secret needing to be opened.
Nevertheless, the reader troubled by lists of books he has not read and authors he has
only heard of will not be assuaged; in the first chapter alone, Durrell's study ranges
from poetry to psychology, anthropology to quantum physics, biology to sociology,
and theology to archaeology. In his preface he drops the names of prominent literary
personalities alongside those of criticism and science, hardly distinguishing one from
another: Hardy, Eliot, Newbolt, de la Mare, Frazer, Jung, Rank, Groddeck, Freud,
Einstein,Whitehead, Eddington, and others (ix—xii). Such alienation is perhaps partly
designed, as Durrell explains his earlier understandings in a later address:
as I came to read them I realised just how stable their Victorian world
had been and how unstable mine had become [...] The new departures
in scientific thought had unsettled and indeed had even ruptured both
syntax and serial order. ("Elephant" 4)
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As Durrell's syntax and serial order is threatened by the instability of modern liv¬
ing, any distinction between poetry and science becomes increasingly arbitrary. In
presenting a key to modernist poetry, Durrell seems to hint at the possibility of the
reducibility of any poetry under such a banner; such is not his intention:
I have thought to present poetry as one dialect of [...] a universe perpet¬
ually shifting, changing its relations and tenses [...], altering its outlines
[...] By this means I hoped to trap those qualities which were inherent in
the poets of a given time. (Key xi)
These qualities are part of localized currents, themselves always already trapped within
greater flows of contradictions often averaged out to a single flow, simplified to be
understood: "if we [...] examine one or two of the heavier objects [...] we might
reach a few conclusions, however tentative. Of course to use the historical method
often leads one into over-simplifications" (8). These simplifications are necessary in
order to make sense ofstaggering shifts over time; only by subjecting ourselves to them
can we hope to "trace historic origins for the change [.. .and] find some sort of clue to
the exhausted subjectivity of the contemporary hero" (14).
He identifies modernism's crucial concerns as "new hypotheses concerning the self
or psyche, and the new theories about the make-up of the universe we are inhabit¬
ing" (xi).5 Among these concerns of the self are new considerations in psychology,
which bring with them added concerns about the mortal and observational limits of
subjectivity (4—6). The theories of the makeup of the universe that differentiate (Vic¬
torian and) modernist thinkers from their predecessors include increased awareness
of the true age of the Earth—dependent, in part, upon Victorian geological hypothe¬
ses by Lyell, anthropological contributions by Darwin, and archaeological discoveries
by Schliemann, Petrie, and Evans (14-16)—and Einstein's virtual implosion of the
Newtonian model of physics (23).6
These discoveries and advancements of the Victorian age meet up and suggest a
larger and interdisciplinary picture to the thinker of the modern era willing to consider
them. The discovery ofradioactivity in 1898, for example, leads scientists into the field
of philosophy, conjecturing on the concepts of time and causality before arriving at
the possibility that (in the words of Durrell) "the ultimate laws of nature were simply
not causal at all." From here, Einstein's theories of relativity are no small leap, but
the cross-disciplinary implications, Durrell argues, are as influential: "It is important
to realize that Einstein's theory joined up subject and object, in very much the same
'Marxism also gets a mention; though Durrell calls it "the ugly duckling among the philosophies,"
he nonetheless recognizes its importance in Victorian culture (18).
6While many of these cultural moments he cites are from the Victorian, and not modernist, age,
"Food," he writes, "takes time to reach the stomach," suggesting that writing after the 1890s represents
an act of delayed literary digestion (19).
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way as it joined up space and time." What is important, he maintains,"are not the
equations [...] but the symbolic act of joining what is separated" (25-26); these ideas
permeated everyday life and likely even shaped Einstein as much as they were shaped
by him. In literature, Durrell finds this new approach of time in Proust and Joyce,
who exhibit a "slow-motion camera at work":
Their books do not proceed along a straight line, but in a circular manner,
coiling and uncoiling [ Characters] hang above the time-track which
leads from birth to action, and from action to death: and, spreading out
time in this manner, contribute a significance to everything about them.
(31)
The Einsteinian joining of space and time manifests itself in literature by presenting
a newly-rich multi-dimensional permeability: just as a director might pan his movie
camera across a scene in two dimensions or move through the space to present al¬
ternative perspectives, so too might the modern author adopt the fourth dimension
as a potential medium through which to move for considering an object-event from
another angle.
Pysychology, too, presented new dimensions in which to consider the ego: "The
same forces which were inquiring into the structure of the universe were also busy
extending the domains of our understanding within the boundaries of the self" (50).
Like the archaeological and geological discoveries that suggested an incomprehensi¬
ble age of the earth, the mapping of consciousness introduced equally unfathomable
depths to the human mind. Furthermore, the introduction of the Unconscious carried
with it the consequence of alienation's inescapability, and Freud's The Interpretation of
Dreams suggested the inherence of linguistic play—all leading to new artistic styles in
modernist literature:
the literature ofour age is distinguished by two sorts ofcompression which
reflect both the changes in the idea of time [...] and also the change in
our attitude to the psyche. Thus you find not only the ideas of a poem
compressed but the sound-values as well, with the rhyme often coming
in the middle of the line instead of being set like a milestone at the end
[...]. Further compression still (as in James Joyce's last work) leads to the
pun—the word with more than one meaning [...]. (65)
Durrell finds a significant interdependence between literature and these new scientific
areas in modernist works. While it is certain that past ages have had similar overlaps
between science and literature, science during the Victorian age and after is profound
enough in its difference to merit special attention: "the last hundred years has been
one of the most momentous epochs in history. Between 1840 and 1900 lie sixty
years characterized by tremendous intellectual upheavals" (14). Nevertheless, he uses
the image of a pendulum which, once in motion, will always swing back, seeking new
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methods ofportrayal and rejecting the ones ofold once they are thoroughly "digested"
(65).
Other CriticalApproaches
Durrell's Key marks two particularly disruptive elements of modern culture: new un¬
derstandings of the self, and new conceptions of the world. Moreover, the interaction
between these realms is particularly different in modernist living, Durrell recognizes,
as Einstein's influence joins these two halves and effaces the distinction between self
and world—even as the complexity of each grows.
Other later critics expand this list; as Victorian discoveries were swallowed and
took time to travel the gullet of modernist literature, so too has other, newer work
nourished the culture of criticism. Alan Friedman writes in 1966 of the "conflu¬
ence ofpsychological, philosophical, scientific, social, economic, and political causes,
analogues, and explanations" responsible for many aspects ofmodernism (Friedman
qtd. in Stevenson, Modernist vii) 7 While Stevenson explains that the term modernism
was used deprecatorily early on, describing something betraying "the solider values of
tradition," it has taken a more positive turn by Woolf's "Modern Fiction" (1919) at
the latest, denoting things as varied as innovations in style, structure, and language
(2—4), or something as subtle as a notable "extent" of such change (5); it can even be
determined by a commitment to novelty, as Stevenson writes in 2004: "modernist
writing [...] is critically defined, as its name suggests, by its determination to make
literature itself a new experience: its appeal for later generations ofwriters principally
resulted from its offer of new styles, forms, and strategies" (Stevenson, Last? 73).8
Peter Childs also recognizes the sense ofdisruption ofwhich Durrell writes, identi¬
fying in modernism a departure from traditional styles and forms (Childs 2—3). Nev¬
ertheless, he problematizes the word, explaining that it is not one owing its provenance
to the arrival of a particular style in 1900s, but rather that it is one of which a form
has been used to describe a contemporary style since the late-sixteenth century (13),
and which has since been used to describe the traits of that one period of time. While
Durrell's meaning of "modern" in the title of Key to Modern Poetry belongs undoubt¬
edly to the former understanding, the contemporary style he speaks of in the 1940s
7While Friedman laments that his perspective lacks the necessary critical distance from which to
consider this confluence "properly" (Friedman qtd. in vii), in 1992 Randall Stevenson writes that "it
is no longer premature to examine modernist fiction in terms of the 'confluence' [Friedman] outlines"
(vii). Among the new understandings afforded by time, Stevenson lists the critical work ofMikhail
Bakhtin, Gerard Genette, Fredric Jameson, and Stephen Kern (vii).
8 See also Christopher Baldick's The Modern Movement: "the major development of literature dur¬
ing these three decades is presented—commonly to the exclusion of all else—as the triumph of the
revolution that we call modernism" (Baldick 3).
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is one identified primarily by key artists of the latter definition: Pound, Eliot, Joyce,
and Woolf. Even still, writes Childs, while a time-bound model of modernism would
fall within the years 1890—1930, "most literature written in the period was not Mod¬
ernist" (18). This sense of exclusivity of style (as not all artists within a particular
period of time can be considered modernist) leads us, then, to consider the sense of
style meant in the term.
Michael Levenson recognizes a stylistic concern in the very sense of disruption
highlighted by Durrell, Stevenson, and Childs. Modernist artists embodied a para¬
doxically simultaneous "mix of skepticism and ardor," he finds: "skepticism about
the destiny of the species, ardor for the latest innovation in a brush stroke or a rhyme
scheme" (Levenson 6). And Michael Bell finds the seeds of this skepticism in contem¬
poraneous science—the very science to which Durrell attributes the twinned disrup¬
tions ofself and universe—which "was losing some of its epistemological self-evidence
and privileged status," thus lending literature an accompanying questioning and epis¬
temological uncertainty (Bell 11). Bell identifies in this uncertainty a central tenet
of modernism very much aligned to Durrell's sense of "exhausted subjectivity" (Key
14): Bell's "central recognition" of modernism is its displacement of the subject to a
"relative status" (Bell 13).
In addition to this emphasis on relativism and epistemological instability, Bell
identifies a few other traits ofmodernism: the concerns ofhistory "in a double sense"—
that is, simultaneous concerns of historical context and historicity itself (14—15); an
emphasis on the nature of the artistic medium, in literature manifesting as an aware¬
ness of language (16);9 a disavowal of earlier idealism and advocacy of skeptical meta¬
physics (Bell 19); the interest in primitivism, resulting from new anthropological pur¬
suits (20); similarly, the interest, if mostly artistic, in colonial subjects, and their use
in writing as objects of psychological projection (23—25); and an espousal of "Sexual
liberation, and liberation through sexuality" (25). Childs, on the other hand, fa¬
vors the characteristics ofmodernism described in Norman Cantor's "Model ofMod¬
ernism": a favoring of "anti-historicism"; focus on the individual over the social; self-
referentiality; discord over harmony; the primacy of functionality; elitism; sympathy
to "feminism, homosexuality, androgyny and bisexuality"; the superiority of art over
ethics; and a general feeling of despair (Childs 18-19).
9Citing David Lodge, Childs writes of this awareness of language, identifying a rise in modernist
literature's use ofmetaphor in favor of the metonymy of realism in earlier literature. In the interbellum
wane of modernist literature's metaphor, he writes, "the late Modernists, such as Beckett, Lowry and
Lawrence Durrell, staged a recovery for metaphor before the down-to-earth postwar authors (such as
Philip Larkin, Kingsley Amis, John Wain) once more championed a realist style." Postmodernism, too,
favors this use ofmetaphor and language play "in its use of the fantasy mode, in its radical dismantling
of character and plot, and particularly in its experiments with language" (Childs 189). The recognition
of a modernist surgence of metaphor corresponds to Durrell's recognition of linguistic compression.
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Durrell's Key misses out on much of Bell's considerations: in 1947 it is likely he is
himselfvery much in the midst ofdigesting some ofmodernism's newer philosophical
implications and is perhaps unaware of the consequences and conclusions of them.
For example, while he devotes a large portion of the Keys introduction to the new sense
ofhistory such aworld is responsible for creating, he focuses more on history in a single
sense: namely, an enlarged historical context.10 Likewise, he does not recognize the
modernist predilection to use colonial figures as objects of psychological projection,
despite having used the same technique himself in his first novel, The Pied Piper of
Lovers (1935)—"pied piper" in the title referring to the protagonist's implied racial
and cultural duality as simultaneously Indian and English.11 Furthermore, though
the aspect is crucial to any reading of the The Alexandria Quartet, Durrell avoids the
sense of sexual liberation completely in the Key. Neither do Cantor's emendations fit
entirely into Durrell's model: as Durrell's history is singular, it cannot be anti-historic;
the primal changes Durrell notes in the modern era are decidedly social rather than
individual; and despair does not enter into his consideration of modernist literature
at all—except perhaps on the part of the reader (Key 144—145).
Childs' sense ofmodernism expressed in a style rather than a particular timeframe
finds purchase, too, in Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane, who agree that it
is difficult "to find a place or date for" modernism (Bradbury and McFarlane 30).
While there are many differing opinions on the meaning of modernism, Bradbury
and McFarlane argue that these opinions share a similar interpretation of "historical
evolution coupled with a notion of crisis and a notion of a point of culmination,"
or "Wendepunkt (turning point)" (36, 40). It is this lack of continuity—mirrored
equally in Harry Levin's unsettling "awareness of chronology" and sense of "feeling
belated and up-to-date simultaneously" (Levin 285, 287), Cantor's anti-historicism,
and Bradbury and McFarlane's Wendepunkt—that leads to an equation ofhistory with
mythology (Childs 19). Durrell's Key seems, in this regard, to be a modernist creation
itself: the key to the Key lies in Durrell's understanding of the modern period to be
"characterized by tremendous intellectual upheavals" and "one of the most momen¬
tous epochs in history" (Key 14). Durrell's perspective of his own historical context is
one that causes him to mythologize it so that it seems both greater and more disrup¬
tive; while he is more optimistic about the outcomes of such tremendous change, the
drive to newness Durrell expresses in the Key corresponds well to what David Trot¬
ter describes as "a feeling, more prevalent among writers than among critics, that the
IOThe results ofsuch a delayed digestion might explain the discrepancy between his 1938 epistolarily-
expressed dislike of Spengler's theories and the 1970 novelistically-dedicated endorsement of the same.
See the footnote on page 121 of Chapter 4.
"Joseph Boone also recognizes Egypt as a convenient screen for eroticized projection in Durrell's
writing (Boone 93—95).
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novel as traditionally conceived was no longer up to the job: that its imaginary worlds
did not, in fact, correspond to the way one's fellows spent their entire lives" (Trotter
70).
A New Logic
It is in light of this sense of newness that I place Durrell's opus; rather, it is in light
of Durrell's call to a new sense of newness that I hope to establish a field in which
his opus might find itself at home. For all of his theorizing on modern literature in
the 1940s, the subjects of the Key tend to be of the 1920s and 1930s. In 1937, in a
letter to Henry Miller, Durrell describes the plan of what he later calls his opus {agon,
pathos, anagnorisis), describing that the impact of such a collection—if he decides to
write them—would be revolutionary in the literary field: "Perhaps I shan'twrite them.
If I do and they are what they might be, well, as I say, one will be an answer to you
all" {Durrell-Miller 65). And in a letter to Eliot written in 1945, Durrell expressed an
opinion of himself that he was one of the top three poets in England, numbering only
among Auden and Eliot; the rest being merely "decorators of each others' bed-sitters"
("Letters to Eliot" 3 5 5—3 56). From these letters we can gather that Durrell's opinion
of any modernist sense of newness—by then even a tradition of newness expressed
by modernist writers in a shared, common vocabulary of Bergsonian and Freudian
application {Key 116-117, 50)—is that it is, in the words ofTrotter, "no longer up to
the job." While "modern" artists describe a world that imparts a sense of newness, the
overuse of particular methods of description dulls that message.
Durrell's opus is a project to reinvigorate the novel, to make it once more "up to
the job." It is for this reason that he begins to differentiate among his writing—serious
novels, other novels, poetry, travel books, essays—as created for different purposes.
To Miller he writes in 1937 of composing these serious novels "for full orchestra" once
every three years, proposing to spend the rest of the time with "literary gardening"
{Durrell-Miller 81). To Eliot he describes in 1945 the need to satisfy artistic muses
as well as worldly ones: "I must write for practice for fun for money and for my girl
friends—no?" ("Letters to Eliot" 354). And in 1955, to Miller again, he describes
the opus as "3 real novels" {Durrell-Miller 278). This sense of the combined agon,
pathos, and anagnorisis (and, later, sparagmos (Pine 34)) as significant works among
other, less-serious writing bespeaks Durrell's desire for the opus to achieve something
more significant, to revolutionize the scene of the twentieth-century novel—a desire
he puts to words more explicitly in an address he gives in Pennsylvania in 1986: "What
I had vaguely in mind was [...] that I might by luck manage to refurbish a little bit
the English novel, which it seemed to me was showing signs of terrible wear and tear
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because of its epistemological backwardness" ("Overture" 18). As such, the opus is
both a "challenge" and "a toehold to young poets and young thinkers" as well as "a
provocation to people who are not growing fast enough" (19).
It is perhaps for this reason that Theodore Steinberg argues that the use ofEinstein
to structure TheAlexandria Quartet marks a disruption from Durrell's modernist fore¬
bears and an entry into the postmodern (Steinberg, "Postmodern Epic" 65): though
Durrell numbers Einstein's influence as crucial to understanding modern literature,
his Quartet explicitly seeks to redress the imbalance of Bergsonian (in favor of Ein-
steinian) representations of time.12 Likewise, John Unterecker's commentary in 1975
on Durrell and the state of the contemporary novel ("terms that until the mid-twenties
of this century were enormously valuable [...] no longer seem even faintly applicable"
(Unterecker 168)) emphasizes the very difference marked in Durrell's writing from
that of earlier modernist writers. For this reason, too, Reed Way Dasenbrock iden¬
tifies the difference between the Revolt and works styled in the modernist tradition,
finding in Durrell "a revolt against those modes and a searching critique of them"
(Dasenbrock, "Modes" 516).
For our purposes, we might recall Lawrence Lucifer's attempt to write a novel, "a
short precis," to explain his new concept of the novel—"the new myth which I am
undoubtedly on the point of creating"—an attempt which, as The Black Book, marks
merely the beginning, "the new vocabulary which I am learning with ease":
I am beginning my agony in the garden and there are too many words,
and too many things to put into words. In the fantastic proscenium of the
ego, when I begin my soliloquy, I shall not choose as Gregory chose. To
be or not to be. [...] The question has been decided. Art must no longer
exist to depict man, but to invoke God. It is on the face of this chaos that
I brood. (Black Book 242—243)
This vocabularywhich Lawrence Lucifer begins learning in The Black Book is ofthe lan¬
guage in which Darley speaks at the end of the Quartet-, here, Durrell's agony develops
into a pathos fashioned much in the style of Pursewarden's plans to reinvigorate the
genre with the introduction of an "n-dimensional novel" comprised of a "marriage of
past and present with the flying multiplicity of the future" (Quartet 198). Balthazar's
suggestion of form for Darley's manuscript as "sliding panels" or a palimpsest, depicts
the kind of reality in which truths "are thrown down one upon the other, the one
obliterating or perhaps supplementing another," the consideration raising for Darley
"the harder-grained question of form" (338). This intertwining and interpenetration
of form in the pathos makes way further to the Revolt, Durrell's sparagmos in which
Charlock writes subsequent books simultaneously—"While I am writing one book
12Anne Zahlan, on the other hand recognizes Durrell's use of Einstein as a modernist convention.
See the discussion on Zahlan's placement of Durrell starting on page 160.
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[...] I write another about it, then a third about it, and so on"—a style that he sug¬
gests might offer a sense of renewal: "A new logic might emerge from it, who knows?"
(Nunquam 16).
Finally, entering into Durrell's anagnorisis, the "sliding panels" of the Quartet slide
back to reveal truth:
the dire and absolute procedure which enabled him to effect a break¬
through into the other register of consciousness [...] glimpsing the very
"itness" of things, ofall nature, ifyou wish! [... ] This kind ofreality had no
Therefore in it. [...] All Sesame slid back—it was a simply mental knack
to slide the panel back upon the mirror of truth! (Quintet 1227—1228)
In the Quintet, the capability to reveal this other register is reserved for artists—often
confused with autists (1092)—who, alone, can understand the "several dialects" of
reality (1263). Finally, in Durrell's anagnorisis, we can recognize the futility of trying
to depict reality as it is lived: '"Ordinary life'—is there such a thing? Yes, the observer
fouls up everything by trying to [...] reproduce the limitations of his understanding"
(1260). While Sutcliffe wants to "really control things. I mean Reality or YTILAER,"
such a desire is incompatible with what he recognizes to be the supreme distance
between perception and that very reality he wants to control: "we have never been
interested in the real world—we see it through a cloud of disbelief. Ni eht gninnigeb
saw eht drow!" (1094).13
With his opus, Durrell separates himself from the modernist tradition and texts
that, as Brian McHale writes, reassure the reader in "what is (Actively) real and what
fantastic" (McFIale, Constructing 65). Julius Rowan Raper recognizes this separation
specifically in Balthazar, arguing that Durrell's writing in Justine and earlier shares el¬
ements with that of Fowles, Nabokov, Barth, and other late-modernist writers who
"depend heavily on verisimilitude [.. .and] avoid fantasy materials" (Raper, "Durrell's
Justine" 94). While these late-modernist texts often dealt with protagonists searching
for patterns or order or, ultimately, meaning, Raper sees a shift towards imagination
in Durrell (Raper, "Breaking" 70—73), thus evading what McHale recognizes to be
the modernist predilection for reassurance. Robin Visel and Yorgos Papatheodorou,
on the other hand, find Durrell's use of the "modernist technique of multiple nar¬
rative perspectives" to be well suited to the destabilizing democracy of polyglot life
in postcolonial Alexandria—and thus characteristic ofmodernist literature (Visel and
Papatheodorou 95).
13This logocentrism is manifest in the Quintet's metafictive play, for example in the way Durrell
describes the noise made by a character as similar to the description one might use to describe the
noise made by a character: "He made the noise which is represented in French novels phonetically as
'Pouagh!"' (1096).
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Nevertheless, the narrativistic destabilization found in the Quartet denies reassur¬
ance, constructing instead a network of "ontological doubt." This ontological un¬
certainty is a key trait of the texts McHale calls "an anticipation of postmodernism"
(McHale, Constructing 65). If the modernist tradition is to be recognized by texts
that reassure the reader of the divisions between reality and fantasy, the postmod¬
ernist one deliberately muddies such divisions using a variety of techniques; readers of
postmodernism in Durrell's works recognize varying levels of these techniques. The
next section of the chapter will explore considerations of Durrell's opus in light of an
understanding of postmodernism.
11 Aggregation - Postmodernism?
While Reed Way Dasenbrock notes the leanings Durrell shares with other cultur¬
ally centrifugal figures (Dasenbrock, "Centrifugality" 202), and while Ian MacNiven
has no trouble in producing a list of adjectives derived from the names of promi¬
nent modernist authors against which to compare Durrell (MacNiven, "Quincunx"
234—23 5),14 Earl G. Ingersoll berates a "general insistence on reading [Durrell's Quar-
tet\ as modernist fiction" (Ingersoll, "Postmodernism" 334). In fact, since the mid-
1980s, most of the critical readers of Durrell's works have been keen to recognize its
postmodern elements; Dianne Vipond, for example, sees in the Quartet a "true post¬
modernist form" and a response to the epistemological backwardness Durrell writes of
in his "Overture" (Vipond 55), and Anne Zahlan notes the "postmodernist territory
of TheAvignon Quintet" (Zahlan, "Crossing" 85). Still, many of these readings depend
less on specific postmodernist aspects of Durrell's works and more on an inability to
read modernist ones into them. In this section, I will first consider postmodernism
as it relates to modernism before looking closely at some of these postmodernist read¬
ings. Finding these readings inconclusive, I will show that a satisfactory reading of
Durrell's postmodernism is elusive, arguing in the end that Durrell's opus cannot be
considered reliably postmodern.
Postmodernist Readings
While willing to acknowledge the novelty in the Quartet's, undertaking, Dasenbrock
is also quite willing to place it "comfortably within modes of modernist fiction writ¬
ing already assimilated by mainstream taste." Nevertheless, he is one of the earliest to
14Compare Dasenbrock's list of names—among them, James, Conrad, Joyce, Pound, Eliot, and
Beckett (Dasenbrock, "Centrifugality" 202)—to MacNiven's string of derived adjectives: Proustian-
Bergsonian, Joycean, Conradian, Lawrencean (MacNiven, "Quincunx" 234—235).
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suggest a postmodern understanding of Durrell's Revolt, writing that it "represents a
revolt against those modes and a searching critique of them" (Dasenbrock, "Modes"
516). Unlike Zahlan, who later finds development in the Quartet to be leading to¬
wards a disavowal of authority (Zahlan, "Crossing" 91), Dasenbrock recognizes in
that author-narrator's growth an earning of artistic integrity and novelistic command
(Dasenbrock, "Modes" 516—517). This novelistic command—which Darley has only
begun to recognize by the end of the Quartet—provides "order for the chaos ofmodern
society." Durrell's novel, while modeled after a common nineteenth-century genre,
modernizes the Kunstlerroman by providing a complex structure, thereby "fitting into
a clear modernist tradition" (517—518). In doing so, he highlights the primacy of art
in modernism.
More importantly, Durrell orders this chaos through memory rather than imagi¬
nation: "Memory—not imagination—is crucial in modernism" (518).15 Dasenbrock
itemizes the primacy of art and memory as principal themes of modernist literature
"through structure, by forming the ordinary," adding to them "life's (and art's) escape
from other social forms of control [...] through sex, by breaking with that ordinary"
(Dasenbrock, "Modes" 519—521). These are the modes ofmodernism against which,
Dasenbrock argues, Aphrodite Revolts-, where the Quartet places the Freudian psy¬
chological tradition in a place of importance, the Revolt "presents psychoanalysis as a
bogus church"; where the Quartet chronicles Darley's search for understanding, the
Revolt offers "titillation in place of enlightenment"; where the exploration of sex in the
(Quartet transcends and liberates, the firm in the Revolt promises, crucially, "control
in place of liberation" (522).
Dasenbrock recognizes in the Revolt a growing discomfort with modern society, a
capitalistic super-structure that increasingly reifies and evaluates people and art, trap¬
ping all in a veil of inauthenticity: "in the vision of The Revolt ofAphrodite, we are
losing our freedom precisely because we are being controlled and manipulated by im¬
itations and mechanical reproductions" (524).16 The surreal version of reality in the
Revolt is such that it is one full ofpublishers but no writers, the merchandising, pack¬
aging, and distribution of a product, but no depiction of its creation (except for that
of Robo-Iolanthe, who, in an odd twist, is no merchandise). Dasenbrock correctly
identifies that "art is a commodity bought and sold in the world and controlled by
15Contrast this distinction with Raper's recognition of postmodernist techniques in Balthazars fa¬
voring of imagination: "Darley has transcended the literature of the memory and entered the kingdom
of the imagination reclaimed by Durrell [...] and the postmodern movement" (Raper, "Breaking" 76).
lSThis vision is not unlike Jameson's view ofpostmodernism being an artifact born of late-capitalistic
society (Jameson, Postmodernism ix), a consciousness of Jameson's titular late capitalism, synonymous
with "multinational capitalism," "spectacle or image society," "media capitalism," and "the world sys¬
tem" (xviii).
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marketing specialists" (Dasenbrock, "Modes" 525). The sex that would have, in the
The Alexandria Quartet, signaled transcendence and liberation is here cold and corn-
modified, an obsession for Julian who cannot have it, amockingly convenient ware for
Iolanthe who cannot get rid of it, and an act of violence for Benedicta who delights in
it—and yet is hurt by it. Dasenbrock argues that the Revolt refuses to conform to the
limiting roles ofmodernism that the Quartet reinforces. As such, the Revolt represents
Durrell's foray into the postmodern.
Confusingly, Dasenbrock's identification of the Quartet's solidly modernist tech¬
niques is the same Vipond makes of its postmodernist ones: Vipond identifies the
Quartet as "the earliest postmodern work of fiction where the subject is art" (Vipond
55), leading to her assertion that the Kiinstlerroman is a postmodern trend (56).17
Vipond claims Linda Hutcheon's NarcissisticNarrative to be her theoretical impulse for
approaching "postmodernism," a marked change from earlier criticism which seems
often to talk of postmodernism as if the word's meaning were personal rather than
general; nevertheless, her definition of the term is strikingly broad as "both a literary
period in history [...and] a theoretical model that posits certain literary traits" (54).
Her list of these postmodernist literary traits is impressive in its scope, if inconclusive:
metafiction with its emphasis on the imaginative process of storytelling
[...]; often a baroque or neo-baroque style with accompanying linguis¬
tic artifice and self-consciousness; a recognition of the collaborative role
of the reader [...]; a privileging of form [...]; tolerance of paradox and
ambiguity; an awareness of the ideological underpinnings of rhetorical
"truth"; use of irony, parody, and intertextuality as defamiliarization tech¬
niques; attention to destabilized reality; a dynamic subject/object relation¬
ship; and a sensitivity to context/history. (54-55)
While Vipond may assert that the "debate over the existence of postmodernism has
died down since it has become an institutionalized critical term," her own treatment
of the word, unwilling to instutitionalize a meaning for it, betrays the very viability
of its problematic past. Nevertheless, she ultimately identifies postmodernism to be a
logical extension ofmodernism, rather than a violent break from or rebellion against
h (55)-
Vipond connects Durrell's Einsteinian affiliation with the modernists, despite the
natural paradoxes inherent in the relativity proposition's destabilizations (57). At the
same time, the Heisenberg Principle of Indeterminacy "is common to a postmodernist
I7While she mentions "Many modern novelists, e. g., Joyce, Woolf, Faulkner" (57), Vipond over¬
looks the primacy and influence of famous Kunstlerromane written by some of these same modernists.
An argument could be made for the propensity of certain postmodern elements in the Kiinstlerroman
lacking in other forms of the Bildungsroman, but Vipond does not make this distinction. To note,
the making of the artist in the Kiinstlerroman calls into question the nature of the work of art itself,
introducing ontological instability especially where the work under question is a book presented with
suggestions of mise en abyme.
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perspective" (58). And while the form and content ofJustine "firmly aligns the Quartet
with the metafictional mode of postmodernism" (57), the opposition implied by the
other three novels to Mountolive is "fundamental," the tension between Mountolive
and the other three mirroring "the dynamic evolution of the novel as a literary genre
in the twentieth century" (60). In the end, it would seem that the "missing link"
to postmodernism is neither the Kiinstlerroman nor the narcissistic narrative, but the
ever-elusive definition of this "institutionalized critical term."
Challenging other critics' use of the word "postmodern" as theoretically devoid
ofmeaning, Theodore Steinberg takes it upon himself to define "postmodernism" as
"works that in some way demonstrate either an awareness of or at least the effects of
[Einstein's] discoveries about time and space" (Steinberg, "Postmodern Epic" 65).18
Steinberg bases this distinction on Durrell's own fascination with the implications of
Einstein's physics, noting that
The Quartet may indeed share a number of characteristics with Cubist
painting, but it is doubtful that the Cubists understood as much about
Einsteinian time and space as Durrell did. The Cubists may embody that
scientific revolution, but again, what makes Durrell's work epic is that he
both embodies and consciously explores the implications of that revolu¬
tion, of that critical moment in human history. (65)
This differentiation—the revolutionary aesthetics ofCubism embodying the same spirit
of the revolutionary science ofEinstein, while the revolutionary aesthetics of Durrell's
literary style embodying but also studying and evaluating the implications thereof—he
makes is far from a light-hearted one, as this "critical moment in human history" in
part defines Steinberg's project of the epic.19 While many of the varyingly "postmod¬
ern" epics he touches upon in his paper take into consideration the moment and effect
ofWorld War II, he identifies the "critical" theme of the twentieth century (and, by
association, the calling card of a postmodern work) to be, nevertheless, the reverber¬
ations of Einstein's theories and how they affect "the way that artists and thinkers
approach the concept of reality" (Steinberg, "Postmodern Epic" 65).
Steinberg's recognition of the new approach to reality echoes Durrell's question¬
ing of reality in the Quintet ("how real is reality, and if so why so?" (Quintet 1266)),
just as his identification of a new extent of Einsteinian understanding is significant
l8In light ofhis admonition ofusing "postmodernism" as "one of those Humpty-Dumpty terms that
mean whatever the user wants them to mean," Steinberg's explanation ofhis own use—"I use it to mean
something quite specific"—is odd (65); nevertheless, the distinction he chooses in his understanding
of postmodernism is at least helpfully direct.
19"The epic is a narrative that focuses simultaneously on the lives of its characters and on a pivotal
moment in the history of a community, whether that community be a nation or a people or the whole
ofhumanity. [...] The narrative deals with both the pivotal moment and with the individual characters
as they live through that moment. Because the action of the epic is so crucial to a whole civilization, it
is often viewed as having cosmic significance" (Steinberg, Epic Novels 29).
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to Durrell's project. Similarly, Vipond's acknowledgment of the Quartet's metafic-
tive elements and Dasenbrock's consideration of the Revolt's imaginative ones are ap¬
proaches few could argue with. The question of the term postmodern, on the other
hand, is slightly problematic in each approach: Dasenbrock differentiating between
modernism and postmodernism as memory and imagination; Vipond by the liberality
of use of metafictive techniques (and further recognizing an epochal distinction be¬
tween Einsteinian and Heisenbergian physics); and Steinberg by the lack or presence
of the element of Einstein. Moreover, the prismatic nature of these three approaches
is found elsewhere: Alan Friedman cites Eagleton's postmodernist dearth of depth,
style, history, and political content (Friedman, Fictional Death 262); Raper associates
Balthazar with a postmodernist deconstruction (Raper, "Breaking" 79); Marguerite
Alexander shares McHale's sense of ontological instability in her reading of postmod¬
ernist elements of the Quartet (Alexander 81); and Donald Kaczvinsky writes of the
Revolt's postmodernist awareness of the dissonance "between personal freedom and
economic security" (Kaczvinsky, "Postmodern Society" 72). To approach these and
other possible postmodernist readings ofDurrell, it is necessary also to recognize—and
reassemble, in all its Humpty-Dumpty impossibility—the term itself.
Reading Postmodernisms
In i960, Hary Levin delivered his lecture "What was Modernism?"—among the first
of a system ofquestion marks bothering "the critics." Here, the questioning of the title
assumes the end ofmodernism and the beginning ofsomething else: "Today we live in
what has been categorized [...] as the Post-Modern Period" (Levin 277). The modern
and the postmodern Levin differentiated by recognition of the former's debt to "Hu¬
manism and the Enlightenment" versus the latter's "anti-intellectual undercurrent"
(271), marking modernism as an indicator of qualitative, rather than merely temporal-
historical, positioning (276). Nevertheless, Levin reserves less flattering characteristics
for postmodernism. Postmodernism is "reproduction, not production" and postmod-
erns are "consumers rather than producers [...] readers of reprints and connoisseurs
of high fidelity [...] gourmets by virtue of the expense account" (279). He attributes
postmodernism's perceived lack of authenticity to intense insecurity, citing a list of
desires camouflaged as cliches: the postmodernist wants "to take a chance on a sure
thing [...] to call the long shot while hogging the inside track, to take credit for origi¬
nality without risking unpopularity" (281). Modernism's recognition ofand emphasis
on the limits of the artistic medium (as recognized by Bell) and its self-referentiality
(as recognized by Cantor) give way to a postmodernism in which art is criticism. Of
contemporary novels, Levin writes, "It is significant that Lawrence Durrell's tetralogy,
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one of the very few ambitious novels to appear in Britain latterly, takes place in the
self-consciously decadent city of Alexandria" (279). Ifmodernism is "the product of
cities," that which is "so impelled to recreate the image of cities," it is not surprising
that the postmodern work takes as its image the postmodern city—not that mod¬
ernist "metropolis in all its frustrations and incongruities" (291), but a postmodern
agglomeration of images, Fredric Jameson's "alienated city" that is "above all a space
in which people are unable to map (in their minds) either their own positions or the
urban totality in which they find themselves," a place denying the "construction or re¬
construction of an articulated ensemble" whose constituent parts meaningfully align
(Jameson, Postmodernism 51).
As Durrell recognizes a built-in delay for the ideology of an era to effect change
in its literature, Levin, too, recognizes an ebb and flow of change, an ebb whose
cycle he calculates to be 30 years (Levin 281). Thus, as "Broader movements, suc¬
ceeding one another, are comparable in their periodicity," Levin identifies the com¬
plete cycle ofRomanticism as spanning 1800—1830, followed by "Positivism, Realism,
and Naturalism" from 1830—1860, "Symbolism, Estheticism, and Decadence" from
1860—1890, "The Irish Renaissance" from 1892—1922 and, finally, modernism from
the 1920s—1950s (282). Needless to say, while these dates are subject to much con¬
tention, the notion behind them is not. In the 20th century, modernism is commonly
considered to be withering in the 1930s, meeting its death in the horrors ofWoridWar
II: Stevenson writes of a common agreement of "a decisive transition between mod¬
ernist interests and postmodernist writing"—a transition whose maturation depends
upon the end ofWorld War II (Stevenson, LastI 79).
Still, the dates of postmodernism are as problematic to place as those of mod¬
ernism. The very urge to date it might itself be considered postmodernist: much
like modernism's fascination with the idea of Wendepunkt, Jameson writes that "the
postmodern looks for breaks, for events rather than new worlds, for the telltale in¬
stant after which it is no longer the same; for the 'When-it-all-changed'" (Jameson,
Postmodernism ix). Nevertheless, he writes, while "The moderns were interested in
what was likely to come of such changes [...Postmodernism] only clocks the varia¬
tions themselves" (ix). As such, "modernist history is the first casualty and mysterious
absence of the postmodernism period" (xi). Rather than history, all postmoderns can
represent are ideas and "stereotypes about that past" which remains "forever out of
reach" (25).
Disagreeing with Jameson's notion of history as the "first casualty" of postmod¬
ernism, Linda Hutcheon recognizes postmodern literature by historiographic metafic-
tion, "those well-known and popular novels which are both intensely self-reflexive and
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yet paradoxically also lay claim to historical events and personages" (Hutcheon, Poet¬
ics ix, 5). Hutcheon's historiographic metafiction is notable for its awareness of both
history and fiction "as human constructs" (5), an awareness that empowers that litera¬
ture to challenge "the invasive culture industry [.. .and its] commodification processes
from within" (20). Historiographic metafiction, like most metafiction, assumes irony
as its main principle, both within fiction and beyond its borders (39), thereby also
effacing any certainty ofmeaning (55). As such, she argues, it
suggests that truth and falsity may indeed not be the right terms in which
to discuss fiction [...]. Postmodern novels [...] openly assert that there are
only truths in the plural, and never one Truth; and there is rarely falseness
per se, just others' truths. Fiction and history are narratives distinguished
by their frames [...] which historiographic metafiction first establishes and
then crosses, positing both the generic contracts of fiction and of history.
(109-110)
Hutcheon claims that the growth of historiographic metafiction is a result ofour cod¬
ified difficulty in "unproblematically" knowing reality (and, equally, unproblemati-
cally knowing that we know it), always qualifying how it is we know something: the
question is always "To which prior textualizations must we refer?" (119). Historio¬
graphic metafiction's inclusion and simultaneous subversion of history is a symptom
of the constant qualification of discourse-awareness. Hutcheon argues that this aware¬
ness actually empowers the text to make obvious the necessary limitations of textual¬
izations of history—the only access to history available.20
Hutcheon's challenge ofJameson and other theorists ofpostmodernism who argue
that postmodern works are "dehistoricized" highlights the effort of postmodern art to
"contest the 'simulacrization' process ofmass culture [.. .by] suggesting the potentially
reductive quality" of such claims: "We are not witnessing a degeneration into the hy-
perreal without origin or reality, but a questioning of what 'real' can mean and how
we can know it" (Hutcheon, Poetics 223—224). These very issues are at the heart of
Brian McHale's construction ofpostmodernism, which is that "postmodernist fiction
differs from modernist fiction just as a poetics dominated by ontological issues differs
from one dominated by epistemological issues" (McHale, Postmodernist xii); in fact,
McHale's consideration depends upon an understanding of constructivism and the
belief that "all our cognitive operations [...] are theory-dependent" (McHale, Con¬
structing 2). The anxiety Hutcheon perceives in a postmodern approach to reality is
one that, in this same sense, constructs the reality (and the history) that it explores.
While McHale suggests that "the dominant of modernist fiction is epistemological"
20Earl Ingersoll, writing of mise en abyme in TheAvignon Quintet, describes the situation of reversal
between the text and the world: "the textual is the real and the real may be only textual" (Ingersoll,
"Mise-en-Abyme" 119).
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and "the dominant of postmodernist fiction is ontological" (McHale, Postmodernist 9,
10), he also writes of constructions of postmodernism that "all of them are finally
fictions" (4).
Reading Durrell, Durrellian Readings
This uncertainty suggests the problems inherent in reassembling Steinberg's Humpty-
Dumpty with any final assurance of having done the job properly: it would be only
too easy to overlook a missing piece in lighr of the larger goal of recognizing a sense
ofwhat will be called postmodernism.2I While it might be tempting to read The Revolt
ofAphrodite as a postmodern problematization of the boundaries of reality and fic¬
tion, such a reading would ignore the "Postface" at the end of Nunquam, explaining
the Revolt as a work in which Durrell "tried to play about with the notion of cul¬
ture—what is it?" (Nunquam 285). Dasenbrock's reading of the Revolt as offering
control in the place of liberation and titillation in place of enlightenment indicates
the limitations of such an understanding of reality, a postmodern reality that encloses
and binds individuals. In Donald Kaczvinsky's reading, Charlock's burning of the
archive at the end of the Revolt suggests that "'modern' values would be resurrected
from the ashes of the doomed postmodern world" (Kaczvinsky, "Postmodern Society"
73), offering—much like the gipsy caves in the Quintet—a new means of accessing
a previously hidden cache of culture. This reading can also offer an understanding
of Durrell's anxiety of culture as an emphasis on modernist values, proposing—in
Durrell's opus—an antithesis to the postmodern revaluation of reality in the modern
consideration of culture.22
Likewise, despite Sutcliffe's excitement of the authorial ability to control Reality or
"YTILAER," in truth he believes that reality is clouded by "ERUTLUC"—culture—
the cloud through which we see the world and which also clouds any interest in that
world (Quintet 1093, 1094). In the Quintet, a sense of culture is especially important
after the war, giving rise to Lord Galen's position ("the Coordinator of Coordinated
Cultures!") from which he worries, "Our culture! What is it? I wish someone could
2IThe problems raised in these three essays are not universal to all analyses of Durrell's potential
postmodernism, but they do embody some of the common problems of dealing with the terms. To
be fair, other approaches deal with these problems more subtly and to greater satisfaction. (See, espe¬
cially, Kaczvinsky's "Bringing Him to the Lure," Zahlan's "Crossing the Border," Pinkney's "Seizing
the Image," and Herbrechter's "Lawrence Durrell and the Canon," addressed later in this chapter).
"In his Key, Durrell defines culture as a collection ofmethods used to interpret reality: "I take this
word to mean the sum, at any given time, ofall the efforts man is making to interpret the universe about
him" {Key 1). In defining it as such, Durrell places his emphasis on the human element of reactions to
such a beast—not reality, per se, but art.
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tell me" (1095—1097).23 The ending of the work may invoke "reality prime," but it
does so at the moment when the discovery of the Templar's treasure just might offer
extreme cultural enrichment. Recognition of culture is fundamental in the Quar¬
tet and The Black Book, too, there respectively represented in major themes of those
books: imperial shifts of the mid-twentieth century and a deprecation of the status
quo "English death" (Black Book 9).
The mania for righting cultural imbalances found throughout Durrell's opus—
coupled with his plan for the work to renew the "culture" of fiction—presents a chal¬
lenge to Levin's understanding of postmodernism as comprised of reproduction (and
not production) and consumers (and not producers). Vipond's recognition of the
central concerns of art, its production, and the artist in Durrell's works reflects a
faithfulness to production and to the producer just as it reflects a commitment to
authentic cultural artifacts. Furthermore, Steinberg's identification of Durrell's un¬
derstanding of Einstein as one that afforded him a more certain understanding of
the world suggests the ontological stability—the very possibility of a world able to
be known—McHale limits to modernist texts (McHale, Constructing 64—6 5). In this
sense, Steinberg's project of the postmodern epic, the text written of a "pivotal mo¬
ment" in culture, already implies a predisposition toward ontological stability, the
only position from which culturally pivotal moments might be recognized—thus sug¬
gesting for a reading of the works as not postmodernist.
We can certainly find the kind ofeconomic postmodernism written ofby Jameson
throughout Durrell's opus, but we run into trouble when considering other under¬
standings. For example, despite the nature of the texts to subvert it by reinvigorating
dead characters and ascribing certain characteristics to historical figures, the history
of Durrell's opus is all-too real. Reading Hutcheon's historiographic metafiction in
Durrell presents a limited field for understanding history as mere construction, but
Durrel's texts depend upon a particular shared historical context. The tendency of
(earlier) Durrellian criticism is to mark his work's rupture with modernist techniques,
finding in that distinction an illogically natural argument for the texts' postmoder-
nity. The flawed argument is an ignorantio elenchi masquerading as an ad absurdum
argument: proving the texts to be not modernist does not also prove the texts to be
postmodernist. Childs' tendency to reserve the mantle of "modernist" for a selection
of those writing between 1890 and 1930 rather than calling all writers of the early
twentieth century modernist (Childs 18) holds equally true in an understanding of
13As Durrell hopes to refurbish, challenge, and provoke to offer a new future for the English novel
("Overture" 18), Galen's position is especially important as one of his duties is to plot "the whole
future of the European book" (Quintet 1095). Finding a lack of merit in the past and present states
of the European book, he laments, "This is what our civilisation has come to..." (1096), intoning, via
Spengler, the inevitability of a rise and fall of cultures.
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"postmodernist." Though the term is problematic to define, the currents are harder
to recognize. In the next section, I will consider Durrell's works as belonging to this
current, a universe perpetually shifting.
hi Liminality - Betwixt and Between?
Thefirst impulse ofevery critic ofpostmodernism is still to relate it to the semanteme it contains:
namely, modernism. This often leads to intellectual miseries, and sometimes to critical conceits.
The degree to which modernism and postmodernism seem continuous or discontinuous, and
indeed both at the same time, will always depend on historical presuppositions; probably, that
degree will remain perpetually moot. (Hassan, "Prospects in Retrospect" 214)
As Ihab Hassan notes above, it is nearly impossible to consider postmodernism with¬
out also addressing concomitant issues of modernism: where does one begin and the
other end? in what manner are the two related (or opposed)? William James' under¬
standing of pluralistic empiricism describes a field of perpetual mutual influence, in
which everything relates to everything else and in which each "will inevitably meet
with friction and opposition from its neighbors" (James, Pluralistic 90). Many of the
problems of (especially early) postmodernist readings of Durrell's work is that they
too often ignore this friction, relying on what Hassan calls "critical conceits" in place
of a recognition of perpetual shifting.
McHale addresses some of the problems inherent in such considerations; though
his Postmodernist Fiction is "essentially a one-idea book" (McHale, Postmodernist xii), in
it, McHale repeatedly questions the term—"Postmodernist?"-—before conceding that
"Nobody likes the term, yet people continue to prefer it over the even less satisfactory
alternatives" (3—4). The trouble comes, as he explains more adamantly in Constructing
Postmodernism, when critics forget that there really is no postmodernism "out there"
(McHale, Constructing 205).14 Rather, he reminds us that
period terms such as these [...] are after all only constructs, convenient
literary-historical counters, figments generated by the discourses of crit¬
ics, literary historians, reviewers, publishers, professors, and (sometimes)
writers themselves. Ifwe reify such categories, turning them into pseudo-
objects with sharp outlines and unambiguous identities, we will inevitably
get "amphibious" texts [...] wrong; but worse than that, we will delude
ourselves about the epistemological and ontological status ofall our literary-
historical discursive constructs, and in that sense will get all our "mod¬
ernist" and "postmodernist" texts wrong. (164)
24McHale is quite clear in this regard: "the thing to which the term claims to refer, does not exist"
(McHale, Postmodernist 4); "No doubt there 'is' no such 'thing' as postmodernism" (McHale, Con¬
structing 1); "there is no such 'thing' as postmodernism" (205).
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l oo often critics overlook the constructed nature of these terms in eagerness to figure
out "what to call the books." Durrell's image of the pendulum swinging (Key 65) is
perhaps more accurate when considering something as abstract as periodization: to
rely too heavily on fixed terms introduces the notions of exteriority, externality, and
separation, negating any overlap in constructions. Allowing the two to meet provides
a rich ground for sharing connection—and allows one to consider the factors of any
transition between the two. This section will address the connection inherent in a
shift between modernism and postmodernism, revisiting a sense of the liminal as read
in Turner and James before finally reading in the instability of Durrell's works an
inhabiting of that transition.
Borderline Receptions
Anne Zahlan uses Brian McHale's theories of dominants in modernist and postmod¬
ernist fictions to identify a different separation in Durrell's writing, finding in Clea the
transition which would follow in the postmodern qualities of The Revolt ofAphrodite.
While TheAlexandria Quartet "as a whole qualifies as modernist according to McHale's
chief criterion [...] Durrell appears [later] to have turned away from the Quartet's
epistemological investigations of perception and impression to undertake ontologi-
cal exploration" (Zahlan, "Crossing" 88). In The Avignon Quintet, Zahlan recognizes
McHale's ontological dominant of postmodernist literature, literature engaged in ask¬
ing the question "Which world is this? What is to be done in it? Which ofmy selves
is to do it?" (Higgins qtd. in McHale 10 and Zahlan 88).
Zahlan identifies the Quartet's preoccupation with Einsteinian science—and the
concomitant concerns with knowledge and understanding—as a touchstone of that
work's inherent modernism (89). The Quintet, on the other hand, is "a work that
moves towards the unpredictable" and is a text in which "no authority exercises con¬
trol." Where modernist texts consider the authority of understanding as something
transcendental to the textual world, Zahlan (and McHale) argue that postmodernist
texts pull any authority into the text itself, thereby undermining it in "deliberate viola¬
tion^] of textual boundaries" (91).25 Where the Quartet delighted in "the intricacies
of psychic process," the Quintet problematizes the verity of the ego: "What always
bothered me was the question of a stable ego—did such a thing exist? The old no¬
tion of such an animal was rather primitive, particularly for novelists with an itch to
25While Marcel Cornis-Pope agrees that "postmodern narrative practices [...] reconsider the rapport
between margin and center, dominant and secondary structures" (Cornis-Pope z8), I would argue that
in the context of Durrell's oeuvre this denial of authorial authenticity is not postmodern but is itself
unstable and shifting.
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explain this action or that" (Livia 37 qtd. in Zahlan, "Crossing" 91—92).26
Finally, Zahlan recognizes Clea to be "a fiction of and on the border." Clea "nego¬
tiates transitions in time and in space" and foregrounds numerous transformations.
As Zahlan writes,
Friendship changes into love; love becomes hatred and then again love.
Power and freedom are lost and then regained; war possesses and then re¬
leases the city. Journeys are made from island to continent, from Europe
to Africa, and back again. The novel is poised also at a border-crossing
of the artist's life: By its close, Clea has been transformed as a painter;
Darley will after all be a writer. As these metamorphoses take place, the
text's concerns also undergo transformation: Epistemological explorations
of shifting perception and relative truth give way to the ontological inter¬
play of realities that dominates Durrell's later fiction. (Zahlan, "Crossing"
92-93)
Zahlan characterizes this transition into the postmodern in light of other transitions,
joining the two elements in a wide continuum of infinitesimal difference, placing Clea
as what McHale calls an amphibious text straddling the genres (McHale, Constructing
164).
In this sense, Joan Pinkney, too, calls Durrell a "'border' intellectual and artist"
positioned "on the edges of systems the better to capture the useful processes of those
systems" (Pinkney 250). Like Zahlan's characterization of Clea as marked by perpet¬
ual change, Pinkney recognizes in Durrell's work elements from disparate traditions.
Of Durrell's border-straddling, Pinkney writes that he "drew from the ancients, lived
among the moderns and wrote with the awareness of the postmodern" (250). This
sense of straddling the generic markers of modernism and postmodernism affords
him not just a dual identity— marked by both postmodernist de-authenticated, hol¬
low imagery and modernist mimetic difficulty (250)—but also access to styles from as
temporally "far" afield as classicism. Ultimately, she suggests Durrell's placement as
"an uncomfortable modernist, with the postmodern mantle flirting above his shoul¬
ders" (2 5 2).27
Stefan Herbrechter also refuses to place Durrell with any certainty under either
umbrella. Perhaps not incorrectly, Herbrechter writes that "Durrell's texts seem not
to be able to live up to the expectations they create," identifying the Quintet with "a
26Zahlan quotes a letter Durrell sent to Ian MacNiven: "the human personality is far from discrete
Nor does reality itselfhave outlines, borders, because it is provisional and not fixed and demarcated"
(MacNiven, "Quincunx" 237). In his speech "From the Elephant's Back," Durrell acknowledges that
this idea comes from D. H. Lawrence's letters ("Elephant" 4).
27James Gifford writes that "his oeuvre exists 'in-between' a variety of schools and movements"
ultimately suggesting that Durrell be numbered among the borderline modernists: "as a modernist,
his texts consistently anticipate effects and sensibilities associated with the postmodern, as might be
expected ofwritings between 193 1 and 1990" (Gifford, "Introduction" 1).
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context that desires itself to be 'postmodern'" (Herbrechter, "Canon" 325). He recon¬
siders the system of question marks thrown into relief by Durrell's works—"Where
to find a place for Lawrence Durrell's work today? [...] Is the Quintet a modernist or
a postmodernist work, or neither?" (326, 327)—before acknowledging the problems
inherent in attempting to answer those questions:
just as there are various and culturally determined meanings of mod¬
ernism, any concept of postmodernism as coming somehow "after" mod¬
ernism, or even modernity, will have to embrace not only the plurality
postmodernism has come to designate, but also the plurality of this plu¬
rality, and will thus have to speak of postmodernisms. (327)
In this sense, Herbrechter's analysis comes farther than most considerations of Dur¬
rell's writing and "postmodernism." In fact, his most definitive statement on the place
he reserves for Durrell's writing actually serves to strengthen the instability of Durrell's
oeuvre among the mutually exclusive notions of modernism and postmodernism:
His work, in its evolution and its range seems to be the very instance of
an un-positionable text, and thus "reputation" in this context can only
mean the un-settling of the kind of reputation writing usually achieves:
the confinement to an epoch, for example, the "modernist," or the "post¬
modernist," both with their ongoing process of "positioning," and of set¬
ting themselves against each other. (326—327)
Herbrechter's refusal to provide a simple position for Durrell's oeuvre evidences many
of the same problems Pinkney describes; too, such a refusal rejects the condition of
limiting a reading or understanding of Durrell's style in light of larger structures and
flows.
Receptive Borders
Ihab Hassan describes postmodernism in light of just such a flow, highlighting the
difficulties inherent in the term—it sounds "awkward, uncouth"; it "evokes what it
wishes to surpass or suppress"; it (wrongfully) "denotes temporal linearity and con¬
notes belatedness"; it "suffers from a certain semantic instability" (Hassan, "Toward"
87)—and in the concept: like any period, it belies an inevitable openness to change;
there is no "Chinese Wall" separating it from modernism; it works "in terms both of
continuity and discontinuity" (88). Nevertheless, he presents a schematic list com¬
paring elements of modernism with those of postmodernism to provide an under¬
standing of a contrast between the two genres (91—92). Modernism is, for example,
informed by Purpose, Design, and Hierarchy, whereas postmodernism relies on Play,
Chance, and Anarchy. Hassan's list contains thirty-three elements for each of the two
columns, re-invoking the problem of classification in such a system: where to put the
work or works that are marked by Purpose, Design, Form, Narrative, God the Father,
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and Metaphysics (all modernist elements) as equally as they are marked by elements of
Participation, Deconstruction, Metonymy, Signifier, Indeterminacy, and Immanence
(all postmodernist elements)?
Durrell's opus presents such a work. He laid out the intricate design of his opus in
1937, working on it for nearly fifty years after that, imbuing each work with a varia¬
tion of a quest motif. The closed form of the novels he shaped pseudo-independently
from one another, but the opus itself depends upon the structure of the whole shape,
as well. And Durrell's metaphysics is detailed in the novels themselves, from Darley's
construction of a kingdom of the imagination, through Charlock's reliance on Speng-
lerian physiognomic relations, to the Quintet's, centripetal characterization, and in all
of the novels' reliance on a greater Spirit of Place.
Contrastingly, the texts rely on a sense of deconstruction, in which the worlds they
describe are often undermined by revelation ofpast untruths.28 This tendency leads to
an interplay of indeterminacies that can be recognized in the unstably nested authoring
ofMonsieur, the nebulous fictionality ofmany characters, and the generous interleav¬
ing ofhistory with fiction; in TheAlexandria Quartet, too, the joint authorship of later
books and the gaps between the volumes—and, especially, the open-ended nature of
the final volume, whose "Notes (by Pursewarden)" deny any previous apparent resolu¬
tion of the text—are further examples of these indeterminacies. At the same time, we
can recognize Hassan's immanences in instances like the invention and intervention
of the Quintet's "Reality Prime" whose effects, a manifestation of Blanford's autho¬
rial immanence, blow the pages of his destroyed notebooks back to Avignon (Quintet
1178, 1319) and free I'histoire, the story, from the finality of the back cover of le livre.
Where to place the texts? Hassan's lists illustrate the very problem of depending
too greatly on the reducibility ofstatic concepts. While it would be tempting to follow
William James' advice regarding the usefulness of distinction—"If no practical differ¬
ence whatever can be traced, then the alternatives mean practically the same thing,
and all dispute is idle" (James, "Pragmatism" 18)—and end the debates over Durrell's
placement, I contend that the very difficulty in placing his oeuvre within the generic
28While Stefan Herbrechter marks the difference between Durrell's application of deconstructive
elements and a true Derridean deconstruction—in Herbrechter's recognition of monistic elements
throughout the Quintet, in the privileging of subjectivity—arguing that Durrell's texts do not go far
enough (Herbrechter, "Encounter" 26—27), the linguistic worlds of Durrell's opus always, eventually,
undermine themselves. Nevertheless, such commentary ultimately speaks on behalf of the specific
worlds of those texts (rather than the problems inherent in the methods and systems of language),
suggesting again the distinction between Durrell's opus and a postmodernist literature.
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borders evinces a particular resistance to classification in the opus.19 Durrell's opus
lauds "a great synthesis" bringing together many different modes of thinking, "mak¬
ing them interpenetrate, interfertilise," describing how "two metaphysics, Eastern and
Western, are moving steadily together" ("Elephant" 6, 7). Durrell plans his opus to
represent this convergence, to show "complementaries and not opposites," to "to cel¬
ebrate this marriage" of unlike forces (7). It is the "poetic equation" of the European-
and Tibetan-type novels ("Overture" 19).
To consider Durrell's opus as it fits among the dualities of modernism and post¬
modernism, East and West, subject and object, displaces the mechanisms of change
at work within those novels. As William James writes on change: "The stages into
which you analyze a change are states, the change itself goes on between them. It lies
along their intervals, inhabits what your definition fails to gather up, and thus eludes
conceptual explanation altogether" Qames, Pluralistic 23 6). To deny Durrell's opus
these intervals denies also the progression in the novels—the sense of "youth, matu¬
rity, and old age" (Durrell-Miller 278—279), the "continuity which hints at an inner
progression from the Black Book onwards" ("Elephant" 7), describing also "a kind of
travelogue of my life" ("Overture" 18). Durrell's opus resists generic classifications
of modernism and postmodernism for its "polluting" nature as a "transitional being,"
"'betwixt and between' all the recognized fixed points in space-time of structural clas¬
sification" (Turner, "Betwixt" 97).30
In 1985, Durrell said in an interview that he hoped to "leave behind something
as consistent as what the French call an oeuvre" (Durrell qtd. in Christy 227). James
Gifford remarks on this very consistency when he writes that "the intertextual relation¬
ships among the texts overlap in a seemingly endless array" (Gifford, "Introduction"
1). Considering this confession alongside his early designs laid out for the work, I can
only argue that it is most correct to consider his opus at large as a single work. While
we might recognize postmodernist elements in the Quintet (or the Revolt, the Quar¬
tet, and even The Black Book), it would be foolish to overlook the privileging search
29That the many varying critiques of the modernist or postmodernist elements of the novels seem
in part motivated by perceived wrongness in previous readings—see, for example, even just the title of
Julius Rowan Raper's "Durrell's Justine and Fowles's The Collector as Late Modernist Novels: Why the
Postmodern?"—bespeaks the difficulty Durrell writes of in knowing "what to call the texts" (qtd. in
Collier 91). The particular resistance to classification in the opus makes the topic worthy of consider¬
ation but hostile to agreement.
3°As such, it presents not only a wealth of characteristics relating to both modernist and postmod¬
ernist literature but also characteristics belonging to neither: indeed, as Gifford affords Durrell the
unsettling position of one "in-between" (Gifford, "Introduction" 1), Pinkney recognizes classical el¬
ements (Pinkney 250), Carol Peirce finds "Elizabethan language" (Peirce, "A Lass UnparallePd" 174)
(Durrell admits "to having 'Elizabethanized'" (Durrell, "Persuading the World" 74), and Time calls
him a "Neo-Elizabethan" ("Carnal Jigsaw" 96)), and Durrell declares himself "the first of the new
Romantics" (qtd. in Lyons and Antrim in).
III. Liminality - Betwixt and Between?
for culture in the Quintet, the optimism in the conclusion of the Revolt, the ordering
structures in the Quartet, or the symbolist form of The Black Book. Durrell's desire
for the opus to challenge established literary traditions signals his urge to break with
those modes of modernism Raper finds effaced in Balthazar. Though he effects the
separation necessary in every rite ofpassage, his opus lacks the aggregation that would
signal its end. And yet to say his texts merely "anticipate effects and sensibilities as¬
sociated with the postmodern" (Gifford i) overlooks the rich potential of Durrell's
situation "in-between." In this sense, the opus is an "amphibious" text inhabiting the
transition between modernism and postmodernism, at once at ease with the modern
and the postmodern as it is at odds with each.
The opus displays these amphibious qualities following many understandings of
the words "modernism" and "postmodernism." The modernist devotions to time and
the psyche Durrell describes in his Key are both at home in his works; at the same time,
the writing eschews the "epistemological backwardness" Durrell laments in other work
of that age ("Overture" 18): witness the commitment to Einstein and to Spengler in
the very form of the Quartet and the Revolt and the fascination with sanity and the
Unsconscious in all four novels, along with the denial of knowledge and truth ("I
thought I understood. But beginning this act with paper I can only say for certain
that I am not responsible" (Black Book 243); truth is "what most contradicts oneself
in time" (Quartet 216)). Likewise, Hassan's list allows for both postmodernist and
modernist readings of Durrell's works. Finally, McHale's distinctions of epistemolog¬
ical and ontological dominants in modernist and postmodernist works respectively
describe the amphibious qualities of Durrell's opus. Tarquin's lament that he knows
"nothing of the world which created me. Nothing." (Black Book 134); Pursewarden's
description and Darley's construction of a world in which truth is unstable; Charlock's
and Julian's robotic replication and corruption of Iolanthe from her knowledge and
memories; and Blanford and Sutcliffe's contradictory texts providing the only path
to truth and understanding of a world which defies understanding: the dominant in
each of these texts is at once ontological and epistemological—the epistemological
dominant of The Black Book ("I know nothing") is ontological ("of the world which
created me"), just as the ontological dominant of the Quintet ("This kind of real¬
ity") is epistemological ("had no Therefore in it" (Quintet 1228)). These are not the
question marks Durrell has built into his "detective stories,"31 but in considering the
3'Claiming the very term for him, Earl G. Ingersoll nevertheless writes that Durrell had no concept
of postmodernism:
Durrell began writing as a variety ofmodernist, and it has been as a modernist that he
has continued to be (mis)read. It might even be argued that he has (mis)read himself as a
latter-day modernist because he was never a part of any artistic or academic/critical com¬
munity in which he might have participated in the discourse of postmodernism. Durrell
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dimension of periodicity we can recognize the mechanisms constructed only partially
consciously: Durrell's separation from the modernist tradition suggests a trajectory in
some ways verging toward a postmodernist aggregation, but in many crucial ways the
opus never successfully negotiates the postliminal rites, van Gennep's "ceremonies of
incorporation into the new world" (van Gennep 21), ultimately residing at full in a
liminal stage.
wrote as a postmodernist without any benefit probably of ever having encountered the
term! (Ingersoll, "Introduction" 14)
Conclusion
Practically it [the absolutist view of the world] is less beautiful; for [...] in representing the
deepest reality ofthe world as static and without a history, it loosens the world's hold upon our
sympathies and leaves the soul of it foreign. Nevertheless it does give peace, and that kind of
rationality is so paramountly demanded by men that to the endoftime there will be absolutists,
men who choose beliefin a static eternal, rather than admit that thefinite world ofchange and
striving, even with a God as one ofthe strivers, is itselfeternal. (Pluralistic Universe 114)
Until Nessim calls to Narouz, telling him that it is time to return home, the reader
of the Quartet cannot help feeling like a witness to a volatile scene; until the men
in their boats end their intrusion between the worlds of the fish and the birds, until
they finish their journey, their safety is threatened on both sides. While the scene in
Mountolive does resolve on the brothers' return to the shore, I have shown that other
liminal moments in Durrell's opus refuse to resolve in a similar manner. In fact, this
refusal to resolve is crucial to the project of—and thus any reading of—the opus.
Durrell emphasizes the liminal and the components of transitions in order to high¬
light the potential navigability of the space between two positions, as the project of
the opus is ultimately one of communication and compromise: "It would be nice to
leave something that represented the prevailing problem which is 'Which side is right
or is there a compromise by which we can join them and make the one world viable?'"
(Durrell qtd. in Christy 227). This one and viable world is not one that can be found
in the opus; instead, the opus marks only the transition toward such a viability, leav¬
ing the rest up to imagination. As the "joiner is the reader" (Durrell, "Persuading the
World" 71), Durrell offers no more than the rudiments of transition, thus inciting the
transition which cannot happen as a whole in the works themselves.
In each of the dimensions under consideration, we can find evidence for the in¬
built mechanisms of change: Durrell presents the self not in the narrow terms of
self/other or subject/object but in terms of selves and subjects, mediating the distance
between two absolute states by placing both in a continuum; furthermore, the pro¬
cess of construction of an artistic subject, an "I" who says "ego," never finalizes into
death and objectification, and Durrell instead enlarges that construction and employs
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a pluralized "I." At this, we can recognize the propensity for the doubling of author-
narrators: Lawrence Lucifer and "Death" Gregory, Darley and Pursewarden (and Ar-
nauti and Balthazar), Blanford and Sutcliffe (and Bruce). The Revolt's Charlock, too,
is doubled in his mental illness in the beginning ofNunquam, as is Iolanthe doubled
in her robotic form. This multiplying opens the field of perspective so that every pro¬
nouncement is not the predicating division of subject and object Benveniste describes
it to be (Benveniste, "Relationships" 197). Rather, the speaker in Durrell's situation of
pluralized subjectivity is at once subject and object and is always in effect transitioning
among other subjects, always in motion, and always as much other as self.
Moreover, fiction and reality in his opus intermingle and interfertilise one another
in a cohabitation of imagination which orders and reorders the world. In the end,
Durrell emphasizes this ordering and reording over any final product: the narrating
becomes the product of itself. Darley's reconstruction of a histoire that never was,
Charlock's construction of a recit to chronicle his techne, Lawrence Lucifer's attempts
to explain something he never understood, and Blanford's shuffling and reshuffling
of his inklings and falling leaves to the point where order can no longer be perceived:
these works are works about their own creations. The details of the Regina Hotel or
Alexandria or London or Avignon are merely distractions from the main plots, which
are always mediations of the space between fiction and reality.
Too, Durrell treats the geopolitical concepts of East and West as shades of the
same Mediterranean hue, while he reverses the roles of place and space both as ex-
tensio and spatium. Though he publicizes his works' dependence upon place, the
space between places is as influential—if not far more. Durrell's novels and island
books—"residence" writing, rather than travel writing-—detail the variations found in
the different Mediterraneans; thus, elements of the Orient and the Occident, osten¬
sibly polar and the subjects of treatment, become mere objects of their greater shared
and common point of reference. Durrell's Mediterranean, perhaps one of the most
defining aspects of the entirety of his oeuvre, defines also the elements of the world
which space it in. Similarly, the Mediterranean works to define the spirit of that
world's inhabitants, those who regularly cross the sea and live on its shores.
Additionally, the valorization and fascination of the past coupled with a succumb¬
ing to worry about the future make way for the immediacy of the unpredictable and
immediate present. Though Lawrence Lucifer, Darley, Charlock, and Blanford each
enter their respective artistic projects through admitted fascinations with history and
memory, these explorations of the past capitulate to the relentless and increasingly
influential pull of the present moment, which drives them all to act. Durrell's opus
privileges this middle stage of the transition from the past to future, thus emphasizing
the agency and potency of the artistic creation. Nevertheless, it is only by forfeiting
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an impossible fidelity to the traditions of the past that artists in the opus can create
anything.
Finally, as Durrell's artists must overcome the past in order to effect their creations,
Durrell's opus shows a break with the traditions of modernism, suggesting a new un¬
derstanding of representing the world; nevertheless, the works elude the mantle of
"postmodernism." When reading the opus, it is crucial to consider the works in their
proper context, caught up in a current perpetually shifting. The works reside some¬
where in between these two giants of twentieth-century genre-studies, exhibiting traits
of both styles: they illustrate postmodernist anxieties with modernist technique while
they address modernist ones with a postmodern understanding. To debate the place¬
ment of individual texts not only overlooks the planned consistency of the "oeuvre"
(Durrell qtd. in Christy 227), it also disregards the inevitable, transitional change in
favor of a consideration of static states (James, Pluralistic 236).
Just as, in Mountolive, the intrusion of fishermen enlarges the otherwise infinitely thin
surface of the lake to highlight the violence between the aerial and the aquatic, so too
does Durrell's opus magnify transitions and the liminal in general, bringing focus to
the usually-effaced violence that links and separates any two states. Furthermore, the
opus presents itself as an incomplete transition, moving from one state to another,
but stopping mid-stream in order to highlight the delta of that transition. This privi¬
leging of the liminal is no accident; rather, Durrell purposefully colonizes this fertilely
unstable betwixt, weaving change and motion into the fabric of the novels.
Durrell compares the limited use of separating these states from the intervals of
change to the futility of considering a film via its individual frames: "To lecture about
reality is to stop it—as one might stop a film—and lecture about the still image of
reality instead: the still picture upon the screen" {Key 3). Nevertheless, as the film critic
will consider the composition of a crucial scene frame by frame, and the metaphysicist
(and Durrell) will lecture on reality, so too must one consider these individual points,
making sure to keep in mind the context of their intervals, the change that goes on
between them. In failing to do so, one runs the risk of totalization.1
In reading Durrell's opus, we must always remember it to be a symbol of transi¬
tion. By the anagnorisis, we can recognize "the flying multiplicity of the real" {Quin¬
tet 1260), a multiplicity comprised of enantiodromic "shifty strangeness" (1093) in
which everything begins to "turn into each other, to melt into each other's inner
1 See Charles Sligh's review of Herbrechter's Lawrence Durrell, Postmodernism and the Ethics ofAlterity
(Sligh 187).
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lifespace [...everything] comes closer and closer together, moving towards the one"
(1265). Such a construction is composed at "the edge of the Provisional, [...] the very
precipice!," thereby, in the end, allowing for that shifty strangeness that can be found
in every beginning:
New sorts ofagency were beginning to make their appearance in the town
[...]. The faintest shadow ofa new atmosphere had begun to flower among
the ruins of the epoch. [...] And now once more changes were in the air,
the structure of things was shifting, disintegrating. (1092—1093)
This structure is one framed in the agon and built upon in the pathos and sparagmos.
The vocabulary of Lawrence Lucifer's Black Book (Black Book 243)—the Word / eht
drow—unwinds itself in the end of the opus to open the whole construction outward
once more to a flying multiplicity.
Indefatigable agency—in corpses, in creations, in landscapes, in the very presenta¬
tion of time—is the mistress of change in Durrell's opus, an agency found even in the
epochal ruins of World War II: the war (though begun after The Black Book) which
raises the questions considered in Durrell's opus ("how real is reality, and if so why
so? Has poetry, then, no right to exist?" (Quintet 1266)), the war which is to Dur-
rell's opus as World War I is to Eliot's Waste Land. The new sense of form contained
in the opus certainly presents a provocation renouncing any potential semblance of
epistemological backwardness. Nevertheless, it introduces ontological conundrums
in an epistemological manner: "real or imaginary, I cannot tell" (Black Book 120), "I
know nothing of the world which created me. Nothing" (134). This world is the
same five-fold world Durrell writes of in the Key, the whole of which can be inhab¬
ited only in the imagination {Key 5), an empirical construction joining opposites and
multiplying plurality (James, Pluralistic 7—8). Durrell's perpetually shifting universe is
one comprised of liminality, colonizing the uneasy third and continually upsetting the
two worlds between which it thrusts itself to enlarge and celebrate a sense of surface
tension, the violence and uncertainty inherent in every transition.
Appendix A
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James M. Clawson, "The Length and Greatness of its History: The
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Originally published in A Cafe in Space: TheAnais Nin LiteraryJournal, Vol. 3 (2005),
1 57—165. Reproduced on the following pages with permission from the publisher.
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James M. Clawson
The Length and Greatness of its History
The Mediterranean in Dnrrell's novels
n the second book of The Alexandria Quartet, Darley's island
II haven is invaded by the Alexandrian doctor Balthazar. The
| intrusion surprises Darley, who finds it easier to believe his
I bearded friend to be a member of the Greek pantheon until
Balthazar exclaims, "No—I am real!" Darley's disbelief, he concludes,
lies in the disproportionate importance of the Mediterranean as a buffer
zone between Europe and Africa with regard to its actual size. "The
Mediterranean is an absurdly small sea," he writes: "the length and
greatness of its history makes us dream it larger than it is" (Quartet
213). The Greeks knew of its significance as a thoroughfare of cultures,
calling the Mediterranean the "Sea in the Middle of the Earth." In
Arabic, too, al-Bahar al-Abiyad al-Mutawasit makes plain the Mediter¬
ranean's centrality in its appellation—"Middle White Sea."
And yet, though the Mediterranean is small compared to the
Atlantic or Pacific, the distance is great when one actually considers
crossing it. Ovid in Metamorphoses and Aeschylus in Prometheus
Bound tell of another for whom the journey to the other side of the
Mediterranean is even more exacting. Mortal daughter of the river god
Inachus, lo is cursed to suffer the lust of Zeus, by whom she is turned
into a cow. Io is lost to all who knew her, for she can no longer
communicate in the manners she once did: "She strove to speak, she
spoke not, but she low'd" (Ovid 31; bk. 1, sc. 14). Though her make¬
over is Zeus's vain attempt to shield her from the wrath of Hera, the
goddess suspects foul play and entrusts heifer lo into the care of the
ever-watchful Argus. Hermes slays the sentinel, and Io flees, only to be
pursued by the madding sting of a gadfly sent by Hera:
Impatient to revenge her injur'd Bed,
She [Hera] wreaks her anger on her Rival's Head;
With Furies frights her from her Native Home;
And drives her gadding, round the world to roam. (Ovid 35; 1.17)
Thus "the girl with horns" in Prometheus Bound, lo meets the
Titan who warns her that her travels are not over, foreseeing that she
must cross into Egypt before being allowed to rest. Hopeless, she
considers throwing herself from a cliff, but Prometheus dissuades her;
once in Egypt, he tells her, Zeus will restore her human form, and she
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will bear a great son (Aeschylus lines 561-886). Moreover, but this he
does not tell her, there she will be worshipped as Io-Isis, goddess of
fertility. This traveling from Greece across the Mediterranean into
Egypt is a fruitful journey. Io is not merely driven to travel by Hera's
torture; she must travel, wandering to the other side of the Mediter¬
ranean to fulfill a creative purpose. The gadfly is nothing more than her
travel agent. Durrell echoes this pattern of trans-Mediterranean travel in
his writing, but in his world it is not the river-maiden but the author
who must travel—again, across the Mediterranean to Egypt—-to
actualize the birth of a fully gestated creation: the novel. This essay will
trace Io's Mediterranean footsteps, considering that sea as a symbol of
fertility in Durrell's three final novels—The Alexandria Quartet, The
Revolt of Aphrodite, and The Avignon Quintet—in light of Durrell's
own spirit of place and an understanding of rites of passage.
I. The Durrellian Myth
Assuming Io's role, novelists Darley and Blanford cross the
Mediterranean in parallel scenes in the Quartet and the Quintet
respectively. When they arrive in Egypt, they face violent physical
transformations culminating in newfound literary success. The passage
for both is an evocative one with some differences, some parallels-—
and many perils. Both cross during the war, daringly sailing when it
might not be wise to do so: Darley leads into the journey by discussing
the war advancing like bad weather, nebulous storm clouds growing
firmer and tighter before compacting and manifesting into the
ostensible innocence of a single periscope in the harbor of his island
(1Quartet 665-666); Blanford and the Prince coolly contemplate the pity
of what would be inevitable material loss of their extravagant
provisions—were a torpedo to strike their ship (Quintet 619). The war
drives them gadding, round the world to roam. But unlike lo they also
relax during their journeys, whether in nighttime—which Darley calls
"superlatively warm and fine" (Quartet 666)—or in daytime—which
Blanford characterizes as cloudless "with not one Homeric curl"
(jQuintet 618). Moreover, both journeys are beautiful, Darley's likened
to riding a comet across the night sky (Quartet 667), and Blanford's to
immortality (Quintet 618).
Once they land in Egypt, they face respective transformations of
those around them. In the Quartet, Nessim loses an eye, Balthazar his
teeth, Clea her hand, and Darley enjoys a newfound physical polish:
"But Darley, how you've changed!" Clea exclaims when they meet
again: "You don't stoop any more. And your spectacles..." (Quartet
712). The transformations ofDarley's compatriots—particularly that of
Clea—awaken his procreative abilities and allow him finally to give
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birth to a work of art, the book whose labor pains manifest as the
Quartet. In her letter to Darley at the end of the tetralogy, Clea predicts
that Darley's artistic fulfillment is imminent: "I have a feeling that you
too perhaps have stepped across the threshold of the kingdom of
imagination, to take possession of it once and for all." When Darley
does cross that threshold, he likens himself to "some timid girl, scared
of the birth of her first child." But, having traveled and transformed,
Darley creates his art with the blessing of the universe (Quartet 877).
In the Quintet, Blanford and Sam are the victims, respectively
losing mobility and life to a freak accident in the desert (Quintet 659).
While Darley's favorable transformation into the spectacle-less and
tall-standing happens before his arrival in Egypt (though it is not
acknowledged until he arrives there), Blanford's bringing back into life
begins later—after he is blown up, transformed into an unfamiliar form,
and suffering depression—when he is seen by Theoroda, who restores
him in the same manner Zeus restores Io: "with a gentle touch"
(Aeschylus 848). His transformation is not complete until he returns to
Europe, crossing the Mediterranean back to Provence, becoming a
patient of Constance and eventually consummating their mutual love
after a physically demanding rescue (which shares many circumstances
with Darley's rescue of Clea) (Quintet 1320-1322). This final act
corresponds with the strangely coincidental collecting of Blanford's
hitherto released and wind-strewn notes, allowing him to focus on "his
forthcoming book whose presence had begun to loom up strangely over
his future life" (Quintet 1318). Just as Darley comes into his kingdom
of imagination, a "whole new world opens before" Blanford, and he
begins to see the possibility of becoming a successful novelist at last
{Quintet 623).
Unlike Darley and Blanford, Io's direct descendant Iolanthe in The
Revolt ofAphrodite enjoys little of this relief. The very pronunciation
of her name, "I-O-lanthe" {Tunc 29), with the accent on the second
syllable and sometimes shortened merely to Io, stresses the already-
obvious connection of the actress with the river maiden. More than
name, Iolanthe shares with her mythical counterpart a transition into
Egypt that lends her greatness, as it is in Egypt that her films are made,
catapulting her into screen Godhead {Tunc 195). But once her first life
is lived, Iolanthe's second incarnation, Robo-Iolanthe, loses any access
to the myth's powers of positive transformation. Deified in life and
reified in death, Iolanthe/Io evades the grasp of all-powerful would-be
suitor Julian/Zeus before falling victim to her mortality and subsequent
transformation into a robot/cow. Denied routine intercourse—sexual/
verbal—she finds instead that she electrocutes/moos. Madness ensues
when she realizes she is no longer human {Nunquam 274). She flees the
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control of Henniker/Argus, hides from panoptic gaze, and wanders
(Nunquam 269)—but crucially in the case of Durrell's Iolanthe, she
finds neither Egypt nor the Mediterranean. Aeschylus's catalogue of
placenames—Hybristes, Caucasus, Themiscyra, Salmy-dessus, Bos¬
porus, etc. (707-34)—-is replaced by Durrell's London, Ipswitch,
Harrow, Pinewood, and Paris (Nunquam 271-72). High in the
Whispering Gallery beneath the giant images of St. Paul—or, high on
Mt. Caucasus in conversation with the giant Prometheus—she faces her
pursuers Felix and Julian—or, the gadfly (Nunquam 280-81). Weighing
her options, Iolanthe commits suicide by jumping over the balustrade.
There is no Prometheus to cause her to reconsider, and St. Paul is just a
mural on the wall. Iolanthe remains a "cow," and for Julian and Felix
there arc no sons—neither in Adam, the male robot, nor in Mark.
Durrell's removal of the Mediterranean setting from the myth replaces
a sense of hope with one of cynical despair.
II. The Spirit ofPlace
Gregory Dickson recognizes the importance of location in The
Revolt ofAphrodite, writing that its characters are "products of place":
"This concept is neither new nor surprising to anyone who has read
(any one) of Durrell's novels" (Dickson 528). He is referring, of
course, to DurrelPs notion of the spirit of place, set down in the essay
"Landscape and Character" as the "invisible constant in a place"
("Landscape and Character" 157): though populations and nations
change, the spirit of place is fixed resolutely within the landscape of a
region (156). In introducing the concept of spirit of place, Durrell
makes the essence of Spanish-ness or Italian-ness or Greek-ness—
heretofore accessible only to those who knew and studied the
respective language and culture—available to anyone willing to
meditate:
Ten minutes of...quiet identification will give you the notion of
the Greek landscape which you could not get in twenty years of
studying ancient Greek texts. ("Landscape and Culture" 158)
Of course, Durrell concedes that "knowledge of language is a
help" (156), but he by no means limits the accessibility of the spirit of
place to linguists or book scholars.
Dickson continues, writing that location in The Revolt is polar:
from mechanical, rational England and Europe in the West to the
holistic, simplistic Turkey and Asia in the East. Greece and Switzerland
are somewhere in the middle (Dickson 528-29). In The Avignon
Quintet, Durrell expands this geographical range farther, drawing in
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India in his description of Egyptian Baroque architecture as "a sort of a
combination of Taj Mahal and Eiffel Tower" (Quintet 621), situating
the Levantine Alexandria as a midpoint between the cultures found in
Europe and Asia. That same year, he calls Greece "half way home"
("From the Elephant's Back" 5) to India from Europe, reinforcing his
notion of the Mediterranean as "the central point, the pivot" (Big
Supposer 38). For this reason, Stefan Herbrechter writes that the
"mythologizing of Greece" specifically in Durrell's writing serves "to
overcome difference and promote the final merging and interchanging
of cultural identities" (255). Not only Greece, but the Mediterranean-at-
large fills this role of cultural interface, by providing a medium through
which physical travel is made possible. In addition, the Durrellian
Mediterranean traveler experiences the Mediterranean at some level
before beginning the journey because it too is mythologized and
accessible as an idea. Physically and mentally, the Mediterranean is
interface and access to an experience of difference; however, the extent
of this experience is questionable.
Roger Porter traces the etymology of experience back to the Indo-
European root per, from which we derive our words for "test" and
"experiment," gathering along the way other meanings, such as "to
cross space" and "to reach a goal." He also pairs the outward motion
inherent in travel writing, one of new experiences and gained
knowledge, with a motion of returning back home, both actual and in
the figurative sense of regaining something lost or claiming an
unconscious desire ("Durrell and the Dilemmas of Travel Writing" 51).
Durrell writes that the first, outward motion for the travel writer has as
its aim the isolation of "the germ in the people which is expressed by
their landscape" ("Landscape and Character" 156). But that discovery
is less important than that which the traveler makes about him- or
herself in the second, inward motion of travel, all passage being
nothing more than "a sort ofmetaphorical journey—an outward symbol
of an inward march upon reality" (Dark Labyrinth 59). The journey
home is really a journey within, what Herbrechter calls "an antidote
against exile," or a re-figuring of the quest for the island, "the
disconnected land whole to itself' (Herbrechter 257, 260). In Porter's
sense, the experience of crossing over to reach the goal of the
disconnected land, the process of travel there, is one of personal
growth. That the process can only be experienced as pure difference
apres coup, as Herbrechter writes (255-56), is not important; it is the
spirit of travel and the opportunity of change it affords that is vital. The
Mediterranean serves as a symbol of this change.
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III. The Rites ofPassage
This personal growth-through-travel is an expected part of
Kiinstlerroman, like The Alexandria Quartet and The Avignon Quintet.
Roberta Seret writes that in this form of the Bildungsroman the
budding artist must "voyage through several stages of development" to
arrive at "art which becomes the creator's homeland" (Seret 1), a quest
in Durrell's work which others have noted as one of ritual crossings of
water and requisite displacement from nation before being re-
assimilated into a newly healed realm (and as a newly healed citizen).
(See Unterecker 29-31.) Victor Turner characterizes this separation
from society primary to any journey as the first stage in the ritual
process ("Liminality" 94). We can recognize the artist's development
beginning with a separation from society in each of our texts. For lo,
her metamorphosis into a cow marks the beginning of her separation
from her community. Darley's separation begins upon leaving
Alexandria, sometime before he writes Justine, but his severance
becomes more pronounced when he receives Balthazar's corrected
manuscript in Balthazar. For Blanford, Livia's desertion marks the
beginning of his disconnection. Iolanthe's extreme celebrity robs her of
a personal life and begins her displacement, furthered by her physical
death. In each, the community in which the respective character had
belonged becomes inaccessible.
The second stage of passage is the liminal period in which "the
characteristics of the ritual subject (the "passenger") are ambiguous; he
passes through a cultural realm that has few or none of the attributes of
the past or coming state" (Turner "Liminality" 94). In this phase, the
Mediterranean delineates a "neutral ground" (van Gennep 17) between
known West and unknown East. For the length of the journey, the
"passengers" find themselves in an "interstructural situation" of
neither-nor, or both-and, "at once no longer classified and not yet
classified" (Turner "Betwixt and Between" 93, 97). Arnold van Gennep
writes of neutral ground: "Whoever passes from one to the other finds
himself physically and magico-religiously in a special situation for a
certain length of time: he wavers between two worlds" (van Gennep
18). The magico-religious-ness of transition is manifest in Io's aimless
wanderings in the way they lead her into stranger and stranger lands,
habited by Gorgons, gryphons, and worse (Aeschylus 791-815); in the
Quartet in the good omen of the dolphin breaking twice at the ship's
bow (Quartet 666); and in the Quintet in Blanford's experience of the
sublime "immortality" of a poet (Quintet 618). Even in The Revolt,
when Sacrapant takes Charlock across the Bosporus to the Asian side
of Istanbul, he is struck dumb in the pre-linguistic limitlessness of the
transition: "Sacrapant waved his arm at it and gave a small incoherent
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cry of pleasure—as if he had momentarily forgotten the text of the
caption which should go with such a picture" (Tunc 110). And young
Iolanthe's relocation to Egypt lends her a screen presence which causes
her to "swim up out of the screen"—if only metaphorically, and if only
from the perspective of Charlock (Tunc 195). Robo-Iolanthe's
journeys, however, are not so magico-religious. Lacking full liberty of
travel, her transition is stillborn: there are no two worlds between
which she can waver, and she fights against her state of separation,
sexually "re"-connecting with Britons only to kill them unwittingly
when sparks really do fly (Nunquam 273). For each character but
Iolanthe, this stage passes after crossing the Mediterranean.
The third stage of a rite of passage is one of one of "reaggregation
or reincorporation" in which
the passage is consummated. The ritual subject, individual or
corporate, is in a relatively stable state once more and, by virtue
of this, has rights and obligations vis-a-vis others of a clearly
defined and "structural" type. (Turner "Liminality" 94-95)
Christopher LaLonde calls the rite of passage a model in which
"order is transformed by transgression" (LaLonde 7). The systematic
separation of the first phase of passage introduces the second stage, in
which significance becomes ambiguous and "interstructural situations"
usurp normalcy. In all of this, writes LaLonde, "the destruction of
boundaries, followed by a reconstruction of a new order in light of
indeterminacy," introduces the third stage of passage (LaLonde 7). This
third stage signifies a successful transition and, in a Kiinstlerroman, an
artist's attainment of his art. In the third stage of her rite of passage,
Io's indeterminate and bizarre journey makes way for the birth of a son
and the founding of a great empire. For Darley and Blanford, the
passage is consummated by their arrivals at the realm of creativity, the
"kingdom of the imagination" which marks an end to artistic and
physical crippling and signifies respective reaggregation and
incorporation into new levels ofwholeness.
Iolanthe, however, remains in a stage of preliminal separation until
her mechanical fault when she hits the floor of the cathedral—either her
second death or her first truly successful one, when, we must assume,
she finally crosses over a different boundary. Removed from society,
she does not waver magico-religiously between two worlds; imposed
upon by an unexpected level of indeterminacy, she experiences no
relief from a reconstruction of a new order. Robo-Iolanthe's passage
stalls before it begins. We can be certain that Durrell, in quoting this
myth as much as he does and yet in taking Io out of the
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Mediterranean—and the Mediterranean out of Io—intends to show how
vital it is.
This "Sea in the Middle of Durrell's World" is more than canvas
backdrop. Just as Alexandria uses its inhabitants as flora and
precipitates among them various conflicts (Quartet 17), so too does the
Mediterranean provide an "invisible constant" to influence the peoples
around it. Durrell constructs this constant in all of his major novels; for
this reason, Durrell's Mediterranean has been likened to Poe's Virginia
and Faulkner's Yoknapatawpha County (Scholes 24; Dasenbrock 209).
Durrell's Mediterranean is a peopled place whose identity extends
beyond its littoral and literal boundaries, an influential umbrella
encompassing, imbibing, and exuding the mutual influences of the
unified space and individual spaces of the Ancient and the Modern, of
Northern Africa, the Levant, Greece, Italy, Southern France, and
beyond to the Pillars of Hercules. Durrell's characters experience the
Mediterranean not only because of its being mythologized in the same
manner as Greece but also because of its importance to all locations in
his work, because of its unique status as cultural crossroads, and
because of its cultural connotation and mythological meaning as a place
whose spirit Durrell constructs within their expectations, a space whose
mythical and historical significance makes it seem longer and greater
than it really is. Travel in this space between places, the pivot point of
cultural definition from self to other, is necessarily bi-directional:
inward at the same time that it is outward. The "magic" frontier (The
Greek Islands 14) of the Mediterranean in Durrell's family of novels is
one that can only be breached through working one's way "through the
ancient crust" ("Landscape and Character" 159), traveling in spirit into
the myth of the place. <$>
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